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Abstract 
The purpose of the dissertation is to further our knowledge of the process of normalization in the 
displaced person (DP) camps in the American zone of occupation in Germany after the Second World 
War.  The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) welfare workers 
brought with them their years of education and training in the United States, primarily as professional 
social workers, to their work in these camps.  They believed that their task was not only to feed and 
clothe the DPs, but to provide rehabilitation as well.  They continually emphasized the importance of 
reinstituting prewar social norms as the key element in rehabilitating the DPs.  However, once they 
entered the DP camps in Germany, they soon discovered that the DPs had very different 
understandings of what constituted “normal life.”  As a result, rehabilitation included not only 
reinstituting prewar social norms, but also introducing the DPs to new ones.  UNRRA focused their 
rehabilitation efforts on six aspects of DP care: housing, cleanliness, education, work, and respect for 
civil and criminal law.   
While the DP camps were administered by UNRRA, they existed next to German communities 
who governed by Military Government and in the midst of their own reconstruction efforts.  Given 
the immense wartime destruction, widespread shortages and the arrival of large numbers of German 
refugees, resources for all groups were at a premium.  As a result, there were numerous opportunities 
for creative and broad-minded people to work at solving problems in unconventional ways.  While 
UNRRA planning had provided some direction for its welfare workers, staff working in field came to 
play an important role in defining UNRRA’s policies.  At the same time, their competing goals of 
rehabilitation and repatriation, as well as their at-times difficult relationship with the military, worked 
to constrain their efforts.  Nevertheless, when UNRRA’s tenure as administrator of the DP camps 
ended in the summer of 1947, they left behind a legacy which highlighted the importance of the 
successful integration of refugees into their societies, and which made rehabilitation as central as 
relief in all future humanitarian responses. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
The United Nations Administration is concerned not only with Relief—that is with making 
provision for material needs—but also with Rehabilitation—that is with the amelioration of 
psychological and social suffering and dislocation… we each possess a practical day-to-day 
system by which we judge or interpret the conduct of others and make assumptions as to the 
probable motives and feelings which lie behind their actions.  Each one of us, then, is 
something of a psychologist in the sense of possessing a very concrete view of human life.1   
 
One of the Second World War’s most important legacies was a refugee crisis for which the 
Allies were unprepared and which would take years to resolve.  This crisis was the result of “a violent 
fantasy of racial mastery,” involving the movements of millions of people in order to create the Third 
Reich as Hitler envisioned it.2  While Hitler did not succeed in the reorganization of the entire 
population of the continent, he did order the movement of millions of people, all in the name of his 
war of conquest.  In the postwar period, it fell to the Allies to deal with the all of those people who 
had been dislocated by the war, including refugees and displaced persons (DPs).  Initially, these two 
groups were differentiated according to their location: refugees were understood to be those people 
found within their prewar national borders, while DPs were those people discovered beyond the 
borders of their homeland.  Allied military leaders believed this would be a short-term problem, that 
they could care for and repatriate all of the DPs in the six months following the war’s end.  Key, the 
political leaders agreed, was the need for a systematic and controlled response if the DPs were to be 
successfully reintegrated into their home communities.  While the voluntary agencies in America and 
Europe would surely play an important role, only a new international organization, with a mandate 
covering both relief and rehabilitation, could provide the level of care that the DPs would require.  
                                                     
1
 Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, prepared for the Welfare Division of the European Regional 
Office of UNRRA by an Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group, dated June 1945, p. 14, in Canadian National 
Archives, Ottawa, R9369, Vol. 3, File 12 “UNRRA – Welfare Division: Report  – Displaced Persons; June 
1945.” 
2
 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 2.  
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Following months of discussions, the agreement to form the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration was signed by the representatives of forty-four countries on 9 November 1943.   
To care for Europe’s DPs, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) employed a staff of social workers with years of training who brought with them their own 
understandings of what the DPs would require in order to most easily reintegrate into their home 
countries.  This training placed a strong emphasis on the importance of social norms.  As sociologist 
Muzafer Sherif explains, social norms define how individuals fulfill their basic needs:                
[w]hen we observe people in search for food, shelter, or mates, we conclude that these 
activities run in certain prescribed channels.  People do eat, mate and enjoy the security of 
shelter; but how and under what circumstances they will eat, mate and  enjoy shelter are, to a 
great extent, regulated by customs, traditions, laws and social standards.  This is true for 
every individual, living in every society we know, primitive or highly developed.  If an 
individual does not come under this category to any important degree, he cannot be said to be 
a member of society.3 
 
UNRRA’s staff continually emphasized the importance of reinstituting social norms that had, 
theoretically, existed before the trauma of their wartime experiences.  However, the social norms they 
sought to reinstitute were based on their years of training and experience working in the United 
States.  When they entered the field in Germany, they soon learned that the (mainly eastern) European 
DPs had very different understandings of what was considered to be social norms. Despite their 
shared belief in the importance of normalizing life in the DP camps, the American social workers and 
the DPs had quite different understandings of how their rehabilitation should be accomplished and 
what “normal life” looked like.   
 In their study of the return of civilians to everyday life in the postwar period, Guillaume 
Piketty and Bruno Cabanes argue that the violence of the Second World War removed the barrier 
between battle and homefront and made it increasingly difficult for men and women alike to return to 
                                                     
3
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pre-war relations in the “intime,” the intimate sphere where people build deep relationships and their 
understanding of self.  The destruction of the home, as the space in which these intimate relationships 
develop, was an attack not only on the physical space, but also on the very identity of its inhabitants.  
This attack led to a sense of insecurity that was difficult to overcome in the postwar period.  At war’s 
end, the return to civilian life was a chance to rebuild these relationships, but this was a complicated 
process.  Each individual brought with them their memories, often idealized, of what life had been 
like before the war.  The combination of these idealized memories and each individual’s wartime 
experiences meant that the renewal of intimate relations was a slow process fraught with difficulties.  
At its heart, each individual had to redefine what it meant to return to “normal life.”  One of the 
fundamental goals of the postwar period was the normalization of relations between individuals.  
However, recreating these relationships did not mean merely reinstituting prewar social norms 
verbatim in the postwar period; wartime experiences forced the redefinition of these norms.  Cabanes 
and Piketty argue that much work has yet to be done in understanding this normalization of the 
intimate space in the postwar period.4         
 While this process of normalizing relations was one which all war-torn societies underwent in 
the postwar period, as soldiers and civilians alike returned home, the DPs struggled especially 
because their efforts to rebuild their lives began in Europe’s DP camps (referred to at the time as 
assembly centres), far removed from their homes.  This was an especially difficult place to reinstitute 
normal life because these camps were only meant to be temporary, they were focused on supplying 
the DPs with the necessities of food and medical care, and the DPs did not govern these camps 
themselves.  Nor were the DPs working to normalize their lives in a vacuum; the camps were peopled 
by numerous other actors who interacted with the DPs in many different ways.  These various actors 
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included the local Germans who lived outside of the DP camps; the occupying forces who were 
responsible for food and housing for the DPs, as well as inspecting and policing the camps; and, 
finally, the welfare workers from UNRRA and other non-governmental organizations who interacted 
with the DPs on a regular basis.  While the camps were initially set up and administered by the army, 
full responsibility for running the DP camps was passed on to UNRRA in the summer and fall of 
1945.  UNRRA staff came into contact with the DPs continuously as they worked to feed, clothe, and 
provide medical care to the DPs residing in their camps.  As a result, UNRRA played an important 
role in helping the DPs normalize their lives.  
The care of Europe’s DPs was just one, and at first only a small, aspect of UNRRA’s work.  
UNRRA was originally seen as a coordinating body for the postwar distribution of goods.  While 
some nations had stockpiled goods during the war years due to the fact that they had been cut off 
from their traditional markets, other nations had been ransacked, their economies destroyed, and their 
food stores eradicated.  UNRRA’s role was to connect the relief suppliers with those states which 
required postwar relief.  Its mandate also included helping to restore agricultural and industrial 
production.  As the British government made clear, “UNRRA might restore water supply systems 
damaged by bombing, but could not install a new sewage system in a town which never had a sewage 
system.” 5   In other words, UNRRA’s purpose was to help restore essential services, but not to 
introduce new ones.  As an organization, UNRRA had a global scope.  It operated in Europe, the 
Middle East and Asia, although it did not carry out the same mission everywhere.  In Asia, UNRRA 
focused its efforts on supplying much needed food, medical supplies and farming equipment to 
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China, although they also organized a public health program, employing 189 staff.6  In the Middle 
East, UNRRA took over the administration of refugee camps from the British and American armies in 
Egypy, Syria and Palestine.   
Within Europe, UNRRA carried out two tasks.  First, it supplied food, clothing, and other 
equipment to sixteen receiving countries, of which the largest share of this aid went to Greece, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and Poland.  These countries were also host to small 
liaison missions which advised on health and welfare as well.  UNRRA’s second task in Europe was 
the administration of the DP camps.  This was originally envisioned as a short-term task which 
involved caring for the DPs only until such a time as they could be repatriated.  This was in keeping 
with the wishes of the Soviet Union, who wanted to ensure that all of their nationals were returned to 
them, regardless of their individual wishes, and who made their own involvement contingent on this 
point.  Despite the short time-frame in which UNRRA was expected to operate, their staff spent much 
effort planning for not only the relief but also the rehabilitation of those people displaced by the war 
beyond the borders of their home country.  The Soviet Union took no part in the planning for postwar 
rehabilitation; they did not believe that it was necessary given the short time-frame between liberation 
and repatriation.  Therefore, while they were very involved in overall policymaking, Soviet officials 
played no part in discussions of welfare.  As a result, the welfare work in the DP camps was very 
much an Anglo-American effort.     
 This dissertation is an institutional history of UNRRA from the point of view of the welfare 
workers.  It is not a study of DP experiences in Germany.  Rather, it seeks to better understand the 
successes and failures of UNRRA’s program of rehabilitation through the welfare workers’ 
interactions with the DPs.  This study begins with the postwar planning, which began in 1943, and 
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continues until the summer of 1947, when UNRRA handed over responsibility for the DP camps to 
the International Refugee Organization (IRO).  In the intervening period, Germany was invaded and 
divided into four zones of occupation which were ruled by American, British, French and Soviet 
forces.  Following the initial period of military advance, Military Government was imposed in the 
American zone of occupation.         
 As this dissertation makes clear, the majority of displaced persons were repatriated in the 
spring and summer of 1945, leaving behind a group of so-called hard-core displaced persons in the 
DP camps in Germany when UNRRA assumed administrative control for them in the autumn of 
1945.  The hard-core DPs numbered approximately one million in the western zones of occupation in 
Germany.    They were comprised of nationals from across eastern Europe who all shared the same 
desire to avoid repatriation to their former homes.  In the spring of 1946, even as repatriation efforts 
had started anew, the DP camps witnessed a new influx of arrivals, the so-called ‘infiltrees.’  The 
infiltrees were those eastern European Jews who had survived the war either in hiding, fighting with 
the partisans, or in the Soviet Union, and who decided, upon returning to their homes in late 1945 and 
early 1946, that they could not remain there.  Anti-Semitism remained strong throughout much of 
eastern Europe in the postwar months.  The infiltrees traveled to Germany, and the American zone of 
occupation in particular, in hopes of resettlement abroad (especially to Palestine) – and so added to 
the number and complexity of the hard-core DP population with whom UNRRA was working and 
contributing to the “long-term” nature of the DP “problem.” 
 While UNRRA's mandate was to encourage repatriation first and foremost, the fact that the 
hard-core DPs were very resistant to any notion of repatriation meant that the reality was that the 
remaining DPs were going to be in the DP camps in Germany for a while, and this opened up the 
opportunity for UNRRA to turn its focus to a program of rehabilitation.  This dissertation focuses on 
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the American zone of occupation because this was the zone in which the program of rehabilitation 
was most fully implemented.  Similarly, it focuses on the UNRRA period of administrative 
responsibility for the DP camps because this was the time in which DP policy was set.  The end of the 
war and the first months of the Allied occupation of Germany was a time of flux.  Despite the effort 
that had gone into postwar planning, conditions on the ground were constantly changing and 
individuals were forced to respond to problems as they arose.  This meant that there was considerable 
opportunity for army officers and welfare workers alike to institute protocols other than those that had 
been previously outlined for them.  According to its agreement with the military, UNRRA was 
permitted to operate in the western zones of occupation in Germany, but only at the request of the 
military.  They remained under military command throughout their tenure.  However, this did not 
inhibit UNRRA workers from taking on the challenge of caring for the DPs.  Given the mass 
destruction, widespread shortages and increasingly large numbers of people on the move, those in 
positions of administrative authority did the best that they could with limited means.  Although some 
struggled with the long hours and primitive conditions, many more rose to the challenge of solving 
problems in these less than ideal circumstances.  Over the course of UNRRA’s tenure, as supply lines 
stabilized and the chain of command was instituted, more formalized operating procedures were 
introduced.   
UNRRA faced political pressures from many sides.  As William I. Hitchcock makes clear, 
“[s]ome American political figures questioned the wisdom of spending money on assisting people 
such as Poles, Ukrainians and Yugoslavs who seemed increasingly pro-Soviet and ideologically 
hostile to the West.”7  Many Americans also saw UNRRA as a Soviet-controlled organization 
pushing Soviet interests.  As relations between the two superpowers cooled and Cold War tensions 
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escalated, UNRRA faced increasing pressure to close down the DP camps.  The two possible 
solutions were repatriation, which would have to be achieved through the use of force, or 
resettlement.  The Soviet Union strongly opposed resettlement as the vast majority of the hard-core 
DPs were either citizens of Poland or from areas controlled by the Soviet Union, and in both cases 
their governments wished to have them returned.  As a signatory to the UNRRA agreement, they 
vetoed the possibility of altering UNRRA’s mandate.  Therefore, in 1946 the United Nations created 
the IRO as a successor agency of UNRRA, and one with a mandate which allowed both repatriation 
and resettlement abroad; the Soviet Union was not a member.  While the handover was first planned 
for 1 January 1947, the IRO took full control of the DP camps on 1 July 1947.  Shortly thereafter 
UNRRA ceased operations.  However, UNRRA had established rehabilitation as a legitimate goal for 
both this and future humanitarian crises.  
 This dissertation is divided into six chapters.  The first two chapters outline the planning for 
the postwar period that was conducted by both military and civilian planners.  Chapter one examines 
military plans for the postwar occupation of Germany.  The document that outlined the plans, 
Administrative Memorandum No. 39, was developed as a Standard Operating Procedure for military 
personnel.  This document outlined basic measures to be instituted in the care of civilians found 
beyond their borders, but these plans failed to take into account the large numbers and the long time 
frame that their care encompassed.  This chapter highlights the strained relationship that existed 
between UNRRA and the military from the start and the way in which the military attempted to keep 
UNRRA from playing any role in the planning process.  Put simply, the military expected to return all 
civilians to their homes within six months after the end of the war, and believed that they could 
accomplish this goal without the help of a civilian organization.  Chapter two analyses UNRRA’s 
own efforts at planning for the postwar period.  While UNRRA staff in Washington were busy 
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attempting to connect with the military, staff at UNRRA’s European Regional Office in London were 
busy defining UNRRA’s goals in terms of both relief and rehabilitation.  They came to understand 
rehabilitation as the process of normalizing life for the DPs, and they focused on explaining how this 
might be accomplished.  As well, officials in both offices began recruitment campaigns, although 
these met with limited success in the beginning.  Once recruited, staff underwent training at at least 
one of UNRRA’s training facilities, located on the outskirts of Washington D.C., in Reading (just 
outside of London), or, immediately before deployment into the field, at the UNRRA Training Centre 
in Granville, France.  Despite these efforts, UNRRA staff and military personnel alike arrived in the 
field ill-prepared for the task of caring for millions of DPs.    
Chapter three addresses initial military and UNRRA experiences with the DPs and the 
handover to UNRRA of full administrative responsibility for the DP camps, focusing on the events of 
the spring and summer of 1945.  When the military arrived in each new town, they implemented a 
standard procedure for governing the local population and the DPs.  They identified buildings to be 
used for DP housing, and, if necessary, evacuated the local population to make way for them.  The 
military also liberated the concentration camps and provided food and medical care for the survivors.  
They had expected all civilians to follow the stand still order that they had announced, and were 
dismayed when former labourers and concentration camp survivors alike took to the roads and headed 
for home.  While the military had expected to empty the DP camps within six months of the end of 
hostilities, over the course of the summer of 1945 this goal appeared increasingly illusory.  
Transportation delays and problems receiving large numbers at the border combined to slow the 
process.  As well, soldiers on the ground made it clear that they were not interested in continuing to 
care for the DPs.  As a result, the American military handed increasing responsibility for the DPs over 
to UNRRA, the organization that they had assumed during the planning phase would be unneeded.  
 10 
 
By 1 October 1945 UNRRA had taken over administrative responsibility for all of the DP camps in 
the American occupation zone of Germany.  UNRRA staff could begin implementing their plans for 
rehabilitation. 
The last three chapters explore UNRRA’s work rehabilitating the DPs.  In the planning 
period, UNRRA defined rehabilitation as a return to the social norm.  Chapter four analyses these 
initial efforts.  UNRRA’s first rehabilitative work with the DPs centered on four aspects of daily life: 
housing, personal hygiene, education, and employment.  They met resistance in each of these aspects.  
In the case of housing, UNRRA was at the mercy of the military authorities, who were responsible for 
allocating all housing and disagreed with UNRRA on which groups to prioritize.  UNRRA’s efforts to 
restore social norms concerning personal hygiene and general camp cleanliness met resistance from 
the military and the DPs alike.  For the military, the DPs were not living up to their exacting 
standards.  For the DPs, UNRRA and military expectations concerning personal cleanliness did not 
align with their own prewar understandings of personal hygiene.  In this case, it is clear that UNRRA 
was introducing new social norms, not reinstituting previous ones.  UNRRA and DP goals concerning 
education were more closely aligned, but again UNRRA met resistance from the military as they 
sought to provide the DPs with adequate supplies to run DP schools.  Finally, the most problematic 
aspect of rehabilitation in this period proved to be UNRRA’s understanding of work.  Both UNRRA 
and the military believed that the DPs should work.  However, again the military caused problems 
when UNRRA requested supplies for camp work projects – there was a limited amount of supplies to 
go to DPs and German firms alike.  The DPs were willing to work inside of the camps, but generally 
refused to work for German businesses.  As a result, rehabilitation through work proved problematic 
as the DPs proved resistant.   
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Chapters five and six address UNRRA’s efforts to reinforce the importance of law and order 
amongst the DPs.  Chapter five focuses on UNRRA’s efforts at reintroducing civil law to the DPs, 
with a strong emphasis on the importance of legal marriage.  According to German law, no marriage 
was deemed legal unless it had been registered with the proper local officer, the German registrar; the 
same was true of births and deaths.  While the DPs were not at first concerned with obtaining the 
necessary legal documents, UNRRA saw otherwise.  The welfare workers believed that holding 
proper legal documents which verified an individual DP’s identity was not only important for all of 
that DP’s future dealings with their home government, but also as an important part of rehabilitation.  
“Deviations” such as common law marriage, family desertion, illegitimacy and parental neglect were 
strongly discouraged.  What neither UNRRA nor the DPs were prepared for was the immense 
difficulties many people faced in their attempts to gain these legal documents.  Chapter six addresses 
UNRRA’s efforts to introduce a respect for criminal law.  While the military authorities were lenient 
towards the DPs during the summer of 1945, by the autumn they began prosecuting those DPs who 
broke the law.  UNRRA sought to teach the DPs to be law-abiding citizens.  However, they faced 
numerous challenges in this task, most notably in curbing DP participation in the black market.  Even 
as they sought to discourage the DPs, UNRRA also worked to ensure that DP rights were upheld 
when they were tried for these crimes. 
 This project addresses three interrelated bodies of literature, and seeks to fill a void in each of 
them.  The first body focuses on postwar Germany, its occupation and its reconstruction.  The first 
people to write the history of postwar Germany were the soldiers who took part in the occupation and 
those military historians who were interested in American occupation policy in Germany.8  These 
                                                     
8
 See Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees: A Study in Forced Population Movement (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1956); Forrest C. Pogue, Supreme Command: United States Army in World War 
II:  the European Theater of Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954); Franklin M. 
Davis, Come as a conqueror: the United States Army's occupation of Germany, 1945-1949 (New York: 
 12 
 
early studies focused on institutions and policies.  They began their studies with the military phase, 
describing in detail the invasion of Germany and the collapse of the German army.  These studies 
placed a strong emphasis on the successful cooperation between the British and American 
governments and armed forces during the invasion (as they worked together under the auspices of the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, or SHAEF), in caring for the civilian population 
and reorganizing local German government, all despite severe shortages.  A strong focus was also 
placed on the policies instituted by Military Government and the relative success of implementing 
democracy in Germany so soon after the fall of Hitler.  While plans for the care and repatriation of 
the DPs also appeared in these accounts, the role played by UNRRA and later the IRO was criticized 
in many instances.  Emphasis was placed on the fact that it took more UNRRA staff than military 
personnel to administer the same assembly centres and that these new international organizations 
were therefore highly inefficient.  There was little recognition of the nature of UNRRA’s work and 
the services which they provided.  These studies also made clear that in the beginning the care of the 
DPs was the first priority, but by 1946 the Allied focus had shifted to German reconstruction, 
especially in the face of the emerging threat of communism.  American political leaders believed that 
the best way of halting the spread of communism was by supporting economic growth and stability in 
those countries at risk of Soviet interference.  The DP question soon fell off the radar.    
An important theme to emerge in discussions of the postwar occupation of Germany has been 
a study of the methods and successes of denazification.9  The most public form of denazification was 
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the Trials of the Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal, which took place in 
Nuremberg between November 1945 and October 1946.  Several trials of lesser Nazi officials took 
place between 1946 and 1949.  More generally, the policy of denazification referred to the removal of 
Nazi party members from positions of power throughout Germany, and also the promotion of 
democracy in Germany.  In the removal of former Nazi Party members, denazification was fraught 
with difficulties as the occupying forces needed the help of German specialists who were inevitably 
former Nazis in order to get the government and the economy functioning once more.  Thus, Military 
Government worked to remove high-level policymakers, but left the lower-level civil servants in their 
positions.  Denazification was also a very time-consuming and costly undertaking.  As a result, 
enthusiasm diminished over time.   
Another important theme to emerge in the history of the occupation of Germany concerned 
the experience of defeat and liberation for soldiers, German refugees and civilians alike.  Millions of 
German soldiers never returned from the field, but for those who did, the homecoming was fraught 
with difficulties.10  The soldiers did not return all at once.  The sick POWs were the first to return, 
followed by those being held by British and American forces.  The majority of German POWs 
captured by the Red Army were forced to help with Soviet reconstruction efforts, and many did not 
return until the late 1940s, with the last only coming home in 1955.  As a result, the process of 
reintegrating the soldiers into their communities and their families took place not over weeks and 
months, but over the course of years.  The communities and families to which they were returning had 
changed dramatically in their absence.   
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Similarly, the arrival and integration of the ethnic German refugees and expellees, known as 
the Volksdeutsche, is a growing field of interest amongst historians.11  German refugees had begun 
flooding westward in the advance of the Red Army in early 1945.  Ethnic Germans who had been 
settled by the German government in the east during the war years as part of the goal of Lebensraum 
were forced out of their homes, alongside members of German communities that had existed in 
eastern Europe for generations.  Together, they took to the roads and made their way into Germany or 
were shipped out by the governments.  Upon arrival in Germany the Allies made them the 
responsibility of the local German authorities.  Nearly nine million settled in the western zones of 
occupation, further straining the already scarce resources.     
German women in turn had their own experience of liberation.  Several studies point to three 
important experiences of German women in the postwar period: rape by invading armies, clearing 
away the rubble, and sexual relations with occupying forces.12  While never entirely absent, a 
renewed discussion of the mass rape of German women at the end of the war was sparked by the 
revelation in 2003 of the identity of the author of A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered 
City. 13  Discussions surrounding the details of the account have reopened debate over how women 
experienced and understood defeat and occupation, and especially how these experiences differed 
from those of men.  Those men who were present at the time had no way of protecting the female 
victims from the invading soldiers.  The image of the all-powerful German man that the Nazis had 
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spent so many years building up was shattered.  The experiences of the Trümmerfrauen (literally 
‘women of the rubble’) also defined the immediate postwar period as a time in which German women 
alone were the ones clearing the rubble and attempting to put their homes back together.  The 
occupation forces assigned the task to members of former Nazi organizations, while others 
volunteered for the task as it meant extra rations.  Men were noticeably absent.   
A third topic of discussion to emerge on women in the postwar period in Germany concerns 
the relationship between German women and Allied soldiers, especially American soldiers.  These 
women entered into relationships with soldiers for various reasons, including the possible economic 
benefits as well as the companionship that the soldiers provided. However, to German society as 
large, these women were labelled fraternizers and prostitutes.  Historians emphasize that this period 
was often seen by Germans at the time as one of ethical decline, in contrast to the supposedly moral 
era of Nazi rule.  This was despite the fact that the DPs – living reminders of German wartime 
atrocities – continued to live in camps located next to and sometimes in the middle of German cities.  
While the occupation authorities soon turned their focus away for punishing the Germans and towards 
fighting the spread of communism, the DPs remained uncomfortable reminders of Nazi wartime 
policies. 
The second historiographical body of literature that this project encompasses is the discussion 
of the displaced persons themselves.  This is a relatively new field of inquiry; little was written which 
focused directly on the DPs in the decades following the Second World War.  The first works to 
appear were those which focused on individual ethnic or religious groups.  This research has brought 
together discussions of DP experiences during the war, their lives in the DP camps in Germany, 
Austria and Italy, and their postwar emigration.  It has focused on each individual ethnic group’s 
social, political and cultural activity in the DP camps.  Historians have examined the foundation of 
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kindergartens, schools, newspapers, churches and synagogues.  The DPs as a whole saw this as a 
period of religious renewal and the churches became not only centers of worship, but also 
representations of their national heritage.  Many of these historians have also been interested in the 
artistic output of these groups, including the work of painters, writers, musicians, and playwrights 
who took advantage of the conditions of relative freedom of expression to continue with work which 
had often been halted during the war years.   
The discussion of Jewish postwar experiences has focused on Jewish displaced persons as 
Holocaust survivors, on the role of Zionism in the Jewish DP camps, and on the eventual creation of 
the state of Israel.14  While much early Holocaust literature spoke of Holocaust survivors as a singular 
group with a single, shared Holocaust experience, recent studies have emphasized the fact that Jews 
survived the war years in many different ways: while some experienced life in the ghettos and 
concentration camps and on the death marches, other took on Aryan identities, joined partisan groups, 
or were evacuated into Soviet territory.  When interviewed about their Holocaust experiences, 
survivors often mentioned their time in the Allied DP camps as well, but often only as an interlude 
between their wartime experiences and their postwar resettlement.  Another important theme to 
emerge in this literature has been the contact that the Jewish DPs had with the local German 
population.  While the DP camps were previously depicted as ‘independent enclaves,’ separate from 
German cities and towns, recently historians have emphasized the fact that the Jewish DPs had 
contacts with the nearby German population in many instances, whether visiting the local hospital or 
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taking part in black market trading; they did not exist entirely independently of their German 
neighbours.  A third important theme to emerge in the literature on Jewish DPs is the role of Zionism 
in the DP camps and its effect on resettlement decisions.  For many, the goal was resettlement in 
Palestine.  For the vast majority Jewish DPs, return to their homelands was not an option.  They 
waited in the DPs camps in Germany until they could either emigrate to Palestine and help in the 
building of a Jewish state, or else obtain visas to settle abroad elsewhere.  However, recently 
historians have challenged the argument that the creation of the state of Israel, and especially the role 
played by Zionists in the DP camps, was an inevitable result of the events of the Second World War.  
They argue that the communal structure of the kibbutzim (communal farms) begun in Germany in 
anticipation of a future life in Israel provided the DPs with structure and community, and were less 
influential in one’s final resettlement decision than previously believed.   
For the Ukrainian, Polish and Baltic DPs, research has highlighted expanding postwar Soviet 
influence in eastern Europe and its impact on repatriation options.15  Much of this literature has 
focused on political life in the DP camps.  The Polish DPs were visited in the DP camps by 
representatives of both the Communist and exiled Polish governments, until July 1945, when the 
Western Allies recognized the Communist-led government in Warsaw as the official government.  
Soviet authorities demanded that repatriation of their own nationals take precedence over peoples 
from elsewhere.  While at first committed to a policy of repatriation regardless of DP wishes, the 
American government revoked this policy in January 1946 following vehement protests from the 
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DPs, including several suicides.16  This eventual refusal to forcibly repatriate the DPs left the 
international community responsible for finding resettlement opportunities for them abroad.  
However, little headway was made in loosening immigration quotas before 1948.   
The problem of statelessness has also been an important theme to emerge in the literature.  
The redrawing of the borders of eastern Europe at the end of the war meant a change in nationality for 
millions of people.  In the territory annexed to the Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania, ethnic Poles 
were forcibly moved into Poland between 1944 and 1946.  Former Poles from these regions living in 
the DP camps in Germany found themselves stateless.  The same was true of the DPs from the Baltic 
states who refused to recognize Soviet control of their homelands.  Finally, the scholarship on 
Ukrainian and Baltic DPs has also emphasized the important role that the experience of the DP camps 
played in the later lives of DPs who resettled outside of Europe.   The DP immigrants brought with 
them their wartime and postwar experiences, as well as the political beliefs that they had formed in 
the DP camps.  Even after resettlement, Ukrainians, Poles and Balts alike hoped that they would one 
day live to see their home states freed from Soviet domination. 
 Alongside the histories of individual DP groups, there have also been several studies focused 
on specific regions and DP camps.  The studies of camps and groups of camps located in the same 
Land, Kreis (county) or even town have allowed historians to focus on the similarities between the 
different ethnic and religious groups in a way that was not previously possible.17  Identity has become 
a particularly important theme in these works.  The DP camps proved an important site for defining 
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each group’s identity through shared history and culture, as well as their united refusal to accept 
repatriation.  Studies of individual camps have provided a more detailed account of day-to-day life in 
the DP camps.  They describe not only where the DPs slept, what they ate, and what activities they 
participated in, but also how they felt about life in the camps.  While earlier histories have followed a 
top-down approach, emphasizing policies put in place by the military authorities for their care, 
historians have begun to ask how the DPs themselves responded to these policies and helped shape 
them.       
The third historiographical body of literature with which this project intersects is a discussion 
of international organization and the groundbreaking role played by early postwar institutions.  This 
historiography began with institutional histories.18  In histories of both UNRRA and the IRO, 
historians have looked at the difficulties associated with the creation of international organizations 
with no institutional experience and an international staff with disparate understandings of the task 
before them.  Histories of both organizations begin with discussions of the unique nature of the post-
WWII refugee crisis.  They stress both the scale of displacement and the changing way in which the 
international community approached the issue of refugees.  While efforts during the interwar period 
were organized by the League of Nations but funded privately, in the postwar period the care of the 
refugees was funded by governments (the United States was the largest donor to both UNRRA and 
the IRO) and organized by newly-formed international organizations.  Histories of both institutions 
have worked to highlight their successes while also outlining the many challenges faced.  They can be 
seen in part as responses to the military histories which negatively compared UNRRA’s efficiency to 
that of the military.     
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The first organizational histories focused on the policies formed at Headquarters and then 
implemented on the ground by each organization.  Alongside these organizational histories, several 
personal accounts of relief workers stationed in Europe in the postwar period have added to our 
understanding of the postwar period.19  These accounts explain not only how relief workers 
experienced their time serving with UNRRA and the IRO, but also highlight the important 
relationships that developed between the DPs and those who left their homes to work with them.  
More recent studies have looked to combine the two approaches, adding the voices of the welfare 
workers to the history of these organizations, and moving away from the top-down approach used by 
the authors of the first institutional histories.20  They make clear that UNRRA staff in particular faced 
an enormous task with no clear administrative guidelines and only a very short timeframe in which to 
realize their very ambitious goals.  Those people who applied to work with the DPs in Germany did 
so knowing that this would be neither traditional missionary nor military work, but a new form of 
international service, and one in which women were encouraged to take part.  These histories also 
shed light on the changing nature of UNRRA’s goals.  While UNRRA was originally planned as 
strictly a supply organization in many of its missions, care for the DPs soon became an increasingly 
important aspect of its work, requiring reorganization at headquarters and the European Regional 
Office in order to accommodate this change in focus.  The fact that welfare workers in the DP camps 
reported to the director of Displaced Persons Operations, and not the director of the Welfare Division, 
was just one of the many administrative complications that soon became apparent and problematic.  
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Another important theme to emerge in these histories is the important distinction between UNRRA’s 
mandate to repatriate and the IRO’s mandate to repatriate or resettle.  While UNRRA’s efforts 
necessarily had to focus on preparing the DPs for reintegration into their home countries, the IRO 
could turn its attention towards the people and the skills desired by resettlement countries.      
The historiography of international organizations has worked to integrate both UNRRA and 
the IRO into the larger history of the formation of the United Nations system of international 
organization. 21  This system brings together individuals and organizations to engage in activities not 
taken up by national governments.  UNRRA and the IRO were some of the first such institutions, as 
these histories make clear.  Many of these histories begin by examining the League of Nations, 
formed in 1919 as part of the peace settlement.  The mandate of the League of Nations included 
security matters, but also issues concerning workers’ rights and health care, and the United Nations 
sought to build upon this precedent by creating a framework of international cooperation for dealing 
with issues of concern to its members.  In their postwar planning, the Allies foresaw the need to have 
agencies in place even before the end of hostilities.  Dealing with the plight of the postwar refugees in 
particular played heavily in the early discussions for such a postwar framework.  However, studies on 
postwar planning have focused on decisions made at headquarters, and not on the work of those in the 
field.           
Bringing together issues that have been raised separately in each of these historiographical 
discussions, most recently several scholars have worked to address the changing nature of the 
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relationships between all of the actors involved in postwar Germany: the military occupation 
authorities, the local German population, the nascent German government, the non-governmental 
organizations, and the DPs themselves.  This literature addresses the question of how the DPs 
navigated and negotiated with each of these groups, and therefore asserted their agency.  This 
literature challenges the previous view of the DPs as pawns of the superpowers and it looks to 
highlight the ways in which the DPs were able to influence policy.     
One of the ways in which DP agency has come to the forefront is in discussions of fertility 
and the recreation of families.22  The study of Jewish family life in the DP camps has placed a strong 
emphasis on the relationship between victimization, guilt, sex, and childbirth.  Marriage and 
childbirth was a means of not only proving to oneself that they were capable of having children (and 
that their wartime experiences had not rendered them barren).  It was also proof to the Germans living 
nearby that Jewish life would continue, despite Hitler’s best efforts, and that more generally postwar 
life was a period of rebirth for everyone who had survived.  While earlier histories portrayed the DP 
camps as autonomous communities, these works have highlighted the many different ways in which 
the DPs not only came into contact with the German population, but used these interactions to assert 
their entitlement to victim status.  While these interactions were originally downplayed or ignored 
entirely, historians have pointed out that they had tremendous import in how the DPs understood their 
wartime experiences and their postwar claims.  Similarly, historians have begun to ask questions 
about how families were reconstructed in the postwar period.  Debates raged at the time between 
UNRRA staff, military officials, the voluntary agencies and the DPs themselves over how best to care 
for children whose parents had not survived the war or who could not be located.  Questions 
surrounding legal identity and citizenship show that ‘the best interests of the child’ was a phrase that 
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could be understood in many different ways, depending on who was uttering it.  Differences between 
European and American understandings of child welfare led to conflicts between all of the groups 
involved over who could legitimately claim the unaccompanied children uncovered in Germany’s 
orphanages and those living with German families. 
Alongside discussions of fertility and family life, historians have also begun to reassess the 
ways in which the DPs identified and represented themselves to the military authorities, the aid 
organizations, and the German population.23  While the military and the aid organizations created 
policies that at least initially treated the DPs as one group, based on their wartime displacement from 
their homes, the DPs instead formed committees to present specific narratives which differentiated 
themselves from the other DP nationalities according to their experiences with both National 
Socialism and Soviet communism.  This self-identification emphasized both their unique cultures and 
their different political goals.  These histories make clear that Polish, Ukrainian and Soviet DPs had 
very different reasons for refusing repatriation.  Still other historians have worked to place the 
experiences of the DPs within the larger Cold War framework.  While earlier histories portrayed the 
DPs as objects of superpower policy, these historians have worked to emphasize the important impact 
of DP political mobilization on these policies.  The DPs presented their own narratives of persecution 
in order to justify their refusal to repatriate.  These narratives in turn helped define who was eligible 
for aid and how they would relate to the occupation authorities and the humanitarian personnel who 
supplied it.       
This study is in many ways a counterpoint to this literature.  While much work has been done 
on the role played by the DPs in determining their fate, nothing has yet been written on those welfare 
workers in the field who interacted with them on a daily basis.  My goal is to attempt to fill that void.  
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This dissertation draws on archival sources, memoirs and secondary literature.  The archival sources 
include the holdings of the United Nations Archive (New York City), the National Archives and 
Records Administration (College Park, MD), and the International Refugee Organization records, 
held at the National Archives (Paris, France).  This dissertation seeks to address the question of how 
the welfare workers understood the task of rehabilitation, how they planned for this process, and how 
this program was modified in the field once the welfare workers began to interact with the DPs.  
UNRRA was the first international humanitarian agency to see rehabilitation as part of its mission.  
While its staff had a very idealistic understanding of the task before them as they headed into the 
field, their interactions with the DPs and the very real, practical constraints that came with operating 
in the field led them to make many pragmatic choices, thus reshaping their conception of the process 
of rehabilitation. 
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Chapter 1 
Planning for postwar relief 
The problem in so far as SHAEF is concerned is that discussions take place at so many 
levels… discussions at the lower level were purely formative and therefore inconsequential to 
UNRRA’s possible use.1  
 
 The period till April 1945 was one of difficulty and frustration for every branch of 
U.N.R.R.A… We were authorized to undertake the care and maintenance of camps and to 
arrange for sorting out and repatriating the various nationals in them.  But we were not 
allowed to commence operations until the Supreme Army Command authorized us.2 
 
In short, the Director General had to collect a staff appropriate, both in numbers and skills, to 
undertake an unknown number of undefined relief and rehabilitation operations in an 
unknown number of countries at unknown dates.3    
 
 
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was an organization 
founded on a belief in international cooperation and goodwill.  It was the brainchild of British and 
American bureaucrats who remembered the problems left behind by the First World War, problems 
such as displacement, famine and the spread of disease, and who wanted to limit their effects after the 
Second World War.  Despite this foresight in their overall policy, from its start UNRRA was an 
organization reacting to events.  In the period from its founding in November 1943 until it was called 
into action by SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the joint Anglo-American 
military organization) in early 1945, UNRRA struggled to form cogent plans for the displaced 
persons problem in postwar Europe.  Their difficulties sprang from the dependent nature of their 
relationship with the military authorities: UNRRA could not develop policy independent of SHAEF.  
From this relationship of reliance arose two main challenges: contacts were being made on too many 
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levels, and UNRRA was not kept apace of military planning in a significant way.  For UNRRA, it 
was particularly difficult to ascertain which agreements were binding, and which were merely 
“formative.”  UNRRA required information from SHAEF in order to begin their planning, but they 
were consistently kept in the dark on army plans.  Requests for information were either postponed or 
ignored entirely.  Despite a lack of information, SHAEF pressed UNRRA early on to have teams 
ready to go at a moment’s notice, but not before it gave the official nod.  As a result, UNRRA had 
great difficulty recruiting and training enough employees, as well as problems at the beginning with 
low morale because there was nothing for individual UNRRA officers to do until they were called 
forward with the army units.  No official agreement outlining UNRRA’s relationship with SHAEF 
was signed until the spring of 1944, finally detailing UNRRA’s responsibilities and role.  Even after 
the agreement was signed, the timing and nature of UNRRA’s work remained unclear.  What this 
meant for UNRRA planners was that they had little understanding of when they would enter the field, 
what they would be expected to do, how many staff they would require, what their exact duties would 
be or what to expect on the ground.  This made it particularly difficult for them to recruit staff and to 
formulate policies.  Nevertheless, with these questions unanswered, UNRRA did its best to plan for 
post-war Europe.   
 
On 9 November 1943 the agreement to form the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration was signed at the White House.  Forty-four nations agreed to take part.  However, the 
discussions that led to such an organization’s formation had begun several years earlier, before the 
United States had even entered the war.  “We shall do our utmost,” declared Winston Churchill, in an 
August 1940 speech, “to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that 
there will always be held up before the people of Europe… the certainty that the shattering of Nazi 
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power will bring to them all immediate food, freedom and peace.”4  Following this speech, Churchill 
formed the Committee on Surpluses in order to ascertain precisely what such a promise entailed.  The 
Committee had another purpose as well: the British government was made aware that producers 
throughout the British Commonwealth had been adversely affected by the war which had cut off their 
traditional trade routes.  As a result, these producers had been left with large surpluses of goods which 
they could not sell locally.  The Committee hoped that it could coordinate efforts to buy up these 
surplus goods and use them in the postwar period as part of their promise to provide “food, freedom 
and peace.”  The British government recognized “the present embarrassments of oversea producers 
deprived by the war of many of their normal markets” and thus planned to stockpile the goods for 
postwar relief, thus solving two problems at once.5  Unfortunately, they did not have the capital 
required to buy the surplus goods.  Therefore, the British presented this idea to the American 
government, and together they ultimately created the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-war 
Requirements to jointly take on this task.  
Both the British and the American governments were already engaged in independent relief 
efforts at the time.  The United Kingdom had formed the Middle East Relief and Refugee 
Administration (MERRA) in July 1942 in order to care for more than 35,000 refugees, principally 
from the Balkans, in six camps.  MERRA was administered by some 200 British army officers and 
soldiers, and provided food, clothing and other necessities to the largely European population of the 
camps.6  At the same time, the Americans had created the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation 
Operations (OFFRO) to organize American relief for victims of the war.  In November 1942 Herbert 
H. Lehman, former governor of New York, was appointed director of OFFRO, with the 
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understanding that he would eventually lead the international organization that they were working to 
create with the British.  Both MERRA and OFFRO, then, were unilateral efforts to provide relief for 
refugees during the war and to begin planning for the postwar period.  The Inter-Allied Committee on 
European Post-War Relief was a third relief effort, the result of an Anglo-American conference in 
London in 1941; it was the first joint initiative in this respect.  The Committee set to work gathering 
estimates of food and other supplies required for the first six months after the war.  They solicited the 
advice of the European governments-in-exile in London and began to draw up rough estimates.    
The Inter-Allied Committee looked at postwar relief and rehabilitation exclusively from the 
standpoint of supply, but there was also recognition on the part of both the British and American 
governments that postwar efforts would have to include more than just food.  Physicians and welfare 
workers in particular expressed strong views on postwar rehabilitation. “Relief workers were haunted 
by memories of the influenza epidemic of 1918-1919,” writes Ben Shephard, in The Long Road 
Home: The Aftermath of the Second World War, “which had killed 40 million people worldwide, 
many of them in Europe; the typhus which had accounted for another 3 million; the famine which had 
carried off 5 million people in Ukraine in 1921.”7  They wanted to avoid the disaster that followed the 
First World War by ensuring that not only food, but also medical supplies were made available.   
At the same time, welfare workers recognized that the refugees’ wartime experiences meant 
they would need professional counselling, and not just food and shelter, if Europe was going to 
recover.  As will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, the interwar period witnessed the 
emergence in the United States of social work as a respected profession.  The United States 
government’s Social Security Act of 1935 transformed public assistance: a host of New Deal 
programs sought to ‘help people help themselves’ by providing them with counselling and other 
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social services.  The programs were based on the principle that people should be paid for work rather 
than given a handout from the government, a central tenet of the emerging social work profession.  As 
one of Roosevelt’s most trusted advisers, former social worker Harry Hopkins brought many of these 
ideas straight to the President.8  When it came time to organize a postwar relief organization, Hopkins 
ensured that rehabilitation was a central theme. 
The discussions of surpluses and questions of postwar supply and those voices calling for 
postwar rehabilitation came together in the summer of 1942.  Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, chief 
economic adviser to the British government, presented a formal plan to Washington that called for the 
creation of an international relief organization to organize and distribute the stockpiled goods, as well 
as provide some form of rehabilitation.  The United States responded by drafting an agreement for 
such an organization.  The project was headed by Harry Hawkins of the State Department and 
received input from Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.  Hawkins presented this draft 
agreement to the British in the late summer of 1942, and amendments were made.  Leith-Ross 
described the genial nature of the bilateral discussions. “The discussions took place in a very friendly 
and constructive spirit.  On all details of the organizational framework I did not hesitate to accept the 
American views: clearly they would have to bear the main burden of financing operations and it was 
important that they should be able to satisfy Congress that the set-up was likely to be efficient.”9  He 
was agreeable to any American views on organizational structure, but he was firm on the 
organization’s goals.  He asserts that he made a point of ensuring that UNRRA did more than just 
provide food to people who were starving; he wanted the organization to provide rehabilitation as 
well.  “I urged that it was uneconomical to send food (except for immediate needs) to agricultural 
areas,” he writes.  “What they needed were farm implements, animals, seeds, etc., so as to get 
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cultivation restarted.  Similarly for industrial areas, it was better to send eg. cotton to the textile mills 
than clothing.”10  Leith-Ross was able to convince both his government and the Americans of the 
necessity of providing more than just basic aid.  However, both governments wanted to make it clear 
that they would not agree to any long-term reconstruction.  “They therefore adopted the term 
‘rehabilitation’ in the draft Agreement,” explains George Woodbridge in UNRRA’s official history, 
“and decided that it should cover only those transitional measures needed to restart industrial and 
agricultural activities and essential services.”11   
The draft UNRRA agreement was sent to the Chinese and the Soviets for comment in the fall 
of 1942.  The Soviets in particular were hesitant to agree to join, and asked many questions about the 
organization’s proposed functions.  As Michael Marrus explains, the Russian representatives “insisted 
that all decisions taken by UNRRA had to have its support,” and “that postwar aid should be closely 
tied to political coloration,” so that only those people who actively took part in fighting the Nazis 
should have access to aid.12  The Soviets were wary of any international organization circumventing 
their autonomy.  In the end, the Soviets agreed to join because the British and American negotiators 
agreed to these demands, and because they would be the beneficiaries of much of the aid.  The 
Americans in particular were willing to concede these points because they did not want to proceed 
without Soviet participation.  Representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, 
China, and twenty-eight other governments met to sign the agreement in Washington, D.C. on 9 
November, 1943. 
The UNRRA Constitution, known as the Agreement for the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration, or simply the Agreement, set out three main functions for the 
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organization.  First, it authorized UNRRA to “plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the 
administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the 
United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, 
medical and other essential services.”13  Second, it called for UNRRA to “formulate and recommend 
measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the coordination 
of purchasing, the use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation 
of hostilities.”14  The Agreement also called for UNRRA to coordinate the movement of supplies in 
order to achieve “an equitable distribution of available supplies.”15  Third, the Agreement permitted 
UNRRA to “study, formulate and recommend for individual or joint action by any or all of the 
member governments measures with respect to such related matter, arising out of its experience in 
planning and performing the work of relief and rehabilitation, as may be proposed by any of the 
member governments.”16   
The Agreement outlined the basic structure of UNRRA.  It called for a Council, a Central 
Committee, a Director General, and various committees.  The Council included one representative 
from each member state, and the Council members were expected to meet at least twice per year, 
although special sessions could also be called.  The Council was the policy-making body of UNRRA, 
and therefore it suggested and debated the policies to be pursued.  Votes in the Council were taken by 
simple majority.  Rules of procedure were left for each section of the organization to define 
independently.  The Director General was responsible for implementing the Council’s decisions and, 
more generally, the organization’s mandate.  He was appointed by the Council on the 
recommendation of the Central Committee.  The Director General had the power to appoint his staff, 
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including deputy directors.  He was responsible for reporting to both the Council and the Central 
Committee on UNRRA’s activities.  The Central Committee was a sub-section of the Council, and it 
contained representatives from China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States.  
As the Agreement explained, “Between sessions of the Council, it shall when necessary make policy 
decisions of an emergency nature.”17  In practice, the Central Committee solved problems when there 
was a disagreement amongst the member states, (or not).  The Agreement mentioned two especially 
important committees: the Committee on Supplies and the Committee of the Council of Europe.  The 
Committee of Supplies was comprised of representatives of member governments that would be the 
chief suppliers of the organization.  The express purpose of the Committee of Supplies was to 
“consider, formulate and recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies designed to 
assure the provision of required supplies.”18  The Committee of the Council for Europe included 
representatives of all member states involved in relief and rehabilitation in Europe.  The Agreement 
formally recognized that this committee was officially replacing the Inter-Allied Committee on 
European Post-War Relief.   
After signing the agreement in Washington, the representatives of the signatories 
immediately moved to Atlantic City, where they began discussions about how such an international 
organization would operate.  Known as UNRRA’s First Session, the meetings that took place 
throughout November and early December 1943 delineated UNRRA’s role in postwar Europe and 
how it would operate.  The Council would meet at least twice a year to discuss an agenda prepared by 
the Director General.  At each meeting the Director General would present a report of the operations 
to date, and the Council was invited to comment.  At these meetings its members would also debate 
new resolutions and discuss UNRRA policy.  The Director General could also call together the 
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Central Committee anytime that he deemed it necessary, in order to address problems of an urgent 
nature.   
At the first meeting of the First Session in Atlantic City, Herbert Lehman (from OFFRO) was 
officially elected Director General.  At that meeting, UNRRA’s mandate was refined to include: 
relief supplies (essential consumer goods to meet immediate needs, such as food, clothing, 
and medical supplies); relief services (such as health and welfare); rehabilitation supplies 
(materials needed to enable a recipient country to produce and transport relief supplies and 
restore public utilities, to the extent necessary to meet immediate needs); and rehabilitation 
services (such technical services as might be needed to assure the best use of rehabilitation 
supplies).19 
As the conference progressed, the Council outlined more specifically how the organization would 
look and how it would function.  They created committees to focus on four specific aspects of the 
organization’s functions: one committee to create overarching policy; another to organize financing 
and supplies; a third to look at relief and rehabilitation policies; and a fourth committee to deal with 
organization and administration.  These four committees were in turn supported by a series of 
subcommittees for more focused problems, such as relief distribution policies, health and medical 
care policies, welfare services policies, policies relating to agricultural rehabilitation, and policies 
with respect to displaced persons.  All of these groups were to prepare reports for and make 
recommendations to the Council.  By 1 December, the end of the First Council Session, forty-seven 
resolutions had been adopted by UNRRA.  Resolution 10, Section 7, which relates to DP policies, 
states: “the Director General should establish the earliest possible contact with military authorities of 
the United Nations with a view to concerting plans for dealing in a uniform and closely coordinated 
manner with any large groups of displaced persons which may be found in any liberated or occupied 
territory on the entry of the forces of the United Nations into that territory.”20 
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 On 1 January 1944, UNRRA Headquarters were established in Washington, DC.  The capital 
city was the logical choice for the headquarters because it was the centre of all military and civilian 
planning in the United States.  It housed not only the White House, but also the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS) and the Combined Boards.21  The Combined Boards consisted of the Combined 
Production Resources Board, the Combined Food Board, the Combined Raw Material Board and the 
Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, and together they organized the procurement and shipping of 
all of the resources necessary for the war effort.  UNRRA headquarters was organized in two parts: 
there were the administrative sections (Bureau of Supply, Bureau of Finance and Administration, 
Bureau of Areas) and the functional sections (Health, Welfare, Displaced Persons).  Lehman began by 
appointing the Deputy Director General of Supply, Roy F. Hendrickson, and from the start the Bureau 
of Supply proved to be the most powerful section of the organization.  The official history describes 
“the dominance in Headquarters of the Deputy Director General of Supply;” how Hendrickson had 
“secured at the outset a clear and wide jurisdiction” which allowed him to create “an empire within an 
empire.”22  The other areas never reached the same level of power.   
The division of responsibilities was left purposely vague in order that the organization could 
respond to the inevitably changing requirements.  As Sir Arthur Salter, Senior Deputy Director 
General and the person in charge of outlining the various functions, explained in March 1944, “[n]o 
set of rules drafted beforehand can determine precisely, and in detail, the part which each of the 
principal officers will take in discharging the different tasks of UNRRA.  To a large extent this will 
have to be worked out by those concerned as they approach their several tasks.”23  Both Salter and 
Lehman wanted the organizational structure to be flexible.  However, this flexibility would lead to 
intense competition within the organization and a constant battle over lines of responsibility.  This 
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proved particularly true, as we shall see, in relation to the displaced persons, whose care came under 
the auspices of both the administrative and the functional sections.  
 The question of exactly how UNRRA would be funded remained open throughout its initial 
tenure.  “In signing the Agreement,” Woodbridge writes, “each member government pledged itself to 
contribute to the resources needed to enable the Administration to accomplish the purposes for which 
it was established.”24  In reality, it was difficult for the planners to imagine exactly how much would 
be needed, and therefore they only spoke vaguely about contributions.  In the end they agreed on a 
plan put forward by the United States Treasury’s Harry D. White which called for each member to 
contribute one percent of one year’s national income, an agreement that was seen as being 
“reasonably equitable” and providing “a fund more or less the right size.”25  The administrative 
budget for the remainder of 1943 and all of the year 1944 was estimated to be approximately $10 
million, and Lehman received his first funds in late 1943.   
However, even once the money was appropriated, Lehman faced difficulties in recruiting 
people and in procuring supplies.  He looked primarily to the United States and Britain for personnel, 
but the able-bodied men were already involved in the war effort, and so he turned to “a limited 
number of welfare specialists, over-age adults, persons physically disqualified from military service, 
and women.”26  Lehman was also hindered by the prospect that any staff he hired might have to sit 
idle, perhaps for months, until such a time as the military would call them forward. Lehman faced 
even larger challenges in procuring goods while the war was still going on.  All requests for supplies 
had to be submitted to two bodies for approval: first, the Combined Raw Material Board had to 
approve the request, then the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board had to allot shipping space to 
bring it to Europe.  The U.S. army’s requests superseded all civilian requests, and this made it nearly 
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impossible for UNRRA to procure any supplies, let alone the large amounts needed to fully supply 
their staff and prepare for their responsibilities on the ground.   
At the same time, UNRRA was planning the opening of an office in Europe.  On 1 February 
1944 the European Regional Office was established in London.  Three Deputy Directors-General 
were appointed: Leith-Ross was placed in charge of the Department of Administration; Nicolai I. 
Feonov of the Soviet Union was named head of Supply; and Lithgow Osborne from the U.S. was 
placed in charge of Services and Areas.  Soon afterwards, three Directors were sent from 
Headquarters in Washington to head up the Divisions of Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons.  
These directors reported back directly to Washington, and were placed on the same level as the 
Deputy Directors-General.  They were responsible for policy in their individual spheres, and they 
operated apart from the other Departments at the ERO.  As Woodbridge explains,  
The arrival of the functional directors (Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons) from 
Headquarters also had unfortunate results.  Although their appearance was a 
recognition that London was to be the effective centre for work with Allied 
governments, SHAEF, and the UNRRA technical advisory committees, the authority 
of the London Office was in no way increased, since the functional directors were 
instructed to report direct to the Director General and not to anyone in ERO.”27 
From the start, then, there were two centers of power within UNRRA.  The Headquarters in 
Washington was responsible for policy-level decisions, including contact with SHAEF.  At the ERO, 
the focus was on operations.  The Director General wanted headquarters to “remain responsible for 
the initial determination of principles of policy,” while the ERO was responsible for compiling 
reports of estimates of European regional requirements, acting as liaison with European member 
governments and military authorities in Europe, as well as issuing operation instructions to the field 
missions. 28  Although in theory this arrangement seemed to separate the tasks of both groups, in 
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practice it proved problematic.  Individual personalities played an important role in defining spheres 
of influence.  “The amount of consultation between corresponding sections in each Office, of course, 
varied with the inclination of the individuals concerned.  In some cases a strong personality in ERO 
tended to assume the lead in policy-making, especially when the opposite section in Headquarters had 
been weakened by frequent turnover of personnel.”29  This situation was thus one of a certain degree 
of overlap, as well as no clear chain of command within the organization.  
To compound matters, SHAEF was not itself a unified entity; it was comprised of staff from 
both the British and American armed forces, with important consequences.  Trying to organize two 
separate armies that could both plan and operate as a single unit was no easy task during WWII.  
They came from separate military traditions and had different ideas about how to fight the war.  
However, they were in agreement that Nazi Germany and Japan needed to be defeated.  Following 
America’s entry into the war in December 1941, the two governments had begun working together to 
formulate a plan for defeating the Axis Powers.  This strategy-level planning took place within the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), a command structure that was developed in 1942 and included the 
President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the heads of the executive 
departments of the militaries, and other British and American armed services leaders.  The CCS met 
altogether several times throughout the war: at Casablanca in January 1943; Washington, May 1943; 
Quebec, August 1943; Cairo-Tehran, November-December 1943; Quebec, September 1944; Yalta, 
February 1945; and Potsdam, July 1945.   
These meetings were a chance for both sides to discuss grand strategy, as well as more 
pointed problems, such as munitions and transportation allocations.  They were also a chance for both 
sides to meet face to face.  These meetings highlighted the myriad difficulties of two separate 
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governing systems and two separate military traditions planning and implementing wartime policy.  
They also highlighted the importance of personality in defining relationships.  Roosevelt and 
Churchill had somewhat different opinions on how closely they should control the military.  While 
Roosevelt took part in determining broad strategy and then allowed his generals to implement it as 
they saw fit, Churchill had a hands-on approach.  When Roosevelt sent Harry Hopkins to London to 
meet with Churchill, Hopkins observed “Churchill in full flower, issuing a flurry of orders, studying 
maps, being briefed, firing off instructions to generals and ministers, all the while carrying on 
discussions of wars and battles of history.”30  This was in stark contrast to Roosevelt, who “left the 
details of running the war to others.”31   
By the fall of 1943, the tide of the war had begun to turn.  The Allies had defeated the 
Germans at the Battle of Alamein in North Africa, and from there they could launch forces into 
southern Italy.  The British and the Americans agreed that they would require an organizational 
structure to coordinate the major offensive that they were planning to take back the continent from the 
Germans.  However, exactly how this structure would operate, and who would people it, was a matter 
of considerable debate.  When the CCS met at the Casablanca conference, they agreed that they 
should begin by selecting a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and give 
him power to choose a staff and to conduct preliminary planning for the cross-Channel operation. 
They named Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan as the head of COSSAC, and it was assumed that the staff 
he chose would serve as a core for the future Supreme Headquarters.  This was a stop-gap solution 
until such a time as the British and the Americans could agree on how the nascent Supreme 
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Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) would function.  There was general agreement 
that whoever supplied the most troops should fill the position.32   
At first Roosevelt believed that the Supreme Commander would be a British officer if the 
attack took place soon.  The Americans did not have nearly as many troops trained as the British, and 
there was no easy way to transport hundreds of thousands of men across the Atlantic in time for an 
early invasion.  American planners believed that they needed at least 600,000 ground troops for an 
invasion in 1942, but calculated that they could only transport 105,000.  Therefore, the British would 
have to supply the bulk of any force used in a 1942 invasion and this would allow them to appoint the 
Supreme Commander.33  However, events in the Pacific theatre made a 1942 invasion all but 
impossible for Roosevelt, and it soon became clear that a later invasion would mean the Americans 
would shoulder the bulk of the operation’s supplies and men.  This meant that the Americans would 
be the ones to choose the Supreme Commander.  Both Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and 
President Roosevelt’s unofficial advisor Harry L. Hopkins recommended General George C. Marshall 
for the job.  Marshall was the U.S. Army Chief of Staff and a strong proponent of the cross-Channel 
approach to defeating the Germans.  At the Quebec conference in August 1943 Roosevelt let 
Churchill know that he was thinking of naming Marshall as Supreme Commander Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SCAEF), an appointment that Churchill accepted.   
Despite Britain’s tacit acceptance of Marshall as Supreme Commander, Roosevelt continued 
to delay naming the SCAEF.  Roosevelt was wary because this new position would take the appointee 
away from Washington and into the field, where he could not use Marshall as his representative in the 
meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and in front of Congress.  For several months, Roosevelt 
tried to convince the British to allow the Supreme Commander to continue to sit on the Combined 
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Chiefs of Staff, but the British refused to consider such a suggestion. 34  They still had not reached 
agreement in November 1943 when they met with Stalin at Tehran.  As Roosevelt considered how to 
solve this problem, he came to the conclusion that he needed Marshall to remain in the United States.  
He had considered placing General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the position of Chief of Staff upon 
Marshall’s move, but in the end decided that Eisenhower would make a better fit leading in the field 
and Marshall would remain in Washington.  He notified Eisenhower on 7 December, and announced 
it officially on 24 December 1943.   
From the beginning, it was clear that the British and Americans had two competing visions of 
how SHAEF would operate.  The British were hoping for a smaller headquarters, based on the one 
instituted by French General Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies during the 
First World War.  This headquarters would focus, as Foch had done, on coordinating overall strategy.  
On the other side were those Americans who believed that the Supreme Commander needed a large 
headquarters from which he could coordinate all of the ground operations, not just oversee policy.35  
The British also had concerns with SHAEF’s overall scope.  They were particularly concerned about 
what SHAEF policies would be instituted in areas formerly under British control, as once they were 
put in place they would likely not change.  They feared that they would lose all possibility of control 
if the same broad SHAEF policy was applied equally everywhere; in other words, they wanted to 
protect their pre-war empire, a concern that would shape British attitudes throughout the war.   
Disagreement over the morality of controlling overseas colonies was a major point of 
disagreement between the two powers.  The British made it clear from the start that one of the reasons 
that they were able to continue fighting the war after France’s collapse was because they could 
depend on the British colonies to support the British war effort.  However, British imperialism made 
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many Americans uncomfortable. As one historian explains, “Roosevelt himself shared many of these 
common American suspicions of imperialism, which never ceased to influence his own policy and his 
own view of Churchill.”36  In particular, Roosevelt felt strongly about independence for India.  He 
went so far as to send a representative to Delhi to encourage the British to come to agreement with the 
Indian National Congress.  “For Roosevelt, as for many Americans, it was a grievous inconsistency 
that India should have been mobilized for war in British interests, at the British behest, and with no 
clear commitment by the British to the principle of self-determination.”37  Roosevelt believed that 
India should be offered independence from the British in exchange for their wartime support.  He 
tried on more than one occasion to convince Churchill of this fact, but to no avail.  This disagreement 
resurfaced in deliberations over the British Protectorate in Palestine, although these discussions only 
moved to the forefront after the war, as will be seen in later chapters.  The disagreement over 
colonialism did not ruin the Anglo-American relationship, but it made clear that on some matters the 
British and the Americans were coming from very different viewpoints.   
The Refugee and Displaced Persons Division of COSSAC, headed by Lieutenant Colonel 
Lawrence W. Cramer, spent the fall and winter of 1943-1944 focusing on two important details: 
recruiting staff for Civil Affairs and planning for refugee care.  They began to recruit people for 
training in Military Government.  At first they selected officers from lists furnished by commanders, 
but it was clear that the commanders did not want to give up their best officers, and the Civil Affairs 
program had to deal with a wave of criticism on the quality of their recruits.  They switched tactics 
and instead began to send out letters directly to candidates that they believed had the necessary skills.  
In particular, they targeted those officers with experience working for the government, especially in 
the field of welfare, and also those officers with medical training.  In a letter to paediatricians serving 
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in the army, they called upon doctors to apply to join the school of military government in order to 
take part in administering the army’s relief program.  The letter states:  
The medical care of expectant mothers and of infants and children is a very important phase 
of the relief program of military government.  Disturbed social conditions, which are 
accompanied by malnutrition, crowded housing, and the migration of large groups of the 
population, contribute to the development of serious child health and welfare problems.  
Disruption of family life, and the curtailment of medical and social services will have added 
to the difficulties.  Care of numbers of homeless children, in many instances without families, 
is another phase which will call for wise and skilful child health administration.38   
COSSAC’s Civil Affairs Division explained that they required the expertise of paediatricians in order 
to advise army medical officers on issues of health care for women and children.  Those who were 
accepted would also liaise with local health officials in the cities and towns across Europe and advise 
them on similar issues, as required.  The letter explains that, “[t]his is an opportunity for pediatricians 
[sic] to apply their training and experience in their own specialty in a program of practical importance 
to the war effort, and of great humanitarian significance.”39  Thus, they tried to appeal to each 
person’s moral sense of responsibility and humanitarianism in their recruiting efforts.   
The Refugee and Displaced Persons Division of COSSAC also focused on questions specific 
to refugee care.  The challenge was that they were missing several key pieces of information.  First, 
they did not have reliable statistics.  They were also grappling with questions of categorization; they 
were undecided as to how to distinguish between the various groups they expected to encounter: DPs 
inside and outside of their country of origin, enemy and ex-enemy nationals, neutral nationals, and 
stateless persons.40  As well, they were unsure how long it would take national authorities to 
reestablish governments following the cessation of hostilities in Europe, and also how much help they 
could expect to receive from these governments.  In spite of this, the Refugee and Displaced Persons 
                                                     
38
 Draft of a letter to be sent from the Civil Affairs Division to pediatricians [sic] now in the Army who have 
been selected for training in military government, prepared by Mr. Schmidt for Col. Hiscock, about Sept. 43, in 
UNA, Series 520 Box 389 File 39 “Sub-Committee on Child Care and Maternity (Folder I).” 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Proudfoot, European Refugees, 108. 
 43 
 
Division began planning.  One of the first steps was to design a system of registration and identity 
cards, as they recognized that their first task would be to classify the DPs.  They would need to know 
how many DPs they were dealing with and where they were located.  The system that they devised 
included three cards: one for identity, called an Index Card; one for registration, including health and 
immigration information, the Medical Clearance Card; and one for administrative purposes in 
assembly centers, the Assembly Centre Administration Card.41 
Cramer’s group also began looking at how they would accommodate the varied groups of 
DPs that they expected to encounter.  They were particularly worried about how to feed and generally 
care for the large numbers of children and youth expected.  In the fall of 1943 and winter of 1944 they 
tackled the problem of the availability of food for children and infants.  They were concerned 
specifically that mothers would be unable to breastfeed their children for reasons of poor health, and 
that consequently the American military would have to provide a substitute infant formula for these 
children.  After months of testing, they recommended that babies be fed a watered-down version of 
the powdered milk provided to soldiers as part of their rations.42   
Cramer’s group was also concerned about taking care of large numbers of older children.  In 
the summer of 1943, Harry Greenstein submitted a report to COSSAC in which he outlined the 
general principles that the military should consider in their administration of camps for children, and, 
in particular, so-called ‘wild children,’ those children found without any parents or guardians and 
therefore no one to impose discipline.  Greenstein explained, “In the early stages of actual experience 
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with these children, there will of course have to be considerable improvisation.”43  Greenstein 
suggested ways in which the military might limit the problems that these “wild children” might cause.  
He began by arguing that the facilities of any such camps for children should be kept small and 
separate from other camps that the military administers, for example, prisoner of war camps.  This 
was in order to maintain discipline and halt the spread of disease.  The camps also should be 
segregated according to sex and age, and there was to be an area set aside for those children who 
“continuously create disorder and problems of discipline.”44  Constructive work projects and 
recreational activities were to be introduced as quickly as possible.  Greenstein concluded by stating: 
“As soon as possible the military authorities should bring in civilian personnel equipped to begin 
planning long-range rehabilitation programs for these children.”45  Throughout the fall of 1943, then, 
COSSAC planned for the handover to SHAEF. 
SHAEF was formally established at its headquarters in Bushy Park, on the outskirts of 
London, in February 1944.  The CCS had been planning for this for some time.  The organizational 
structure that they created for SHAEF was based on two previous models: Eisenhower’s command 
post in the Mediterranean, Allied Force Headquarters; and COSSAC in Washington.  Within SHAEF, 
six divisions were created: Personnel Division (G-1), Intelligence Division (G-2), Operations 
Division (G-3), Supply Division (G-4), Civil Affairs Division (G-5), and Publicity and Psychological 
Warfare Division (G-6).  The alpha-numeric system was introduced in order to differentiate the 
SHAEF divisions from those belonging solely to the American or British militaries.  For example, 
CAD referred to the American Civil Affairs Division, and in order to avoid any confusion, SHAEF 
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Civil Affairs, made up of both British and American officers, was assigned the code G-5 in order to 
distinguish it.   
Problems associated with refugees and displaced persons fell under the purview of G-5.  As 
Pogue explains, organizing the Civil Affairs Division was more difficult than any of the other 
divisions in SHAEF. “Unlike the other general staff divisions,” he writes, “G-5 could not be set up 
simply by copying long-established U.S. or British practices.”46  Part of the problem was that the 
British and American members of CCS had not agreed yet on exactly what responsibilities Civil 
Affairs would assume.  After the First World War, the purpose of Civil Affairs had been to take 
control of existing governmental structures and ensure that they carried out the orders of the 
occupying army.  After WWII, this would not be possible because “the Allies undertook to… root out 
the political theories which Mussolini and Hitler had put into the legal systems of the two countries, 
to change Fascist- and Nazi-inspired economic regulations—in short, to effect a political revolution 
under Allied auspices.”47  Individuals at every level in the German government would have to be 
replaced as part of the process of de-Nazification that had been agreed upon by Roosevelt, Churchill 
and Stalin.   New bureaucrats would have to be found to replace Nazi supporters.  Thus CAD could 
not simply take over the political structures that existed.  New people would have to be found, and G-
5 would have to train them.  Therefore, they needed a much more detailed outline of what they hoped 
to accomplish and how they planned to do so.   
They also disagreed over who would lead G-5.  For several months, an American and an 
Englishman held the position jointly.  Finally, on 22 April Eisenhower named Lt. General A.E. 
Grasett, a British General, as the head of G-5.  Grasett picked up where COSSAC left off and 
continued with its plans.  G-5 began by compiling reports of estimates of the numbers displaced by 
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the war.  In January 1944 they released a report detailing the latest figures that the Army had 
gathered.  The figures for Germany were compiled from several different reports, including reports by 
Psychological Warfare Intelligence (dated 14 December 1943), the Committee on Migration and 
Resettlement (summer 1943), the Inter-Allied Committee on Displaced Persons (20 October 1943), 
and the work of American sociologist Eugene Kulischer.  Based on this information, G-5 concluded 
that there were between 6,160,020 and 8,500,500 foreigners in Germany in late 1943, including at 
least 392,396 prisoners of war and civilian internees.48   
Kulischer’s report, The Displacement of Population in Europe, offered the most detailed 
discussion of foreigners in Germany.  In this report Kulischer explained that, through several different 
policy initiatives, the Germans had redistributed the population of Europe, moving individuals and 
whole families en masse in order to further their political, economic and demographic goals.  
Kulischer explained that, “[t]he acknowledged [political] aim of the German Government is to 
redistribute the population of Europe so as to establish German influence and leadership over the 
largest possible area.”49  Economically, the Nazis wanted to use the populations in these territories in 
German industry, most notably in the production of armaments, but in other industries as well.  
Kulischer explained that there was little demographic data available on the movements, and therefore 
little way of knowing “the age, sex and occupational distribution of the transferred persons and also 
their precise whereabouts.”50  At most, he could only distinguish broad movements of people.   
Kulischer organized his study into three sections: one on German movements; one on non-
German movements; and a third on the German mobilization of foreign labour.  Kulischer explained 
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that Germany had always employed a large number of foreign workers, numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands even in the pre-WWI era, but that number had increased dramatically to several millions 
following the outbreak of war in 1939.  The Germans used many different methods in order to attract 
workers, ranging from propaganda and indirect pressure to round-ups, arrests and deportations.  They 
also made use of the prisoners of war who they captured.  During the first year of the war, workers 
were used primarily in agriculture, but following the harvest of 1940, workers were increasingly used 
in non-agricultural work, namely for construction and also in the war industries.  Kulischer explained 
that workers were being moved across all parts of Europe, from east to west and north to south, to 
work on fortifications and more generally to supply the army.  But the majority of workers were sent 
to work in Germany proper.  He stated, “Today a host of foreigners unprecedented in number and 
unparalleled in character is living and working in Germany; like a gigantic pump, the new German 
Reich is sucking in all the resources of Europe and masses of Europe’s working population.”51  
Kulischer estimated that up to the moment of publication of his report in 1943, some thirty 
million people in Europe had been displaced from their homes.  This number included people 
displaced both within and beyond the borders of their home country, but excluded the movements of 
soldiers or prisoners of war.  It also did not include people who had left their homes in order to escape 
aerial bombardments.  Kulischer was reluctant to predict what any future population movements 
would look like, but he pointed out that, by 1943, the German army had been halted and that any 
movements would take place within territories that they already controlled.  Within these territories, 
he explained, “population movements may be expected to become more violent than ever.  Recent 
information shows that the Reich is determined to pursue its demographic policies towards peoples 
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whom Nazi theory condemns as inferior.”52  He believed that there was little chance that the 
movements would cease.  While the circumstances of the war meant that the German administration 
would be forced to make do with the people that they had, this would likely lead to a search within 
areas already occupied for additional reserves of workers.  When the German army was finally 
defeated, he predicted, all of those people working for them would find that they were no longer 
employed, and would want to leave Germany as soon as possible.  While Kulischer believed that 
most of these people would want be repatriated, he recognized that there would be certain groups who 
would not wish to return home: those who experienced persecution at home and those who feared the 
postwar political situation in their home country.  Thus, as early as 1943, there was already some 
recognition that not everyone would agree to repatriation.  This idea was most strongly articulated by 
the Jewish and Baltic NGOs, who predicted that the people they were mandated to help would not 
want to return home.53  Nonetheless, Kulischer concluded, “Unless there is an organization to provide 
these people with means of subsistence, and to give them confidence that they have not been 
forgotten, the highways of Europe will be blocked by long processions of destitute exiles, enduring 
every kind of privation in an effort to return unaided to their homes.”54  This, of course, was 
UNRRA’s stated goal.   
Based on this information, SHAEF set out four main goals for dealing with the DPs: to make 
sure they did not interfere with military operations that were taking place; to control disease; to stop 
them from roving and pillaging; and to organize them for repatriation.55  G-5 saw their role as 
providing short-term relief until such a time as the DPs could be returned to their homes.  Although 
they also recognized that not everyone would want to be repatriated, they assumed that long-term care 
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would not be their responsibility.  The main themes of their postwar DP planning were thus housing 
and supply, and the problems that were associated with these issues.  They spent some time 
investigating other issues, most notably questions of re-socialization, especially in relation to 
children, but this was never their main concern.  They knew that they would first need to focus on 
housing, feeding and clothing the DPs, and they believed that by the time these tasks were in hand 
that they could hand off responsibility for the DPs to some other group or authority.  UNRRA was 
certainly one possibility, though others existed.  The American military, in fact, was advocating for 
the Red Cross, whom they knew and respected from their work together in caring for prisoners of 
war.  However, first they had to come to agreement with the British, and the Red Cross was never 
their first choice.   
SHAEF had been involved in the discussions around the development of UNRRA from the 
start.  It had sent representatives to take part in UNRRA’s First Session in Atlantic City, and it 
followed UNRRA’s progress closely, though they had contributed little to the discussion; the 
American delegates to the First Session came from the State Department, not the War Department.  
Even before UNRRA was officially established, the American military debated the form in which an 
agreement with UNRRA might take.  Many in the military were against making any formal 
arrangements with UNRRA at all.  In a memorandum dated 2 June 1943, David Marcus, from the 
Office of the Chief Staff of the American Civil Affairs Division, expressed concern that UNRRA’s 
role was as yet unclear.  He explained,   
[w]ithin our own Federal agencies there are disputes over the meaning of the very terms that 
are used in this document, as these terms mean one thing to one agency and something else to 
another.  These disputes will be multiplied many fold when nations interpret the meaning of 
such elusive terms as ‘rehabilitation, essential services, prevention of pestilence… The 
program of UNRRA is so extensive that of necessity it cannot contain definite provisions 
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creating specific obligations and duties.  The UNRRA may become a forum for individual 
nations to complain about matters that are of paramount interest to that individual nation.56   
He echoed the concerns of several military officials that UNRRA would be more of a hindrance than 
a help to the military.  “Although laudible [sic] in every purpose,” he concluded, “I doubt the wisdom 
of entering into a formal agreement.  It might be wiser to issue a simple declaration or statement by 
responsible persons establishing a committee or council whose ‘modus operandi’ may be the very 
provisions of the proposed contract.”57  Malcolm J. Proudfoot, one of Cramer’s assistants at COSSAC 
and a captain in the American army, concurred that such feelings were widespread in the upper ranks 
of SHAEF.  He explained that “enthusiasm for making use of UNRRA was less pronounced on 
higher levels.  The military authorities had never been directly instructed by their political rulers to 
co-operate with, or make use of UNRRA, and had little stomach for including civilian personnel who 
could not be brought directly under their control, under the military umbrella.”58 
In the official history of UNRRA, George Woodbridge explains that UNRRA was eager to 
take part in military planning for the postwar era from the start. “They had,” he wrote, “however, no 
authoritative information on military plans or the actual progress of military operations.”59  The 
military had purposely excluded UNRRA from their preparations.  The military’s aversion to 
UNRRA involvement in postwar planning was not unique to the international organization; the 
military did not take kindly to any civilian interference.  The military code of conduct called for 
respect for the military chain of command, but civilians were not required to respect it.  The military 
had also just won a hard-fought battle with the State Department for control of postwar planning.  
Throughout the war the military and civilian agencies had tussled over who would control occupation 
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planning.   When the War Department set up a school in Charlottesville to train civil affairs 
personnel, American newspapers labeled it the “school for Gauleiters,” reflecting a widespread belief 
that postwar occupation should rest with civilian authorities.60  Roosevelt also believed that 
occupation policy should be set by civilian authorities.  However, when the State Department had 
been given control of civil administration in North Africa, it quickly became clear that they were not 
prepared for the task.  In a letter to the Secretary of War, Roosevelt conceded that  while “other 
agencies are preparing themselves for the work that must be done in connection with relief and 
rehabilitation of liberated areas, it is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained the Army 
will have to assume the initial burden.”61  As a result, the military was placed in charge of occupation 
policy, but with the proviso that they work with civilian organizations.   
 The army begrudgingly accepted UNRRA’s involvement on the condition that they remained 
under military control.  They made requests for UNRRA to have officers prepared to go into the field, 
but they hesitated to call them forward.  This left UNRRA at a loss as to how many people to recruit 
and how quickly. “Headquarters and ERO,” Woodbridge explained, “continued to live each day as 
though the next might find them in the midst of full-scale operations.”62  This proved an impossible 
situation for planning.  Therefore, UNRRA did the only thing that it could do: it made plans based on 
Sir Arthur Salter’s theory of administration, a method that outlined broad structures, but avoided 
“defining precise functions.”63  When UNRRA representatives were invited to attend meetings with 
the military authorities, they were forced into the role of largely passive observers as they had nothing 
concrete to contribute because they had no data on which to base their plans.  Instead, they anxiously 
awaited any opportunity that SHAEF might toss their way. 
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As the British and American troops pushed eastward in the winter of 1943-1944, German 
surrender seemed probable, and the question of postwar arrangements which had been secondary 
while all attention was focused on fighting the war suddenly moved to the forefront.  The military 
wanted to ensure that it was prepared for the anticipated postwar chaos if the German army were to 
collapse suddenly.  Thus, it doubled its efforts for recruitment and training, and it began compiling 
handbooks and Administrative Orders to prepare for Military Government.  In early 1944 the military 
focused on recruiting and training men and women for the task that lay ahead.  G-5 spent the spring 
of 1944 organizing the European Civil Affairs Training Center at Shrivenham and worked to train as 
many civil affairs officers as possible leading up to the invasion.  While the school originally focused 
on military law and command structures, the curriculum was later modified to include skills that 
could be utilized on the ground: language skills and an understanding of cultural differences.64   
G-5 also worked to create a program for the postwar German Military Government.  The 
plans for this program, however, moved forward very slowly.  Not only did the Americans and the 
British have to coordinate efforts, but this was one matter in which the Soviets also had a vested 
interest.  Following the liberation of France, the French government also wanted a say in the matter.  
Separately, the Civil Affairs Department of the U.S. military and the Post Hostilities Planning Sub-
Committee of the British Chiefs of Staff were conducting their own planning.  When Eisenhower 
approached the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for a plan for Germany’s military government, 
they responded that it was still being formulated and instead offered him a directive for the pre-
surrender period.  This directive would give the Supreme Commander legislative and judicial 
authority in all areas under his command, with the understanding that this agreement could be 
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amended at a later date.  The directive also stated that representatives from any civilian agency, 
including UNRRA, could only participate with the express invitation of SCAEF.65         
Negotiations between SHAEF and UNRRA on a proposed agreement also began in early 
1944.  Lehman met with leaders within SHAEF several times in the spring in order to press for a 
better definition of UNRRA’s role.  He was particularly concerned about when UNRRA would enter 
the field and when they would take over from SHAEF.  The military refused to make any 
commitment on either issue.  In a February 1944 letter, Hugh R. Jackson wrote to Leith-Ross to 
update him on the state of negotiations with the military.  Jackson explained that while some progress 
had been made in UNRRA’s negotiations with the military, “it cannot be said that everything is 
buttoned up in the way I would like to see it.”66  UNRRA did not have the details of the Army 
procurement program, which UNRRA needed in order to adapt their own plans to those of the 
military.  He also mentioned that no specific plans had been made with regards to joint planning for 
displaced persons or the role of liaison officers, key information that UNRRA required.   
Internally, SHAEF circulated several possible agreements with UNRRA for comment.  These 
agreements all touched upon the questions that Lehman had been asking of SHAEF: questions of 
timeline and questions of supply.  None of the responders within the military were enthusiastic about 
coordinating their efforts with UNRRA, although some accepted that UNRRA should be kept up to 
date on certain aspects of the planning.  W.A. Wood Jr., Deputy Director of the military’s Plans and 
Operations Division, agreed that UNRRA should be apprised of military plans, although he also 
argued that the military should not agree to take responsibility for the procurement of supplies after 
the military period had ended.  At most, he was willing to offer that “the United Nations will be 
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permitted to take over unexpended supplies procured for civilian use.”67  Other responders left even 
less room for UNRRA: they did not believe that UNRRA should be involved at all until the fighting 
had ended.  This open hostility made it impossible for UNRRA to make more than limited inroads 
with the military. 
Despite the military’s reluctance to bring UNRRA up to date on the details of their planning, 
they were under pressure from lawmakers to begin preparing for the postwar situation in Europe.  In 
response to requests from the House of Representatives, SHAEF was pushed to explain their vision 
for Europe once the war had ended.  In April 1944, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee responded 
to the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations.  “Provisions must be 
made,” they wrote, “to supply the bare necessities of life to these peoples until the time when 
indigenous governments have established social, political and economic control of their respective 
areas adequate to allow the return of normal self-sufficiency.”68  They explained that the United 
States would contribute to this relief through three entities: the military, the Lend-Lease program, and 
UNRRA.  The military’s responsibility would be for providing relief in areas that experienced 
fighting.  UNRRA would take responsibility when the indigenous governments took control from the 
military.  Lend-Lease would provide supplies in areas that were not under military control but did not 
have an indigenous government.  They explained that UNRRA would meanwhile play a key role in 
supervising the distribution of supplies, until they were able to take over full responsibility for the 
displaced persons from the military.  They concluded, “[a]ll plans of the affected United States 
agencies for European civilian supply have been coordinated, and the individual plan of each agency 
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has the approval and support of all of the others.”69  It was an astonishing claim, as, at least with 
regards to UNRRA, this was far from the truth.   
By May 1944, SHAEF recognized that they would have to come to some agreement with 
UNRRA.  The Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated a report entitled “Relations with United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration,” written by Colonel H. E. Rounds and Colonel J. Magaw in 
response to questions raised by Lehman.  In this report they outlined the prospective SHAEF-
UNRRA relationship.  They began by quoting the UNRRA agreement: 
the Director General shall ‘in conjunction with the military and other appropriate authorities 
of the United Nations prepare plans for the emergency relief of the civilian population in any 
area occupied by the armed forces of any of the United Nations, arrange for the procurement 
and assembly of the necessary supplies and create or select the emergency organization 
required for this purpose.’70   
The agreement, then, required a close collaboration between the military and UNRRA.  “In particular, 
the Director General of UNRRA should have free access to CCAC, so that he may represent the 
views of UNRRA to the military authorities responsible for relief planning and may raise any 
questions which, in his opinion, require discussion between UNRRA and the military authorities,” 
they explained.71  They did not suggest that the Director General should sit on the board of the 
Combined Chiefs, but that he should be able to bring all relevant issues to their attention.  Rounds and 
Magaw recognized that the first matter of concern for UNRRA was the issue of procurement of 
supplies.  “It is necessary that UNRRA be informed at a very early date,” they explained, “whether 
the military authorities accept responsibility for procurement of the necessary relief supplies for the 
whole of occupied territories of Europe for a period of six months.”72  If UNRRA was expected to 
take over control in less than six months after the end of hostilities, then the military had to continue 
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to provide supplies.  Similarly, if they were expected to take over later than six months after the end 
of hostilities, then they would likewise need this information in order to plan for that time.   
Rounds and Magaw also argued that UNRRA had to make its plans known to the military.  
They offered three reasons why the military must be involved in UNRRA’s planning.  First, they 
explained that if the military period lasted beyond six months, then the military would likely have to 
draw on UNRRA’s supplies. Second, they explain that UNRRA would require the military’s support 
in any presentation to the Combined Boards, and that “it is necessary for UNRRA to be in a position 
to assure the Combined Boards that there is no overlap between the relief requirements being 
procured by the military and those specified in UNRRA’s program.”73  Third, the military had to 
ensure that UNRRA’s procurement efforts did not compete in any way with the procurement efforts 
of the army.  “Possibilities of competition between UNRRA and the military authorities for available 
relief supplies can be guarded against only by early and continued collaboration.”74  They concluded 
that UNRRA’s request to stay informed on the state of military procurement of relief supplies was 
justified, and that, “[w]hile the CCAC is of the opinion that it may not be feasible to assure UNRRA 
that notice will be given of the anticipated date of termination of military responsibility in any area of 
country, UNRRA should, nevertheless, be assured of as much advance notice as is practicable.”75  
They were careful to point out that UNRRA would only take over from the military in areas where 
“recognized indigenous authorities have indicated that at the end of the military period they will 
desire the assistance of UNRRA.”76  Finally, the authors recommended that the military inform 
UNRRA of these decisions and that joint planning begin immediately.  This was, of course, what 
UNRRA had been waiting for all along. 
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 SHAEF made minor changes to the Rounds and Magaw draft and composed a letter to 
Governor Lehman to accompany it.  In their letter to the Director General, the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff outlined the relationship that they foresaw with UNRRA.  They explained that if the Director 
General had any concerns, “it is suggested that such observations or suggestions should be discussed 
either between your representatives, as designated in your letter of 16 February 1944, and the 
designated representatives of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee or by approach to the Chairman 
of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in pursuance of the conclusion set out in paragraph 7 
hereunder.”77  The Combined Civil Affairs Committee, comprised of Civil Affairs staff from both the 
British and American armies, worked to coordinate the efforts of each staff within SHAEF.  It had 
agreed to take responsibility for the Displaced Persons, including all relief supplies, for the military 
period, which they defined as a period of six months following hostilities.  They asserted that if the 
military period should last less than six months, that they would continue to provide relief supplies 
for the first six months.  However, they also pledged to give UNRRA as much notice as possible 
before the end of the military period, and that UNRRA would be apprised of all estimates that the 
army made in their procurement of relief supplies.  The Combined Civil Affairs Committee asked 
that, in return, they be kept informed of all UNRRA planning with regards to the procurement of 
relief supplies.  They also reminded UNRRA that “the military authorities will not be in a position to 
negotiate with it [UNRRA] regarding any activities of the Administration in any country unless the 
recognized indigenous authorities have indicated that at the end of the military period they will desire 
the assistance of UNRRA.” 78  They concluded the letter by assuring the Director General that 
UNRRA would have full access to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in order to discuss any 
issues arising from planning, except for issues of military security.  UNRRA would pick up six 
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months after hostilities had ended, but again they did not believe that there would be much work left 
for UNRRA, and therefore no need to worry about issues like procurement. 
Lehman responded on 19 May 1944 asking for clarification on several points made by the 
CCS.  He began by asking them to define which geographic areas they were referring to in their 
discussion of the military period.  He asserted,   
[i]t is most necessary from the standpoint of planning UNRRA operations that UNRRA 
receive an indication of the areas of Europe which have been determined to come within the 
formula just quoted… it is my understanding that the areas of Europe for which a U.S. and 
U.K. military responsibility for provision or relief supplies has at present been determined are 
Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Germany, 
Austria, and Italy.79   
Another concern of Lehman’s was the provision that UNRRA must be invited by the local authorities.  
“It is my understanding that this condition will be satisfied where UNRRA, after appropriate 
consultation, receives the invitation or consent of the Government concerned or of the national 
authority exercising administrative authority in the area in question to administer or assist in the 
administration of relief.”80  In Germany, where no national authority would remain, this would not be 
an issue.  Lastly, Lehman confirmed that if the military period pushed past six months in length, 
UNRRA would make available any relief supplies for military use.  Although not all of Lehman’s 
concerns were addressed, he accepted the agreement because he recognized that some agreement with 
the military, even an imperfect one, was better than nothing.  UNRRA would now receive enough 
information to begin planning in earnest.  The agreement was officially signed on 25 November 1944.   
The summer of 1944 saw the first conference devoted to refugee problems, as well as the 
compilation of handbooks for use in the field by SHAEF personnel.  On 1 June 1944 Fred Hoehler, 
Deputy Director of the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA, reported that “we have made 
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preliminary arrangements for close working relationships between my division and the Displaced 
Persons Section of SHAEF under General Gullion.”81  General Allen W. Gullion was a Judge 
Advocate General in the American Army, head of School of Military Government, located at the 
University of Virginia, and also a key figure in early relations between UNRRA and SHAEF.   
On 12 June 1944, Lieutenant General Grasett, head of G-5, called a meeting at Norfolk 
House, just outside of London, which was attended by several members of SHAEF and UNRRA, as 
well as representatives from the American Treasury Department, the State Department, the British 
Ministry of Economic Warfare and the British War Office.82  Grasett opened the meeting by stating 
that “SHAEF’s responsibility was for an arbitrary period of six months after the collapse of Germany; 
it might be more or it might be less.”83  He explained that this decision would be made by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff.  After the military period, “CAD would be followed ‘possibly and 
probably’ by UNRRA.  Their plans should be framed so as to fit in, as far as possible, with the longer 
range plans of their successors.”84  This was a considerable change in attitude from SHAEF’s position 
of only a few months prior.   
General Grasett spent some time discussing the situation that existed in France.  “So far there 
has been no displaced persons problem,” he explained.85  The Allies had arranged for camps to take 
care of a possible 40,000 refugees should the need arise.  He then turned to the matter of supplies, 
explaining that the farms were in operation and that there did not appear to be any shortages of food.  
General Grasett then called on General Scowden to discuss issues of supply.  General Scowden 
explained that the supplies for the first 180 days had already been allocated by the CCAC, with 90 
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days’ worth of supplies already stockpiled in Britain, and the second 90 days’ in the process of being 
shipped.  He believed “that the first 180 days were fairly well taken care of.  He added that army 
groups will make detailed surveys on the spot and will send in requisitions which may easily result in 
modification of SHAEF’s estimates.”86  General Scowden explained that planning needed to be done 
for three possible outcomes: the collapse of the German army, German withdrawal and sabotage of 
remaining supplies, and continued fighting.  He placed particular emphasis on the possibility of 
German collapse, and stated that, in this event, the Allies would be prepared to step in and provide 
supplies.        
After General Grasett, Leith-Ross was invited to speak about UNRRA’s role.  He stated that 
UNRRA agreed with “the desirability of dovetailing plans between the two organizations, and he 
welcomed the action already taken in certain fields to invite representatives of UNRRA to sit with the 
corresponding planning groups in SHAEF.”87  He reiterated UNRRA’s concern that it would be 
difficult to recruit staff without a definitive timeline for UNRRA’s involvement.  General Grasett 
responded that he could not give a definitive answer, but that “SHAEF would want to be assured that 
the Allied Governments wanted UNRRA’s help.”88  This was a continuing point of contention 
between UNRRA and SHAEF.  General Grasett mentioned the French as the first government whose 
consent UNRRA would require.  This was, of course, an excellent example of UNRRA’s dilemma 
and UNRRA representative Feonov, the head of the ERO’s Supply Division, asked General Grasett 
which French government he meant, Vichy or de Gaulle.  Grasett was forced to reply “that the answer 
to that question would have to be determined by other than the military authorities.”89  One of the 
most difficult problems in the immediate postwar period was identifying which group or groups 
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should be identified as the governing authorities, representatives from the government-in-exile, or, in 
the case of France, the resistance, or those from the collaborationist governments.  Without a clear 
answer to his question, Leith-Ross moved on to questions of supply and transport.  He asked General 
Grasett if there would be supplies available for all of the three possible outcomes (German collapse, 
withdrawal or continued fighting), and also if the general had any information on military transport 
facilities and warehousing.  Grasett could not answer these questions in great detail, but agreed to 
look into them.   
One month later, on 12 July, a second meeting was held between representatives of SHAEF 
and UNRRA.  Representing SHAEF at this meeting were Major General Gullion and Brigadier 
General Frank J. McSherry; UNRRA sent several UNRRA-SHAEF liaison staff; the meeting was 
chaired by Hoehler.  The meeting was an opportunity for the SHAEF representatives, and General 
Gullion in particular, to explain the organizational structure of SHAEF, and in particular G-5, and he 
highlighted the importance of integrating UNRRA’s liaison staff as quickly as possible “so that the 
carryover from military to civilian operation would be more easily affected.”90  UNRRA’s liaison 
staff was welcome to begin attending the weekly meetings held at SHAEF headquarters, accompanied 
by the SHAEF Displaced Persons officers.  The military wanted to make it clear that their 
organizational structure was fixed and UNRRA would have to work within it.  General McSherry also 
took the opportunity to clarify the chain of command.  He explained that each person assigned to a 
country mission was responsible to that commanding officer.  “He stressed the point that their 
principal job should be in relation to the missions to which they are assigned and on displaced persons 
planning,” although they may be asked to take part in special detail as well.91  Generals McSherry and 
Gullion were both focused on outlining the separate power structures and chains of command that 
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existed within SHAEF.  The British and American militaries each brought into SHAEF separate 
histories and operating procedures, and they wanted to ensure that UNRRA was aware of them.   
Clearly there was a lack of faith in UNRRA.  They both also emphasized the importance of a 
strong working relationship between the military and civilian authorities.  General McSherry “stated 
that complete integration with the military services would be necessary if this job is to be carried out 
without embarrassment to the civilians or to the SHAEF organization.”92  Similarly, General Gullion 
emphasized the point that the close relationship between UNRRA and SHAEF was presently only in 
effect for matters concerning Displaced Persons, and that any extension of this relationship to other 
areas of mutual interest would depend upon “the manner in which these displaced persons officers of 
UNRRA conduct themselves and perform their duties with the Army.”93  This was further evidence of 
the military’s distrust in UNRRA.  In his report to the Director General, Hoehler stated that this 
meeting saw continued improvement in relations with SHAEF.  “This conference was a high-water 
mark in our relations with the military, and from my point of view one of the most satisfactory 
accomplishments in the Displaced Persons Division.”94  This was, however, not saying much.  He 
asserted that the clearest advantage to this meeting had come from putting several military officials in 
the same room, thus allowing UNRRA to ask the same questions to all of them.  UNRRA was now 
clearly involved in the discussion on displaced persons matters, although it would take months for 
them to collect the information that they required.  Hoehler’s evaluation of the situation is perplexing.  
At every turn it appears as though UNRRA is being side-stepped, and yet he reports that this meeting 
is a successful step in the right direction.  While it appears as though Hoehler had a tin ear, his 
expectations were set so low that in fact he was just happy that UNRRA was invited.    
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The first clash between SHAEF and UNRRA erupted almost immediately.  On 28 July, 
Brigadier General Julius C. Holmes, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, and General Grasett’s 
second-in-command, wrote to General Hilldring, the Director of the Civil Affairs Division in 
Washington, to complain about the way in which the British papers were reporting on UNRRA and 
its role in postwar Europe.  Holmes believed that UNRRA had informed the newspaper that they 
would be taking over the operation of all DP camps immediately, and that the military would play no 
role.  “One of the senior officers of the French Mission asked General Gullion the other day in all 
seriousness what his duties were now that UNRRA had taken over the problem of displaced persons 
in Europe,” Holmes wrote.95  He asked General Hilldring’s permission to put out an official press 
release clarifying UNRRA’s role in the initial phase, and explaining that “this matter is a 
responsibility of the Army during the military phase” and that UNRRA must be invited in by the 
governments of the liberated countries before they can begin operations.  In the end no press release 
was made.  However, this letter makes clear that UNRRA had a long way to go in earning the respect 
and trust of their counterparts at SHAEF.  Civilians generally garnered little respect from the military, 
and this was not a position that was going to change quickly or easily.    
At a meeting of UNRRA’s division heads on 19 July 1944, concerns were expressed on 
several points of conflict with the military authorities.  Feonov, the Soviet representative to UNRRA 
and the director of supply, reported that he had met with General Scowden to discuss the possibility 
of UNRRA taking part in supply discussions.  Scowden had denied UNRRA any representation at 
these meetings, arguing that “results of such discussions could be made available by SHAEF to 
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UNRRA, which should be adequate for UNRRA’s purposes.”96  UNRRA was clearly not welcome.  
Roy F. Hendrikson, UNRRA’s deputy director in charge of supply, who had attended the meeting 
with Scowden alongside Feonov, neatly condensed the whole of UNRRA’s problems with SHAEF 
when he stated: 
the problem in so far as SHAEF is concerned is that discussions take place at so many levels.  
What seemed to be a tacit agreement with a SHAEF country mission was not necessarily 
final…  General Scowden was well disposed towards UNRRA, but took the position that 
discussions at the lower level were purely formative and therefore inconsequential to 
UNRRA’s possible use.  At the level where SHAEF itself agreed to any undertaking this was 
a different matter.97   
At the same time as UNRRA liaison officers were trying to integrate into SHAEF, UNRRA 
also attempted to establish a working relationship with the Soviet Union.  Hoehler reported to the 
Director General that throughout the summer of 1944 there was reason to believe that UNRRA might 
be able to cooperate closely with the Soviet authorities in matters concerning DPs.  “Mr. Illiuschenko 
came to my office one morning,” he reported, “to say that his Government would send several liaison 
people to work with UNRRA and would hope that they might have some relationship with 
SHAEF.”98  The Soviets were apparently hoping to use a position within UNRRA to gain entrance 
into SHAEF.  Whether this was for official or for clandestine purposes is never clear.  However, at 
the end of the summer the Soviet government suddenly withdrew this proposal.  Hoehler mentioned 
the possibility of closer cooperation with the Soviet Union based on the overtures made by the 
Soviets to several officers at SHAEF, including Colonel A. J. Drexel Biddle, a member of 
Eisenhower’s staff at SHAEF Headquarters, who brought the matter to Eisenhower’s attention.  “I 
have now been called by SHAEF,” Hoehler concluded, “to arrange a conference between Major-
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General Vasiliev, Brigadier Venable and Colonel Biddle for a discussion of prisoners-of-war 
matters.”99  This meeting eventually took place on 31 August.  At this meeting General Gullion 
invited the Soviet government to appoint liaison officers for work with SHAEF, but these plans led to 
nought.100          
In the summer of 1944, at the same time as SHAEF was bringing UNRRA officers into their 
planning discussions, SHAEF also began compiling handbooks on an assortment of subjects related 
to Military Government for officers in the field.  It was in this endeavor that the first major 
disagreement over postwar policy between the British and the Americans occurred.  The German 
country unit of SHAEF had been working on their Handbook for Military Government in Germany 
throughout the spring of 1944, and by June 15 they had completed a third draft.  Believing that it was 
ready for publication, they sent it to an editorial board and several hundred copies of it were 
circulated for review.  As Earl F. Ziemke explains in his study of the American occupation of 
Germany, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau received a copy of the handbook and was incensed 
at the plans for economic rehabilitation.  As Ziemke relates, Morgenthau argued that “[t]he German 
people had to have it driven home to them that ‘the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless 
conspiracies of modern civilization.’”101  Morgenthau took his concerns directly to the President, who 
in turn responded that the Handbook had to be withdrawn.  “President Roosevelt expressed 
displeasure,” Pogue writes, “because so many Americans and Englishmen held that the people of 
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Germany were not responsible for the war, a view he insisted was not based on fact.”102  He believed 
that the Handbook outlined a situation in which the American Military would provide too much aid to 
the German population, reinforcing the belief that the Germans were not to blame for the war, an idea 
with which he strongly disagreed.  The Handbook had also called for a large-scale public works 
program, organized by the occupying army, which implicitly promised long-term involvement in 
postwar reconstruction, a promise that Roosevelt was not willing to make.   
SHAEF faced a difficult problem once the President became involved.  They could not ignore 
his concerns.  However, Allied soldiers were approaching the German frontier and they required 
some guidance.  The task of reworking the Handbook fell into the lap of G-5, as the Germany country 
unit had been disbanded, who had to make the best of a bad situation.  SHAEF’s first concern was to 
have something prepared for use by troops in the field as soon as possible, as they believed that Allied 
forces would soon be entering Germany.  They did not have time to rewrite and reprint the guide.  
Instead, they decided to append a notice to the front of the previously printed handbooks, addressing 
the President’s concerns.  The notice listed three main principles for officers to follow in instituting 
policy.  One of the principles in particular proved problematic: in the original text Germany had been 
referred to as a ‘liberated’ territory, but this was changed to ‘occupied’ in order to appease the 
President.  However, this change did not translate well into the German language.  “In German there 
is no way of muting the connotations of plunder and annexation of territory [thus] ‘We come as 
conquerors’ quickly found a place among the durable quotes of the war,” explains Earl Ziemke.103  As 
a result, no one was satisfied with the final handbook. 
Once the handbook was complete, for better or worse, SHAEF turned its attention toward 
finalizing a more detailed plan for troops on the ground handling displaced persons.  In November 
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1944, SHAEF released Administrative Memorandum No. 39, a document which outlined its 
procedure for dealing with displaced persons in Germany.  The Refugees, Displaced Persons and 
Welfare Branch of SHAEF had spent the spring and summer of 1944 working on this memo.  The 
purpose was to define as clearly as possible the roles expected to be played by the military, UNRRA, 
the German authorities and other groups responsible for the care of the displaced persons in postwar 
Germany.  The document began by stating that “[t]he liberation care and repatriation of United 
Nations displaced persons is a major Allied objective.  Available resources at the disposal of military 
commanders will be employed to accomplish it as a direct military responsibility.”104   
The memo established policy for the period of military advance, as well as the period of 
Military Government.  The period of military advance covered the period of fighting.  Once the war 
in Europe ended, the Allies would institute a Military Government and SHAEF would be replaced by 
a governing body.  SHAEF had always been envisioned as just a wartime command structure for 
coordinating British and American troop movements.  With the end of the war, this command 
structure would no longer be necessary.  In its place, Germany would be divided into zones of 
occupation.  Discussion amongst the Big Three over the partition of Germany into separate zones of 
occupation began when Roosevelt suggested it at the Tehran conference in November 1943, and it 
was finally agreed upon when they met again at the conference at Yalta in February 1945.  They 
agreed that each power would be responsible for administering its own zone of occupation (including 
one for France) but the country as a whole would be ruled by a joint commission, the Allied Control 
Council (ACC).  Each zone would also revert to a separate military command structure.  In the 
American zone, SHAEF’s military control would be handed to the United States Forces, European 
Theatre (USFET), based in Frankfurt, while political control would be placed with the United States 
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Group, Control Council (USGCC), based in Berlin.  The USGCC represented the American element 
of the ACC, which also included representatives from the other occupying powers.   
During the period of military advance, UNRRA would be invited to take part in the care of 
the DPs.  UNRRA would not take responsibility for any enemy or ex-enemy displaced persons; 
responsibility for these groups would fall to the German authorities.  Crucially, the Report delineated 
the differences between refugees and displaced persons.  According to SHAEF, refugees were the 
internally displaced, those civilians who were “temporarily homeless” and “at some distance from 
their homes for reasons related to the war,” but who were “not outside the national boundaries of their 
country.”105  In contrast, displaced persons were those civilians who were externally displaced and 
therefore “outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of war.”106  SHAEF also 
differentiated the DPs from enemy and ex-enemy territory from the United Nations Displaced Persons 
(UNDPs), those DPs whose homes lay in countries that were members of the United Nations.  
Finally, they defined stateless persons as those people who were de-nationalized or whose country of 
origin could not be determined.  This was an important distinction; it distinguished those people who 
would require short-term care and repatriation from those who did not.   
SHAEF planned for the advancing armies to leave behind Military Government detachments 
to work with the DPs.  After Military Government was instituted, Military District Commanders 
would take over the supervision, control and administration of the DPs and refugees.  All questions 
regarding DPs would then be handled by the Displaced Persons Executive (DPX), a group comprised 
of SHAEF Headquarters staff, Military Government detachments, combat and service officers, DP 
staff officers from the British Control Commission and the U.S. Group Control Council, and UNRRA 
personnel.  During the period of military advance, SHAEF would “exercise overall administrative 
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control over the care, control and repatriation of displaced persons and the control of refugees so long 
as the Supreme Commander has responsibility.”107  SHAEF would, however, invite Liaison Officers 
to advise them and assist in the organization and care of the DPs.  Chief Liaison Officers would reside 
at Supreme Headquarters.   
The memo outlined the roles expected to be played by each of the main participants in 
postwar Germany and further emphasized their lack of trust in UNRRA as an organization.  The 
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) would be responsible for preventing the 
hindrance of all military operations, controlling the spread of disease, protecting the DPs from 
interference by the Germans, ensuring that the Germans supplied care and maintenance for them, and 
working towards the rapid repatriation of the DPs.  The Allied governments would have the 
responsibility of caring for all DPs and enemy nationals discovered within their borders, as well as 
their own nationals, once they had been repatriated.  SHAEF missions would be responsible for 
making “[a]rrangements for the repatriation of displaced persons from Processing Centers in 
Germany to Reception Centers in their own countries, and repatriation of German displaced persons 
from Assembly Centers in Allied countries to Reception Centers in areas which are a SCAEF 
responsibility in Germany.”108   
 Once Military Government was instituted, Military District Commanders would take over 
duties relating to refugees and DPs from fighting formations.  District Commanders would be 
responsible for locating, caring for and controlling UNDPs as well as moving them to Assembly 
Centers.  They would also report to SHAEF on the numbers and locations of the DPs in their area.  
Most importantly, they would “[f]ree from confinement nationals of the United Nations and of neutral 
countries confined, interned or otherwise under restraint by German authorities because of race, 
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religion or activities in favour of the United Nations, and place them under Allied military control or 
restriction as may be appropriate pending other disposition.”109  Thus, there was a clear understanding 
in 1944 that the military would be liberating concentration camps, as well as a recognition that the 
people found there would in all likelihood require additional medical and welfare care.  The District 
Commander was responsible for transporting them to facilities that could provide them with this care.  
SHAEF was also careful to include the possibility of United Nations nationals joining their own 
military units, or else taking part in labour battalions organized by their military.  There would also be 
opportunities to take part in civilian work at Assembly Centers, though this point was simply touched 
upon.  Military Commanders were also responsible for the health and welfare of the DPs; for their 
accommodation and registration; for the protection of their property, rights and claims; for security 
checks; for assisting the Liaison Officers in their repatriation; and for supervising the German 
authorities.  The German authorities would be responsible for paying for all goods, facilities and 
services for DPs; for their care, maintenance and medical attention; for the special provision for those 
persons of enemy origin who were persecuted; for the payment of wages and benefits of all foreign 
workers in Germany; for information regarding the numbers and location of DPs and those people 
confined to imprisonment and concentration camps; and for disseminating Military Government 
orders. 
 Administrative Memo 39 also finally outlined UNRRA’s role in postwar Germany.  UNRRA 
was allowed to care for the DPs in Germany, but it was not authorized to deal with any enemy or ex-
enemy DPs, save for those who were stateless or persecuted during the war.  “UNRRA staff officers,” 
SHAEF explained, “will be attached to and form part of all headquarters at which there are Displaced 
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Persons Staff officers.”110  The plan was to continually increase the number of UNRRA staff 
members as well as their responsibilities so that the eventual handover would be as smooth as 
possible.  The memo stated, “UNRRA will provide personnel to take over in whole or in part the 
administration and management of Assembly Centers for United Nations displaced persons as and 
when desired by military commanders, who will call forward personnel through command 
channels.”111  UNRRA would provide medical and welfare specialists, as well as secretarial and 
administrative personnel, when the military requested them.  UNRRA personnel would be required to 
wear a special uniform so that they could be easily identified by the military.  Eventually, “[t]he 
proportion of UNRRA personnel at all levels will be increased as rapidly as military and other 
considerations permit in order to facilitate the smooth transfer of full responsibility to UNRRA.”112  
All UNRRA staff would be called forward through the ERO.  The Intergovernmental Committee on 
Refugees (IGCR) would remain responsible for the resettlement of people who do not desire to return 
to their homelands.113   UNRRA would care for these people until such a time as they could be 
resettled.     
The SHAEF plan placed a heavy emphasis on the role of the Liaison Officers.  “European 
Allied national authorities have made available liaison officers empowered to issue repatriation visas, 
who will assist in the care and repatriation of their displaced nationals.  For the most part they will 
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carry out this work in Assembly Centers, but their services may be required at all levels,” the Memo 
explained.114  The liaison officers would be accredited to and called forward by SHAEF.  They could 
be moved around at SHAEF’s discretion.  They explained that, “Liaison Officers for Repatriation 
may receive, and after consultation with the appropriate military authority, act upon such instructions 
of their government as are consistent with the requirements of the military authorities.”115  The 
Liaison Officers would have the same privileges as other military personnel, and all matters relating 
to discipline would be referred to the European Allied Contact Section at SHAEF.  The functions of 
the Liaison Officers included assisting in identifying and registering the DPs; recommending 
repatriation priorities to SHAEF; issuing repatriation visas to DPs; assisting in the preparation of 
reports; assisting in the control of their nationals; assisting in the organization of health and welfare 
programs; furnishing SHAEF with information as necessary; assisting in the selection of staff, the 
settlement of claims, and the exchange of currency; approving Assembly Center directors; and 
carrying out security checks on their nationals.  Those designated Chief Allied Liaison Officers would 
work at Supreme Headquarters.116   
 SHAEF foresaw three different types of DP processing centers: assembly centers, reception 
centers, and border control stations.  Assembly Centers would be established to provide DPs with 
food, clothing, shelter and medical care until they could be repatriated.  Reception Centers were not 
explained in any detail, but were presumably transit and collection points.  Border control stations 
“will be established in Germany, as a military responsibility, on civilian traffic routes, at or near 
international boundaries, or the lines of demarcation between Allied zones, for the control of 
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movement across these boundaries and demarcation lines.”117  The Memo also explained that all 
persons claiming POW or civilian internee status would be accepted as such until SHAEF was able to 
investigate each case.  They explained that   
[p]ersons of United Nations nationality found outside Prisoner of War Camps who claim to 
be prisoners of war, or members of United Nations military forces who have escaped or 
evaded capture by the enemy and are uncovered in the course of military operations, and 
British/U.S. civilians found outside civilian internment camps who claim to be civilian 
internees, will initially be cared for as displaced persons.118  
SHAEF also addressed legal questions about the displaced persons.  They explained that any 
UNDP arrested by German police was to be handed over to the military or Military Government 
police, and that they would be tried in military or Military Government courts, and not German 
courts.  This was a reflection of the growing concern over issues of law and order.  As well, in cases 
heard in front of German courts where DP interests are concerned, Military Commanders should 
ensure that UNDP interests are safeguarded and that the trials are adequately supervised.   
 Administrative Memo 39 placed the Displaced Persons Executive (DPX), a section of G-5, in 
charge of all repatriation movements.  “When military commanders wish to initiate repatriation 
movement of displaced United Nations nationals, who can be returned to their countries of origin 
without interference with military operations,” it explained, “such movement will be coordinated by 
DPX, Supreme Headquarters, AEF, acting through the Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Mission 
accredited to the country of reception of the displaced persons.”119  Designated reception centers were 
already being arranged in France, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands, and each center was 
intended to be able to receive a set number of displaced persons without prior notification.  However, 
above and beyond the set number of DPs, the centers would require warning from SHAEF.  
Displaced persons were not to be moved across international borders other than directly into their 
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home country, “except where operational necessity makes it mandatory or when they are in transit to 
their countries of origin.”120  Displaced persons did not require visas in order to return to their home 
country.  DPX would keep track of all reception center locations and all groups of displaced persons 
awaiting repatriation.  DPX would also “[c]oordinate movements from Assembly Centers with 
Reception Center capacities and, in consultation with Movement and Transportation/Transportation 
Corps, will arrange onward movement.”  According to SHAEF policy, DPs would be sent to the 
closest reception center in their home country.  DPX would also be the office responsible for issuing 
movement orders for groups of nationals at Assembly Centers, copying SHAEF on all movement 
orders.  Assembly Center Directors would be responsible for choosing the groups to be involved in 
each movement, and they would supply DPX with a list of names and registration information of all 
displaced persons to be repatriated on the day of movement.  These lists would also be furnished to 
the group leaders of each movement, to ensure full identification when crossing national boundaries.   
 Administrative Memo 39, then, created a plan for the care of Displaced Persons in Germany, 
and allocated responsibilities to each of the organizations involved.  They envisioned the smooth 
movement of DPs from the areas that they were located, into assembly centres, and finally in 
organized repatriation movements to their home countries.    For at least six months, the military 
period, SHAEF would be responsible for the care of all DPs, and also for their repatriation.  This 
responsibility would eventually pass to Military Government, once it was instituted.  The German 
administration would be responsible for providing all food, housing and other services.  SHAEF 
would guarantee that they provided it, and also ensure the security of the assembly centres.  If 
SHAEF needed assistance with the DPs, they would turn to the national liaison officers.  Together 
SHAEF and the LOs would administer an orderly repatriation movement.  SHAEF’s plan left very 
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little room for UNRRA.  While they would be active in the military period, it would only be in the 
form of individual UNRRA officials working under the direction of the military.  Only after six 
months would UNRRA take over administration of the DP camps, and by then SHAEF believed that 
the repatriation movements would be all but complete.  Therefore, Memo 39 outlined a plan in which 
UNRRA was made a minor partner in the postwar care of the DPs.   
 Thus, by the fall of 1944, as the Allies advanced toward the German border, SHAEF had in 
place a broad organizational structure for dealing with displaced persons in Germany.  UNRRA had 
spent the first half of the year unsure of the role that they would play, and the second half of the year 
working for their people to be included in the various meetings and conferences.  By the end of the 
year they had made considerable progress.  They had also come to an agreement with SHAEF on the 
role that they would play.  However, this agreement significantly circumscribed UNRRA’s role.  In 
the event that there were still DPs in Germany following the military period, UNRRA would take 
responsibility for their care.  However, it is clear from Memo 39 that SHAEF did not expect that 
much work would remain for UNRRA.   
SHAEF believed that they had constructed a workable postwar plan.  Following the problems 
associated with the preparation of the handbook in the summer of 1944, the more detailed 
administrative memo more clearly outlined the military and Military Government periods and the 
broad responsibilities of each group in each period.  The military believed that they had a plan of 
action.  Unfortunately for UNRRA, they were involved too little and too late to take advantage of 
much of this information.  They were largely passive observers in the planning phase.  Therefore, 
when the time came to begin putting UNRRA staff into the field, they were ill-prepared, as 
subsequent chapters will show.  What is interesting to note is that the military was not prepared either.  
Despite the plans and the conferences, they were also caught off guard on the ground as well.
 76 
Chapter 2 
‘Man does not live by bread alone’: planning for rehabilitation, 
recruitment and training 
What equipment does the social case worker need in order to enter into the social case 
process, both in direct relationship with the client and in transmission of power through 
organization of environment?  For direct relationship he needs a professional attitude and a 
habit of understanding a personality or case as a whole… For dealing with the environmental 
situation he will need besides this a point of view as to community and member, knowledge 
of social patterns and institutions, and knowledge of a possible range of concrete facts which 
are to be the materials of environmental change.1 
 
[I]t may be worth saying that a majority of displaced persons have led what is in fact a 
compulsorily parasitic existence… Traces of this situation and its related attitudes are bound 
to persist in the community of the assembly centre, and may well appear in the form of 
unthinking selfishness and lack of consideration for others.2   
 
The essence of this whole matter lies in patience, and in trying to arrange for the development 
of sincere human relations which contain elements of genuine affection and tenderness.3 
 
 
 
When UNRRA’s founding charter was signed on 9 November 1943 in Washington, D.C., the 
task before it was laid out very broadly.  The Allies were beginning to see the tide turning in their 
favour; there was reason to believe that victory was possible.  They were aware that victory in Europe 
would mean the release of millions of non-Germans who would have to be cared for and eventually 
repatriated.  UNRRA had two stated goals: they were to supply not only relief, but also rehabilitation 
for those people displaced by the war.  Exactly what was meant by rehabilitation was initially unclear, 
but it gradually and necessarily took shape during UNRRA’s planning stage, over the course of 1944 
and the spring of 1945, before the collapse of the Germany army.  As well, before they could begin to 
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place anyone in the field, UNRRA had to recruit field personnel and prepare them for their work in 
Germany.  They also had to more clearly define their goals and outline their practices.  For a nascent 
international organization with no previous experience to draw upon, this was no simple task.  
Therefore, while staff at UNRRA Headquarters attempted to gain information from the military and 
tried to coordinate their efforts with them, UNRRA staff in the European Regional Office (ERO) 
prepared for entry into the field in two ways: they recruited and trained staff, and they formulated 
welfare policies.  They began by developing job descriptions, vetting applicants, and designing a 
training program.   
 
UNRRA sought to recruit a qualified, international staff to fulfill its mandate.  That 
international character was considered crucial and was mandated in UNRRA Resolution 37 which 
stated that “the staff of the Administration should be of an international character, and selected upon 
the basis of individual competence, character, and integrity, without discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, race, nationality, or creed, and recruited upon as wide a geographic basis as is possible.”4  
UNRRA also implored all member governments to make available qualified individuals in their 
countries for employment with UNRRA.  “There is no question at all,” Mary McGeachy, director of 
UNRRA’s Welfare Division, wrote in February 1945, “that UNRRA’s work with regard to Displaced 
Persons will fail if the welfare programme of Assembly Centres is not well done, and this depends 
ultimately upon the quality of personnel we are able to recruit to this service.”5  While she 
acknowledged the clash between the time required to vet all applicants and the urgency of filling the 
vacancies, she nevertheless asserted that “we cannot afford to put into this extremely important field 
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any but the best material.”6  For UNRRA’s mission in Germany, “the best material” was professional 
social workers.  Their knowledge of efficient administrative practices along with their experience in 
helping those in need made them prime candidates for work in UNRRA’s assembly centers in 
Germany.   
UNRRA believed that professional social workers were the group most qualified to take on 
the task of rehabilitating Europe’s displaced persons.  They brought with them both key interpersonal 
skills and administrative experience.  Social work was a relatively new profession.  At the turn of the 
century the term ‘social worker’ was not yet in use.    Relief for the poor in the United States in the 
early twentieth century had been dispensed by private organizations.  Before dispensing aid, each 
applicant received a friendly visitor at their house, who called on the applicant at their home in order 
to assess the need for relief.  The workers distinguished between the deserving and undeserving poor, 
those who they determined could provide for themselves but chose not to, and those who could not 
provide for themselves and therefore deserved relief.  Successful “friendly visitors,” as they were 
called, struck up a genuine relationship with the families that they visited.  They also gave advice to 
the applicants.  They sought the moral reform of those that they visited.  As Mary E. Richmond’s 
Friendly Visiting among the Poor explained, “If outside help is needed, it should be made conditional 
upon renewed efforts at work or in school, upon willingness to receive training, upon cleanliness, or 
upon some other development within the family that will aid in their uplifting… we should make our 
help a ladder rather than a crutch.”7  Friendly visiting was an opportunity for the visitor to share their 
own experience and expertise with the poor.  They brought with them their class values and their 
social norms.  Friendly visitors were generally women from the middle class: the wives and daughters 
of wealthy farmers, small businessmen, and self-employed professionals, and, as the composition of 
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the American middle class changed, also the wives and daughters of engineers, managers and other 
professionals.     
At the turn of the century, private organizations dispensing relief became increasingly 
interested in organizing and rationalizing charity.  The Charity Organization Societies (COS) 
developed with the goal of bringing a scientific approach to requests for aid.  Originally founded in 
Britain in the late 1860s, the COS movement made its way across the Atlantic and in 1877 the first 
COS was founded in Buffalo, New York.  Members of the COS joined together to pay the cost of an 
agent who investigated applicants seeking relief.  This came from a growing fear amongst charitable 
organizations that people were seeking relief from several different agencies simultaneously.  In order 
to prevent this, the COS collected information on all applicants for relief and kept this information in 
an index.  They also sought to investigate all requests, register all applicants, and supervise the 
distribution of relief to them.  The COS method represented what came to be called ‘scientific 
charity’: the application of scientific methods to social welfare.  The key was rationalization: the COS 
leaders sought to replace the existing inefficient system of charity with a rational system that 
prevented anyone from exploiting the aid system.  While the friendly visitor continued to visit the 
client and offer advice, the decision to offer relief was made by the COS agent, and all records were 
maintained by them as well.  Thus, the paid COS agent brought to the business of charity not only 
their social work skills, but also their administrative skills.  Their ability not only to interview the 
applicant, but also to report their findings in writing, was seen a skill that all professional social 
workers should develop.       
 As a result of the influence of scientific charity, the early twentieth century saw the rise of a 
new kind of American social work, which encouraged people to become self-sufficient, and the 
decline of traditional charity work, with its focus on dispensing relief.  With it came the 
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professionalization of social work.  The professional social worker focused on helping people help 
themselves.  This was a response to a widespread belief that relief removed the onus on the individual 
and therefore removed the need to work to provide themselves with life’s necessities.  “While some 
critics realized that relief rarely did more than prevent starvation,” social worker Beverly Stadum 
noted, “more lamented how it destroyed self-reliance, threatening community morals and leaving 
business, the engine of progress, short of workers as they preferred the dole to honest wages.”8  Thus 
the goal of each agency was “to put its clients into a position which would enable them to achieve the 
fullest possible measure of self-help.”9  Some social workers referred to this process as one of 
‘stimulation.’  A social worker’s goal was to identify each person’s strengths and capabilities in order 
that they might stimulate the applicant (soon referred to as the client), to use these strengths to 
overcome their difficulties and learn to provide for themselves.10  In 1922, Robert W. Kelso, 
President of the National Conference on Social Work, explained that the future of social work lay not 
in dispensing relief, but instead in stimulating self-reliance: 
it is common still to enter the office of a relief agency and stand abashed before a stern old 
monolith whose business is the mechanical termination of the poor.  This sibyl is becoming 
extinct.  The carefully trained case worker with a heart and imagination is taking her place.  
The dispenser of doles is departing, and in his stead is arising the skilled social worker—the 
citizen of vision who can glimpse the finished statue in the granite block; who can see the 
summer blossoms in the snow.11 
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In order to be able to stimulate this self-reliance, social workers shared important qualities, including 
“[f]aith and interest in people, insight, balance, patience, freedom, from prejudice; power to suspend 
judgement, to lead, to evaluate findings, to organize.”12   
The increasingly widespread belief that social workers were there to help their clients become 
self-sufficient was elaborated upon by the Milford Committee in their 1929 Social Case Work, 
Generic and Specific: A Report of the Milford Conference. The Milford Committee consisted of a 
group of executives and board members from six national social work organizations in the United 
States, and their report sought to identify the key practices used by American social workers.  One of 
the key tools that they highlighted was the social worker’s understanding of social norms and 
deviations.  Norms were understood as desirable social activities, aspects of everyday life that were 
beneficial to the individual and to society as a whole.  These norms included certain understandings 
of aesthetics, education, family, home, law, literacy, marriage, parenthood, recreation, religion, self-
support, social behaviour, voluntary associations, and work.  For example, each individual should 
maintain personal cleanliness, including bathing regularly, cleaning their clothes, and brushing their 
hair and teeth.    They should also strive to marry, have children and maintain a family unit, as well as 
work and be self-supporting, and consider involvement in other organizations, such as their local 
church, service club, or recreational sports league.  In contrast, they defined deviations as undesirable 
social activities, and included any actions that might inhibit “the capacity of the individual to organize 
his own normal social activities in a given environment.”13  In other words, the social case worker 
was concerned with those deviations from the social norm that prevented an individual from living 
successfully on a day-to-day basis in society.  These deviations did not automatically require the 
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assistance of a social case worker, but a social case worker’s help was required when a deviation 
inhibited a person’s “capacity for self-maintenance.”14  The Committee differentiated between 
deviations concerning the individual alone, and those which also had an impact upon the family.  
Deviations concerning the family included bigamy, common law marriage, family desertion, 
illegitimacy, non-support, and parental neglect.  Deviations concerning the individual included 
communicable disease, crime, delinquency, destructive behaviour, illiteracy, lack of skill in trade, 
mental ill health, non-conformity, prostitution, unemployment, and vagrancy.   
According to the Milford Committee, generic social work was best understood as the 
differentiation between “norms of human life and human relationships” and “typical deviations from 
accepted standards of social life.”15  Social work identified those people who deviated from social 
norms and established methods of study and treatment.   In order to assess an individual’s adherence 
to social norms and their deviations from them, a social case worker had to accumulate information 
from the client including a personal history, complete with their education and family background; 
their personal data, including their marital and social status; their economic situation; the nature of 
their relationships to others in their family, social circle and workplace; and their environmental data, 
with reference to their housing, community facilities, and their standard of living.16  Interviewing was 
the main method of obtaining this information.  Face-to-face meetings with clients allowed the social 
worker to examine each client’s situation and determine any deviations inherent in their lifestyle.  
Accurate interviewing required a certain level of finesse, “an alertness by the interviewer for leads to 
information which can be followed without antagonizing the person interviewed,” as well as “the 
establishment of a relationship through the interview which will insure whole-hearted co-operation 
and an ability to cover as much ground as possible in as little time as possible without sacrificing the 
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essential requirements of the relationship between the person interviewed and the organization.”17  
The ultimate goal of each social worker, according to the Milford Committee, was to give their clients 
the tools necessary to make themselves self-sufficient.  The Committee asserted that social work “has 
made its highest contribution when its clients no longer needs the social case worker, not because he 
no longer faces these deviations but because his developed capacity for self-maintenance is equal to 
the task of dealing with them unaided by a social case worker.”18  This became known as the case 
work approach to social work, requiring intimate one-on-one involvement at the level of the 
individual.  It was time-consuming and geared toward long-term social rehabilitation. 
Most Americans believed that charity was best dispensed by private organizations rather than 
the government.  They believed that charities would be better administered than government 
operations because the trustees were generally businessmen with administrative experience and 
because charity directors could be fired if they did a poor job.  Many argued that “local relief often 
had more to do with politics than with charity or justice” when undertaken by public agencies, and 
that in many cases those who handed out public relief were corrupt.19  The stock market crash in 
November 1929 and the Depression that followed gradually changed this opinion of the government’s 
ability to administer relief.  At first many Americans, including President Herbert Hoover, believed 
that the economic downturn was just a normal phase of the business cycle, and that the surest way to 
recover was to encourage investment and continued production.  The responsibility for providing 
relief to the poor thus remained in the hands of the private charities, but they did not have the 
resources to help the millions of unemployed Americans who sought their help.  “The present 
economic emergency,” faculty at the New York School of Social Work explained, “has brought all 
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social work into touch with a wider range of interests in American life than ever.  It has been 
subjected to critical scrutiny in some quarters; it has been welcomed as a collaborator in others.  It 
faces a period of reduced resources.”20  The Depression also challenged the assumptions on the root 
causes of poverty.  “’The new poor’ are different from the old poor,” social worker Antoinette 
Cannon wrote, “in that their poverty is clearly the result of outer social circumstance and not of their 
individual inadequacy.”21  This challenged the logic of the prevailing social welfare system.   
In 1932, the National Conference of Social Work called for the federal government to take a 
leading role in providing funds for the needy, and for a move from private relief provided by private 
charities to public relief organized by the government.  Social workers and their organizations 
changed their minds about the evils of public relief, and they began lobbying for increased 
government involvement.  “The truth is, the depression has swamped social work,” explained June 
Purcell Guild, a Virginia social worker.   
I believe the time has come for social workers to meet existing issues with a comprehensive 
program of social reform.  Aiding individuals one by one is essential.  Organizing 
community-welfare plans is also well and good.  Clearly, however, something more far-
reaching is also needed.  For those who would call themselves social workers, there is no 
escaping the social challenge of the times.22   
President Hoover resisted federal government involvement in relief, but in March 1933 Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt succeeded him and he brought a very different understanding of the Depression, its 
causes and possible resolutions to the White House.  In May 1933, Congress approved the creation of 
the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and earmarked nearly $500 million for relief.  
At the helm of this massive new government organization was Harry Hopkins, a New York social 
worker with several years’ experience working for private charities.  Hopkins believed strongly in 
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work relief: providing the unemployed with work and then paying them for it, instead of simply 
doling out charity.  The Public Works Administration (PWA) was founded in November 1933 in 
order to provide work relief jobs.  The PWA organized the construction of infrastructure such as 
roads, bridges, dams, hospitals and schools and used FERA funds to provide work for the 
unemployed.  This was the first time in which the American government had financed and organized 
large-scale relief for the poor.   
Thousands of new public agencies were created at the federal, state, and local levels, and 
these agencies in turn recruited large numbers of social workers to administer them.  While the first 
university program in social work began in 1889 with the Summer School of Philanthropy in New 
York, programs were soon founded in Boston, Chicago, Missouri and Philadelphia as well.  In the 
early years social work programs attempted to teach both individual treatment and social reform; 
curriculums endeavoured to cover social worker techniques for resolving individual problems and 
resolving societal problems.  However, in 1915, following Abraham Flexner’s report to the program 
planning committee of the National Conference of Charity and Correction entitled “Is Social Work a 
Profession?,” social work increasingly focused on case work and individual treatment.  Flexner 
argued that social work was not a profession because it did not have an “educationally communicable 
technique” and its boundaries were generally too broad. 23 From that point on, social work education 
focused on defining a methodology of case work and spent increasingly less time discussing societal 
change.  While other forms of relief work continued to operate within charity organizations in the 
United States, professional social work became increasingly synonymous with social case work.  As 
part of this new emphasis, university courses in social work taught students the language of social 
case work and an administrative process to follow while strongly emphasizing the importance of 
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proper and accurate record-keeping.  These were skills that UNRRA would soon draw heavily upon.  
Case work and report-writing were necessary prerequisites for a nascent international organization 
requiring a common administrative language and operating procedures, as will be seen.  In the 
interwar period, those social workers who had trained at universities filled the managerial positions in 
the developing American agencies, while younger, untrained recruits worked directly with clients.  
James Leiby explains that “[i]t was out of the question that professionals hold the line jobs—they 
were too few and too expensive—but they took a place as supervisors or administrators, and as such 
they tried to infuse their values into the organization.”24  Between the professional social workers and 
the new recruits, known as the rank-and-file, social work in the United States expanded dramatically 
in the decade before the Second World War and provided a large pool of qualified staff from which 
UNRRA hoped to draw.       
Britain had not seen the same expansion of social work as a profession in the interwar years.   
The American experience of the Great Depression and the work of FERA and the WPA greatly 
expanded the role of the professional social worker in American society.  British welfare practices 
were based on the old English poor laws which separated the poor into three groups: the able-bodied 
poor, those who were capable of working but could not find work; the impotent poor, those who were 
incapable of working due to illness or age; and the idle poor, or those who were unwilling to work.  
Those who were incapable of work were provided with relief, but for those who were capable of 
work, the government organized indoor relief and the workhouse.  The only form of relief available to 
them was in the workhouse, where conditions were harsh in order to discourage anyone from turning 
to this form of relief.  By the early twentieth century this form of relief had been largely discredited 
due to the appalling conditions.  In the interwar period workhouses were abolished.  Private charities, 
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known as voluntary societies, came to play an increasingly important role.  As had been the case in 
the United States, they were generally run by volunteers from the middle class without formal social 
work education.  “The days are, it is to be hoped, past,” wrote future British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee in his 1920 study The Social Worker, “when people without any qualifications other than a 
good heart and the means of obtaining money plunged straight into social work.”25  British 
universities were beginning to offer social work programs of study.26  Although the drive toward 
professionalization thus was beginning in Britain as well, the voluntary societies continued to retain 
control over providing relief to Britain’s poor.  Despite the growth in university-educated social 
workers, “the amateur can still find plenty of work to do.”27   
As a result of the different historical circumstances, American and British social workers 
brought very different understandings of social work to their employment with UNRRA.  The 
traditional British view of social work focused on poor living conditions and hunger as the primary 
causes of social disorder.  These problems were best solved by focusing on ameliorating the worst 
housing conditions, as well as providing adequate food and health care.  In contrast, American social 
workers, who were university-trained and aware of the latest scientific theories and developments in 
psychology, saw the crucial role of the social worker as fostering an overall sense of self-worth and 
instilling personal initiative in the individual.  American social work had accepted the centrality of 
case work, while British social work had not.  These differing understandings of social work created 
tension among those involved in UNRRA recruitment, training and planning.  Historians Susan 
Armstrong-Reid and David Murray stress the importance of this distinction in understanding the 
working relationship between members of the two schools of thought.   They explain that “Americans 
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trained in the modern concept of welfare work tended to disparage, whether justly or not, the British 
voluntary societies for their non-professional, un-theoretical, and haphazard approach to welfare.”28   
Although ultimately in the US Zone, at least, the American casework methodology and social 
work philosophy would win out, this debate played itself out in UNRRA’s various planning 
committees and sub-committees, and later between individuals in the field as well.  In a memorandum 
submitted to UNRRA by the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad (CBSRA), the differences 
between American and British social work practices were highlighted.  While acknowledging that 
social workers from both countries shared many of the same beliefs, including the importance of 
cooperation between all groups involved in the relief and rehabilitation of Europe’s displaced 
populations and respect for individual cultures and social practices, on other issues they saw things 
quite differently.  CBSRA emphasized the importance of group relationships as they explained that 
“[i]t will be of the greatest importance to preserve the spirit of co-operation between groups that had 
developed through the resistance movement and find new scope for its practical application after the 
war.”29  They also noted that “welfare operations should always allow for practical responsible 
participation by those who benefit from them.”30  This was very much in keeping with the traditional 
voluntary society view of relief work.  “Ordinary citizens may lack expert knowledge or technical 
skill as welfare organisers,” they wrote, “but they can do a surprising amount of good welfare work in 
association with experts.”31   
CBSRA feared that UNRRA’s staff of professional social workers would not welcome the 
help of the voluntary societies’ recommended recruits, in spite of the fact that they held years of 
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welfare experience amongst them.  They also encouraged UNRRA to create displaced persons 
committees as early as possible.  “CBSRA submits that a welfare policy based on these 
considerations will be more fruitful that one which on the one hand limits itself to mere negative 
toleration of established social groupings, and on the other seeks to secure the endorsement of its 
action merely from advisory groups composed of so-called ‘representative leaders.’”32  CBSRA was 
afraid that UNRRA would not allow the DPs themselves to play any meaningful role.  They were also 
concerned about the role of indigenous voluntary agencies.  They wanted to ensure that no voluntary 
agencies, foreign or indigenous, were left out.  In their effort to privilege the practices of British 
social work from those of social workers in America, the Council also quote at length the British 
Board of Education’s Circular 1516.  “Any attempt at a State-controlled uniformity or regimentation 
would be both stupid and perilous; more than that, it would be wholly alien to the spirit of this 
country” they wrote.33  They explained that the initiative always stemmed from those working on the 
ground; the federal government’s goal was merely to support these grass-roots efforts.  “The function 
of the State in this work is to focus and lead the efforts of all engaged in Youth Welfare; to 
supplement the resources of existing national organisations without impairing their independence; and 
to ensure through co-operation that the ground is covered in a way never so far attained.”34  It was the 
responsibility of the local authorities, those who best understood local conditions, “to take the 
initiative in their local areas; provide the machinery for local co-operation; encourage existing 
organisations to extend their work; and fill the gaps not covered by such organisations.”35  The 
Council wanted to discourage UNRRA from taking a top-down approach and dictating professional 
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social work practices to those social workers who had not been university-educated but nevertheless 
brought to the table several years of community experience. 
UNRRA initially believed that there was a place for both British and American social 
workers in Germany’s DP camps, despite their very different principles, and they set their sights on 
recruiting social workers from both Britain and the United States to administer Germany’s DP camps.  
This was certainly a pragmatic move—they needed as many qualified individuals as possible to join 
the organization.  In 1944, recruitment began at UNRRA Headquarters in Washington.  It was 
managed by a group of personnel officers from Headquarters, but included staff from the other 
UNRRA divisions, as well as representatives on loan from the United States Civil Service 
Commission.36  From Washington they recruited for positions for all of UNRRA’s field missions.  In 
March 1944 they began to formulate the job descriptions for missions throughout Europe.   They 
outlined several positions, beginning with the General Relief Welfare workers, and soon adding 
specialists in fields such as child care, emergency shelter, emergency feeding, occupational training, 
registration, information and advice services, community organization, and camp welfare programs.  
The specialist in charge of camp welfare programs would be responsible for estimating the need for 
welfare programs, supplies and facilities and to formulate plans for implementation of these 
programs.  These programs would cater to specific groups within the camps, including pregnant 
women and those with young children; youths and adolescents, including recreation and education 
programs; adults requiring vocation training; those requiring counseling services; and general work 
programs and recreational activities for the camp population at large.  The camp welfare specialist 
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would also be responsible for advising the camp administrators on all welfare questions, helping to 
prepare material for manuals, and reporting to Welfare Division Headquarters in Washington.37    
The call for applications from UNRRA described the candidates they sought and the rigours 
of the job.  Each candidate would have to be prepared to work in an assembly centre of 3,000 – 
10,000 Allied nationals, consisting mainly of men, but also of women and children.  According to the 
advertisement, UNRRA sought both Principal Welfare Officers and Deputy Welfare Officers.  
Principal Welfare Officer duties included organizing and directing welfare activities in Assembly 
Centres and training welfare staff.  They sought candidates between 30 and 55 years of age with a 
minimum of five years’ experience in social work in either government or voluntary agencies.  While 
they preferred candidates with general social work experience, they also invited applications from 
social workers with specialized experience as well.  Candidates had to be proficient in English, and a 
knowledge of French or German was considered beneficial.  Candidates were also required to pass a 
medical examination.  Finally, they sought candidates with a “good educational standard.”38  The 
duties of the Deputy Welfare Officer consisted of assisting the Principal Welfare Officer, and 
UNRRA sought candidates under twenty-six years of age with at least three years of welfare work 
experience.   
These qualifications were discussed in detail with both the Allied armed forces and the 
voluntary agencies.  The Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group, a group of specialists who focused 
on the psychological effects of the DPs’ diverse wartime experiences, argued that “any success in the 
psychological handling of the vast problem of displaced persons ultimately depended on the quality 
of the individuals you would entrust with carrying out your plans in actual contact with the distressed 
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people.”39  They strongly recommended that UNRRA utilize specialists in their selection process, as 
“rejection of poor material and selection of valuable personnel is done much more reliably by expert 
teams using scientific techniques, than if left to ‘amateur’ interviewing.”40  They also suggested that 
UNRRA seek out a psychological consultant to advise on all psychological matters, including 
personnel recruitment but also once staff have entered the field, “when countless human relations 
problems are liable to threaten the success of your work.”41  These proved to be impossibly high 
standards for recruitment in the end.         
UNRRA also discussed its call for applications with several voluntary agencies, who 
UNRRA expected would help with their recruitment.  In May 1944 Mary Craig McGeachy sat down 
with members of the Personnel Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Societies for Relief 
Abroad in order to discuss the standards of recruitment for UNRRA personnel.  The American 
Council included representatives from the American Red Cross, the Catholic War Relief Services and 
the American Joint Distribution Committee.  The American Council was in strong agreement with 
McGeachy that relief work abroad required both education and experience.  In their joint statement of 
Personnel Standards, they agreed to seek out social workers with a Bachelor’s degree and no less than 
three years’ work experience.  They were also willing to accept applicants with no formal education 
but with five years of experience, provided that they had “foreign relief experience involving 
administrative responsibility” or “a minimum five years’ significant experience in a recognized social 
agency performing functions similar to those likely to be undertaken by or in cooperation with 
UNRRA.”  In other words, they were willing to accept social workers without formal degrees from 
universities, but they had to have significant experience in lieu of formal education.  Both the 
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American Council and UNRRA also agreed that knowledge of a foreign language would be 
beneficial, and that they also must be physically fit, especially those applicants over fifty years of age.  
“Because of the arduous nature of the work to be done and the conditions of living likely to prevail,” 
they asserted, “persons should be required to be physically fit and such fitness should be determined 
by examination in accordance with requirements prescribed by UNRRA.”42  Based on this agreement 
on Personnel Standards, UNRRA expected the American Council to recommend suitable candidates 
for UNRRA’s work in Europe.  McGeachy also organized a recruitment drive in Canada under the 
auspices of the Canadian Council of Voluntary Societies.43  
While recruitment for all missions began in UNRRA Headquarters, the ERO took over 
recruitment for the German Mission in September 1944.  Just as McGeachy had done in the United 
States, the ERO also turned to Britain’s Voluntary Societies for help in identifying suitable 
candidates.  However, neither the American nor the British Voluntary Societies were able to provide 
the numbers of qualified staff UNRRA sought.  It was June 1945 before the required 5,880 personnel 
for work in Germany were recruited.44  In the first months recruits came almost entirely from the 
United States, Britain and the British dominions and colonies.  However, by the end of December 
1945, UNRRA staff working in DP Operations in Germany was more evenly distributed, including 
staff from across Europe.45  One remarkable aspect of UNRRA’s composition was the large number 
of women that were hired.  In June 1946, at the height of its personnel count, 42 percent of staff were 
women.46  This was a remarkable feat for an organization at the time.     
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There are several reasons for UNRRA’s slow initial recruitment.  The most obvious was the 
fact that much of Europe had been occupied, eliminating this population from the pool of possible 
candidates.  In parts of the world not occupied, many qualified personnel were nevertheless involved 
in the war effort, either working directly for the armed forces, or for their governments, or else 
involved in wartime production.  Thus there was little qualified surplus labour available.  A second 
reason for the slow pace was the fact that UNRRA could not explain to those it hoped to recruit how 
long their services would be required, nor where they would be working.  This certainly hampered the 
recruitment of those individuals who were already employed and who did not want to leave their 
current posts without some understanding of UNRRA’s operational timeline.   
A third, and related, reason for the early recruitment shortfall was the fact that UNRRA had 
no large recruitment staff of its own and therefore relied on the voluntary agencies to do this work for 
them.  While this might have seemed the least expensive option at the time it meant that UNRRA was 
at the mercy of the voluntary agencies.  UNRRA had failed to take into account the animosity that 
resulted from the nascent organization’s agreement with SHAEF.  Before UNRRA and SHAEF came 
to agreement in November 1944 on UNRRA’s role as agent for the military authorities, SHAEF had 
tentatively placed the American Red Cross society in charge of civilian relief in the summer of 1944.  
The decision to hand over control to UNRRA came about after discussions over the meaning of relief 
and, in particular, rehabilitation.  The Red Cross was solely concerned with crisis management.  They 
provided short-term relief and aid in the form of food and medical supplies and care.  As the historian 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Caroline Moorehead, explains, in 1945 Red Cross 
workers “follow[ed] behind the troops, like the early Red Cross commissioners of the Franco-
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Prussian war, to survey what would be needed and hand out instant emergency help.”47  The Red 
Cross was focused on providing the basic necessities in order to stave off starvation and prevent the 
spread of disease.  Discussions between the British and American governments over the meaning and 
extent of rehabilitation soon made clear that they planned a more extensive rehabilitation process than 
could be provided by the Red Cross.  Harry Hopkins, one of President Roosevelt’s key advisers, also 
influenced the President’s understanding of rehabilitation.  Hopkins strongly supported a program of 
rehabilitation that went far beyond food and medical care.  As a social worker and, later, 
administrator of FERA, Hopkins believed strongly in American social work’s emphasis on helping 
people to help themselves.  Hopkins also strongly supported the creation of a postwar international 
organization based on these principles.48  At the same time, a new international organization which 
would administer this expanded mandate for both relief and rehabilitation also provided an 
opportunity to include the Soviet government, which the American President likewise supported.49  
These factors all came together to encourage handing over responsibility for relief in Germany to a 
new organization, international in character and considerably broader in scope, and the exclusion of 
the Red Cross. 
  The Red Cross objected to SHAEF’s decision to give a newly-founded organization such as 
UNRRA such an important responsibility.  They questioned UNRRA’s legitimacy and its ability to 
supervise all of the aid agencies working in Germany, and especially those that had already been 
working on the ground in other parts of Europe, as the Red Cross had.  In fact, the American Red 
Cross withdrew from Germany because it was so incensed, although the British Red Cross remained 
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active in Germany under UNRRA supervision (as was required of all voluntary agencies who wished 
to operate in Germany).  Thus, from the beginning, UNRRA-voluntary agency relationships were 
strained.  Even when UNRRA was able to coordinate recruitment efforts with the other voluntary 
agencies, they generally preferred that their own personnel remain independent of UNRRA, working 
alongside it, but not as UNRRA employees.  In addition, all negotiations and agreements with 
SHAEF over payment, allowances and procedures to be followed were made with UNRRA, which 
infuriated the voluntary agencies, who saw UNRRA as an interloper and a hindrance to their free 
action.  The hostility was apparent in the Red Cross workers’ play of words on the acronym UNRRA, 
as “You never really relieved anybody.”50  Armstrong-Reid and Murray argue that  “the 
Administration’s early relationships with both the British and American voluntary associations, upon 
whom it had counted as its chief recruiting source, were [thus] fractured by hostility and 
misunderstanding.  As a result, the number of recruits from the voluntary agencies did not come close 
to expected levels.”51     
In March 1945, with the end of the war in Europe in sight, a large reserve of personnel 
opened up and UNRRA focused its efforts anew on recruiting from military personnel already on the 
continent.  On 24 March the War Department sent out a memo on behalf of UNRRA to encourage 
applicants from the American military.  The memo explained that UNRRA sought to fill several 
positions at the earliest possible date, including assembly center directors and assistant directors, 
welfare, supply and store officers, stewards (cooks), as well as accountants and financial officers.  
The War Department called upon qualified individuals to submit applications, and explained that 
soldiers on active duty could be relieved under the War Department’s Circular No. 485, section III.  
In order to ensure that this memo reached the widest circulation, the War Department called upon all 
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military companies to post the memo for thirty days.52  At the same time, UNRRA sought to compile 
lists of military personnel they believed were qualified.  “Although final arrangements with the Army 
for release of such personnel have not been completed,” a March 1945 UNRRA Personnel Division 
officer noted, “it is necessary to go ahead with our plans for obtaining lists of suitable personnel now 
on military furlough.”53  By 1 May 1945, UNRRA had recruited a total of 170 assembly center 
directors and assistant directors and 160 welfare and assistant welfare officers, although they were 
seeking a further 123 directors and 139 welfare officers.54       
UNRRA also took advantage of another group of teams working in the field: French 
volunteers of the Mission Militaire de Liaison Administrative (MMLA).  The Free French 
Headquarters in London had organized the MMLA to accompany the Allied troops during the 
Normandy invasion, and in October 1943, the MMLA created a women’s section, known as the 
Section Féminine.  These women participated in a six-week course alongside the male members of 
the MMLA, who were training as liaison officers.  When the training course was complete, they were 
given practical experience in vehicle maintenance, first aid, as well as messing and delousing 
practices for large groups of people.  They were called to accompany the Allied troops on 25 June 
1944, less than three weeks after D-Day.  They were divided into teams of five members, and they 
traveled alongside the Civil Affairs detachments of the Allied armies.  They began taking control of 
the refugee camps that the Allied armies had organized in Normandy, generally situated in factories, 
schools, or monasteries.  They were soon called forward to accompany the troops as they moved 
through France.  When Paris was recaptured from the Germans in August 1944, the Section Feminine 
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of the MMLA consisted of 120 women working in the field.  These women continued on with the 
Allied armies beyond France, into Belgium and Holland, and finally into Germany as well, where 
those who wished to remain in the field were recruited by UNRRA.55   
In order to supplement the skills and experience of the international staff that it was 
recruiting, UNRRA sought to compile information on conditions that their staff could expect to 
encounter in the field, and general guidelines as to how UNRRA’s welfare workers should approach 
them.  The ERO commissioned a series of reports which looked at both the initial relief and also the 
more lengthy rehabilitation of the DPs.  These reports included the contributions of psychiatrists, 
sociologists, social workers and doctors, both from the armed services and voluntary agencies, 
primarily from Britain and North America.  Two key reports underlined UNRRA’s goals with respect 
to the DPs: Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons and Special Needs of Women and Girls 
during Repatriation and Rehabilitation.   
Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons was issued in June 1945 by the Welfare 
Division of ERO.  It outlined the difficulties that they expected UNRRA welfare workers to 
encounter regarding the mental health of the individual DPs.  The report comprised ten chapters, each 
contributed by a different expert.  The first section focused on individual groups of DPs: the 
categories of adult DPs, as well as children DPs.  The second discussed what the experts anticipated 
the DPs had been through and how it may have affected them, including a special chapter on 
demoralisation, promiscuity and prostitution.  The last chapters looked at the psychology of the DPs: 
‘The Way Home,’ ‘Going Home’ and ‘Recovery.’  Particular emphasis was placed on the ways in 
which different psychological problems might present themselves amongst the DP population and 
how welfare workers could identify them in order to respond appropriately.   
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Also in June 1945, a second report was submitted to the Welfare Division of the ERO entitled 
Special Needs of Women and Girls during Repatriation and Rehabilitation.  This report was also a 
compilation of individual papers submitted by experts in the field, divided into three sections: General 
Background, Assembly and Repatriation Centers, and Individual Physical and Psychological 
Problems.  As the Report explained, a working party had been created in the fall of 1944 to “suggest 
services to meet the special needs of women and girls” living in assembly centers.56  Although it was 
impossible to estimate what percentage of the displaced persons would be women, there was a 
general understanding that significant numbers of women had been removed from their homes in the 
occupied territories and brought to Germany.  The largest group of women would almost certainly be 
those aged 20 to 35, as they were deemed the most productive age group, but there was also an 
acknowledgement that women of all ages were likely to be encountered.   
Together, these two reports examined several key themes, including the wartime experiences 
of the DPs, the developing relationship between the DPs and UNRRA welfare workers, the process of 
rehabilitation, and suggestions for a smooth repatriation.  Special Needs of Women and Girls 
highlighted the varying experiences of women during the war.  Some had been housed in barracks, 
while others lived in German homes.  Foreign women in Germany could have spent the war in a 
variety of ways: as agricultural workers, as factory workers, domestic help, and still others in 
concentration camps. “Some women went voluntarily to Germany,” the working group explained, 
“and perhaps not unwillingly; and some went with their husbands and families, maintaining the 
normal family unit intact.”57  In other words, their experiences varied enormously.  What they had in 
common, however, was the loss of personal dignity.  “The economic and other inequalities between 
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groups of foreign workers, the demoralising conditions under which they were forced to live, their 
isolation from families and home influences, and the severe deprivations suffered by many, were all 
aimed at breaking down social standards among both men and women, particularly in the less 
privileged groups.”58  The authors pointed to a number of groups requiring special attention.  These 
groups included women liberated from concentration camps, women forced into a life of degradation, 
women with young children, and young girls. 
Both reports also examined the loss of family and community that all DPs had experienced.  
By removing individuals from their environment, people had lost the comfort and structure of their 
daily lives.  This structure had been replaced by a life that was not of their choosing.  There had been 
a loss of privacy, a loss of individuality, and a loss of respect for all forms of authority.  According to 
the authors, the displaced persons might be expected to revert, at least in part, to “the dependent 
attitudes of childhood” in response to their experiences.  Others may have dealt with “painful 
emotional conflicts” by repressing any memory of them.  Still others would have more overt 
responses, including a breakdown of self-control; bitterness and touchiness; greed; undercurrents of 
hostility; self-destructive actions; forced pleasure-seeking; and immorality.  Many displaced persons 
were also expected to experience depression, which the authors described as “a generalised and 
embittered withdrawal from social relationships” and which may, in severe cases, lead to suicide.59  
Welfare workers were going to have to identify these responses and respond to them accordingly.   
Both reports also presented some of the pitfalls that the welfare workers were expected to 
encounter in their work.   One of the first problems anticipated were the misconceptions that the 
welfare worker had about the displaced person.  The authors encouraged welfare workers to avoid 
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thinking in terms of “typical nationals,” because “[t]he fact that people belong to a particular national 
group does not necessarily mean that they will correspond in any way to what one inevitably has in 
mind as a typical member of that group.”60    UNRRA welfare workers had to remember that 
individual displaced persons from the same national group would each have had their own 
experiences and their own personality.  In other words, they wanted to warn welfare workers against 
stereotyping.  There would also be many problems associated with language.  Even when two people 
spoke the same language, they would be bringing to the conversation two different sets of values.  
Individual words and phrases would be understood differently because of these values.  In order to 
address these issues, UNRRA welfare workers required a clear understanding of the process of 
rehabilitation.   
In the introduction to Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, the authors explained 
that UNRRA would not only be responsible for the relief of the displaced persons, but, just as 
importantly, with their rehabilitation.  “For man does not live by bread alone,” they explained.  “We 
are social animals, and are only content if our various strivings are harmonised with each other and 
with the interests of the group in which we live.”61  They described what they saw as the four main 
drives that explain human action: the drive towards self-preservation, the drive towards mastery over 
the environment, the need for love, and the drive towards reproduction.62  Each person will ascribe a 
different value to each of these drives, they argued, determined most strongly by their personality, but 
geography and history would also play a part.  These drives were formed during childhood and were 
most strongly influenced by interactions with other people, most importantly parents, siblings, and 
later friends and colleagues.  Through these interactions, individuals developed feelings and 
understandings that came to define their character.   
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The authors of Psychological Problems stated that rehabilitation would have three 
components: physical and mental recovery from illness and starvation; recovery from emotional loss; 
and re-socialization within the larger community.63  The steps to a successful rehabilitation included 
an assessment of the individual’s level of regression, provision of an environment suited to this level, 
and then the introduction of incentives.  The authors explained that this process would create “an 
atmosphere and opportunities where the careful and graduated use of incentives leads to graded 
satisfactions over efforts.”64  Notably, they understood satisfaction as the redevelopment of personal 
initiative and the acceptance of responsibility.  The development of personal initiative was at the heart 
of American social work practice during the interwar period, and these reports exemplify the strong 
influence played by American social workers on rehabilitation as understood and exemplified by 
UNRRA.  Just as social workers in the United States were doing with their clients, so too was 
UNRRA focused on using each person’s strengths to overcome their difficulties and learn to provide 
for themselves.  In practice, rehabilitation was the work that each individual DP would have to do to 
repair their personal relations and their social connections.   
The working groups highlighted two especially important terms in understanding 
rehabilitation: discipline and cheerfulness.  The authors of Psychological Problems explained that 
both terms were constantly misunderstood.  They saw discipline as first and foremost a call for self-
discipline.  They explained that, “[d]uring recovery phases the false discipline of force may be 
essential in periods of crisis and must then be used without anxiety, but with full awareness that it 
postpones and does not remove or resolve hostile, critical or rebellious attitudes.”65  Similarly, cheer 
had to come from the individual.  UNRRA welfare workers who tried to force cheer on the DPs 
would only make matters worse.  They had to come to it in their own time.  Welfare workers, the 
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authors warned, had to take these pitfalls into account from the very beginning.  For many DPs, the 
process of registration would be their first contact with a non-enemy authority.  The displaced persons 
may find some of the questions problematic or objectionable.  Any explanation that was given would 
go a long way towards reassuring them of the necessity of the entire process.  More generally, the 
administration of the centre should in no way resemble the way labour or concentration camps were 
run.  They explained that “[i]t may even be necessary to organise a relatively inefficient method of 
dealing with some of the problems of repatriation simple [sic] in order to avoid ‘doing what the Nazis 
did.’”66  
Both reports offered a number of suggestions for approaching the rehabilitation of women in 
particular.  Active participation in community life was their ultimate goal.  “A thread running through 
all plans,” they wrote, “should be to give opportunities for service, and to distract the mind from 
anxiety and brooding…. The aim of the Administration must be to make them increasingly active 
participants in their organisation and services.”67  They should also be encouraged to take over 
domestic duties in the camps.  They explained,  
Women’s response to regimented life is much less favourable than men’s.  Opportunities 
should be provided to awaken and satisfy their natural home-making instincts.  In 
arrangements for housing, the preparation and serving of food and occupational activities it 
may be possible to find many useful outlets for women’s domestic interests which will have 
an important rehabilitative effect.68   
They also suggested that a number of cultural and recreational activities be organized in order to 
prevent women from becoming idle.   
While the discussion of adults focused on the differences that divided the DP population, the 
discussion of displaced children focused on a key experience that all DP children shared: namely, that 
none had experienced a normal childhood or a “familiar home life.”  Children required stability in 
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their lives in order to develop normally, while “[a] child deprived for one reason or another of a 
dependable background to his life tends to feel unequal to his experience….The effects of this anxiety 
in turn show themselves in various kinds of disturbed behaviour.”69  Especially important for these 
children was the psychological state of the adults who accompanied them.  If the adults were 
“anxious, shattered grown-ups” then the children would likely be “uncertain and insecure.”70  Many 
would also lack the stability of having their fathers in their lives. As a result, the expectation was that 
they would act out in several ways.  Some would appear anxious and afraid; others would be 
apathetic; and still others, defiant towards authority.  There could also be problems related to 
sexuality, especially amongst girls who were raped and boys who acted sexually precocious as a 
response to their experiences.  Their rehabilitation had to include the provision of a safe and secure 
environment.  Unless the mother suffered from anxiety, it was recommended that the child spend as 
much time with her as possible.  The child DPs should also be encouraged to play and be creative.  
Some of the suggested tasks include playing with water and earth, and eventually washing clothes and 
growing flowers, as well as ‘vigorous muscular play’ in order to make a legitimate use of their 
aggression.71               
Both reports discussed in detail the importance of food and privacy in the process of 
rehabilitation.  Food was important for a number of reasons.  First, it is a necessity of life.  Many of 
the DPs had been starved for years.  They had eaten what was served to them when it was served.  It 
was something over which they had had little or no control.  As the authors of Psychological 
Problems explained, “[h]unger for security of food is only stilled after a long period of regular 
physical satisfaction for the psychological consequences usually heal more slowly than the 
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physical.”72  This would be one of the first steps towards the rebuilding of trust.  It was expected that 
there would be cases in which people hoarded food long after it was clear that there was an adequate 
supply, a response to the world of hostility that they endured during the war years.  The best way to 
deal with this problem was to assure the displaced persons that there was an adequate supply, and also 
to ensure that it was distributed as fairly as possible.  Although there could be no choice and usually 
not enough being served to provide them with the nourishment they needed, by giving the DPs some 
say in how the food was prepared, UNRRA welfare workers could begin to build a relationship of 
trust.  As well, the type of food was important.  Foods that the DPs recognized from their homelands 
would help them in their rehabilitation.  By putting the DPs in charge of preparing the meals, the 
assembly center could not only provide them with an activity to fill their time, but it also made them 
active participants in their care.   
Both reports also highlighted the importance of privacy in the housing arrangements.  The 
authors of Psychological Problems argued that people would need space and privacy in order to deal 
with their experiences.  They explained that the individual displaced person no longer had 
“opportunity to be alone or to reflect upon things as a private individual.  He was driven back to a 
crowd existence in the camp where he became a victim of all mass-emotions and rumours.”73  
Similarly, the authors of Special Needs of Women and Girls argued that privacy was of the utmost 
importance.  They explained that “[f]acilities should be provided for displaced persons to be alone or 
quiet, as many will need opportunities for solitude after the long years of being herded together.”74     
Most importantly, both reports pointed to the importance of responsibility. UNRRA saw its 
primary goal as instilling an acceptance of responsibility in each individual.  This responsibility 
included responsibility for one’s person, in the form of personal hygiene and appearance; 
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responsibility for one’s actions; and a responsibility to be a contributing member of the community.  
Firstly, both reports placed great emphasis on personal cleanliness and appearance.  They warned that 
the DPs might, at first, not be interested in cleaning themselves or their clothes.  Welfare workers 
would have to convince them of the importance of personal cleanliness and the assembly centers 
would have to provide adequate resources for bathing and for cleaning clothes in order to reaffirm 
this point.  The authors of Psychological Problems explained that the DPs may “wash themselves 
less” and that “they [may] appear more ragged than need under the circumstances.”75  This was partly 
a result of not having access to adequate facilities for an extended period.  However, this was also 
explained as a manifestation of the process of regression, whereby individuals fell back on more 
primitive habits in order to cope.  People would only recover a sense of hygiene when they realised 
the importance of their appearance to their mental wellbeing.  As the report on Special Needs of 
Women and Girls explained, “The possession of some decent and pleasant clothes, after this long 
period of deprivation, will make a considerable difference to individual happiness and behaviour in 
the Centre.  The women should be encouraged in their natural desire to clothe themselves as decently 
and attractively as possible.”76  Regarding personal hygiene, it was anticipated that some displaced 
persons might exhibit strange behaviour with regards to their health, and their reproductive health in 
particular.  The authors explained, “medical examination is often asked for by repatriates as a 
technique of reassuring themselves that their experiences have not damaged them beyond recovery… 
the underlying purpose of examination is as much to reassure the patient about his own health, as to 
help the doctor.”77  As part of the process of taking responsibility for one’s person, people would need 
to convince themselves that they are not only physically healthy, but also not so harmed by their 
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experiences that they could no longer conceive children.  In particular, they argued that this problem 
may plague women DPs.   
 The reports also emphasized the importance of instilling a sense of responsibility for one’s 
actions in the DPs.  Both touched on the expectation of problems arising around issues of immorality 
and promiscuity.  At its heart, the working group on Psychological Problems saw these issues as 
rooted in issues of low morale.  As previously mentioned, the working group on Psychological 
Problems recognized the Nazis’ goal of destroying inter-personal relations.  While “girls and women 
have been… led behind the fronts by force and debased into mechanical lust-gratification machines,” 
men were also “dragged to Germany and forced to impregnate German women."78   In Psychological 
Problems, the authors argued that, as a result, the relationship between the sexes would remain 
uneasy for some time.  The welfare workers should be wary of instituting too many rules and 
regulations regarding relationships and conduct.  Instead, they should help foster an environment in 
which relationships could develop naturally.  They explained that, “the community must necessarily 
develop its own rules but care should be taken to see that neither harsh emergency regulations nor 
customs prevent that widespread growth of effective social contacts between the sexes.”79   
Both reports focused on the problems of women forced into degradation.  Special Needs of 
Women and Girls focused on the various ways in which women and girls in particular had been 
victimized.  They discussed not only the brothels where “the prettiest girls” were taken, but also how 
“German soldiers were given free access to the women’s sleeping quarters in the labour camps.”80  In 
order for these women to recover from their experiences, they would require counselling and support, 
as well as medical care.  They were careful to point out that these women and girls must be 
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differentiated from those women who had been professional prostitutes before the war and had gone 
to Germany voluntarily.   
Finally, a particularly thorny issue for the welfare workers would be the children born to 
these women.  As they explained, “[w]here women have had children – sometimes unwanted – born 
to them in or subsequent to leaving Germany, and as a result of conditions referred to above it is 
hoped that they will be allowed to decide for themselves whether they wish to keep the children.”81  
At its core, UNRRA wanted to limit the effects of promiscuity and the resulting illegitimate children.  
They wanted to instil in the DPs a sense of responsibility in order to limit the fallout from such 
actions. 
A third aspect of responsibility that both reports focused on was one`s responsibility to the 
community at large.  This was a process that would take time, but they believed that this should be a 
goal of the welfare workers.  This process should begin with the introduction of informal discussion 
groups.  Newspapers and radio reports could offer topics of interest for the DPs.  This would be a 
chance for them to express their feelings and opinions on current events and also their personal 
experiences.  They could also make comments and suggestions on their care.  These informal 
discussions should in turn lead to more formal meetings.  People should feel free to discuss any issues 
openly.  The authors of Psychological Problems outlined a suggested methodology for these group 
meetings: they should include 8 to 30 people, they should last 1 ½ hours, they should be held twice a 
week, and their suggestions should be heeded, when possible.82  Younger displaced persons should be 
included in order to foster in them a sense of the political process, many of whom may have had “no 
political feelings beyond a reaction against or an acceptance of Nazi doctrines.”83  They were also 
trying to teach them about democracy.  Active membership in the community involved taking part in 
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community decision-making, and voting was the prime example of this.  The younger DPs had likely 
never previously participated in elections, and this was something that the welfare workers were keen 
to introduce.  Eventually, the hope was that people should start to feel a sense of responsibility to the 
community.  “Relief from repressive measures, and freedom from close scrutiny and supervision,” 
they wrote, “are bewildering luxuries at first, but the human need for more positive rewards from life, 
in the form of competent independence and a place of responsibility in society, are quickly felt.”84  In 
response to the fear of authority and their previous parasitic existence, they explained, some displaced 
persons would want to band together and form gangs.  The purpose of these gangs was to establish 
social status and self-respect.  However, they ultimately would lead to the formation of a hierarchy or 
caste system, a dangerous direction.  It was felt that these groups would disappear once there was a 
feeling of “social security” within the assembly centre. 
In addition, committees should be organized to develop programs for education and 
recreation.  The working group on Psychological Problems put forward several suggestions of 
activities that would keep the DPs from sitting idle: cinema showings, sports groups, dances, and, 
eventually, work projects.  Sitting idle would only give the DPs time to obsess over their wartime 
experiences and slow their rehabilitation.  The authors suggested that a center cinema should be 
organized as soon as possible.  Film was a useful tool because it did not require the active 
participation of its viewers.  It would distract the DPs without requiring too much effort, which many 
DPs would not be able to handle physically.  Eventually more active recreation should be organized, 
including sports, concerts and dances.  However, these activities should be planned by the displaced 
persons themselves; UNRRA workers would only be there to facilitate these programs.  In the long 
run, they insisted, the DPs should be made responsible for as many of the camp functions as possible 
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in order to facilitate their rehabilitation.  The authors also advocated the introduction of religious 
services.  However, they explained that the clergy should not be made responsible for helping women 
deal with issues of sexuality as this might bring about increased feelings of guilt.85  Eventually work 
projects should be introduced in the assembly centers.  The authors recognized that problems might 
arise with the introduction of any work program because of their wartime experiences as slave 
labourers for the Nazis.  They accepted that, “difficulties may arise, for forced work has a familiar 
and unpleasant flavour for displaced people.”86  They explained that the best way to avoid a situation 
in which the displaced persons compared work in the assembly centers to work in the concentration 
camps was to let them plan their own projects, projects that would benefit their community.  These 
projects should aim to recreate working relationships between individuals as well as a sense of 
purpose for the group as a whole. 
Both reports also looked at the process of repatriation and suggested ways in which the stress 
of this transition could be reduced.  The authors of Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons also 
pointed out that the displaced persons would not want things to be exactly the same upon their return; 
instead they would want to know that “the community or the world learned something or gained 
something from their loss, their pain, their sacrifices and their efforts.”87  To help with this, the 
authors offered several suggestions for making repatriation less traumatic: do not overdo the 
welcome; let the returnees take things slowly; be ready with information on rules, such as rationing; 
and approach the returnees as people who have been away, not people who have changed.88  Upon 
return home, “the same individual may display the demanding attitude which commonly ascribed as 
that of a ‘spoiled’ child and on another occasion the self-depreciation and drive to expiation of one 
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who feels himself unworthy of affection and respect.”89  The only way to deal with these types of 
psychological problems was to give the returnee the understanding and attention that they needed in 
order to become self-sufficient, but not so much that they become needy.  The purpose, after all, was 
to help people to help themselves.  “One measure by which the success or failure of social work may 
be graded,” they explained, “is the resulting attitude of the helped towards the helper.  Recurrent 
effusive gratitude and a repeated return for further assistance is a sign of failure.  Forgetfulness is a 
sign of success.”90  
   According to these reports, then, the key problems of rehabilitation that UNRRA expected 
to face were numerous. At its heart, they expected to see several different forms of delinquency 
surface.  Some of these issues were the result of regression to more primitive habits: the DPs might 
appear unclean and dishevelled, they might lack certain social graces, and they might even appear 
touchy and hostile.  It would take the provision of a stable environment and time for many of these 
overt responses to diminish and eventually disappear.  However, other problems stemmed from 
deeper problems of social disintegration that were entrenched by Nazi policies.  These problems 
included greed, self-destructive actions and immorality.  The authors of both reports argued that these 
problems would be more difficult to overcome.  UNRRA was particularly worried about cases of 
sexual promiscuity and illegitimate children.  They believed that a large number of children already 
lived out of contact with their fathers.  They worried that unwed mothers would not want to keep the 
children that came from these relationships and that hundreds if not thousands more children would 
see the end of the war without either parent.  This would leave UNRRA in a difficult position in terms 
of who would care for these children.  As American social workers were professing in the interwar 
period, keeping the family unit together was an important social norm.  
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Finally, both reports highlighted the point that welfare workers had to recognize that their job 
would be a thankless one.  “People have suffered too deeply and fundamentally,” stated the Report, 
“to react in a pleasant way.  Their attitude may often seem harsh and unjust but this must be met with 
understanding and an absence of personal feeling.  The Welfare Worker needs to shun all illusions but 
to retain belief in human nature.”91  The welfare workers would almost certainly encounter people 
reacting to years of lost personal dignity, and that would not disappear overnight.  For the particularly 
difficult cases, only counselling would help. 
 The reports compiled by the ERO formed part of the training program that UNRRA 
formulated for its new recruits.  This training program contained three parts: initial training for those 
employees recruited in North America took place in College Park, Maryland, just outside of 
Washington, D.C.; for those employees recruited in Britain, a training facility was located in Reading; 
and a final training centre was established on the Normandy coast in France, preparing all UNRRA 
employees for deployment in the field.  Approximately 16 percent of UNRRA’s personnel working at 
assembly centers in Germany were American; 31 percent came from the Britain and its colonies, 
including Canada; and 18 percent came from France.  The remainder were recruits from other 
European countries.92  Women comprised 36 percent of UNRRA’s operations in Germany.93     
In North America, once UNRRA had received a candidate’s application and deemed the 
applicant a suitable candidate, UNRRA’s Investigation Section had the task of securing the necessary 
clearance for each new recruit through the State Department.  At that time, the Personnel Division 
notified the candidate by mail that they were being considered for a position with UNRRA, and 
requested further detailed information.  The Investigation Section reviewed that information and, if 
there were no problems attaining security clearance, UNRRA then sent a second letter to the 
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candidate confirming their appointment.  This letter instructed the new employee to begin applying 
for a passport, and to make arrangements to report to UNRRA Headquarters in Washington.  Upon 
arrival in Washington, new recruits faced another battery of paperwork.  They also visited doctors for 
health exams and received shots.  Once past those hurdles, new employees were then invited to the 
UNRRA Training Center, located on the campus of the University of Maryland at College Park, on 
the outskirts of Washington, DC.  At the same time as new recruits were taking part in training, 
UNRRA Headquarters Staff Services Division was responsible for preparing each employee for 
overseas duty.  They arranged uniforms and other necessary equipment.  They also provided 
counseling on personal affairs, information regarding living conditions overseas, and requested 
transportation and final clearance.  The Travel Section was responsible for organizing all documents, 
including passports, visas, and military permits, as well as all necessary tickets and reservations.94  
Once all of the papers were finalized and the training completed, UNRRA employees were sent by 
ship to Britain.   
The first training course at College Park began on 1 May 1944 and lasted two months.  The 
curriculum included “basic instruction in the relationships between the [UNRRA] Administration and 
the military, the organization and management of Assembly Centres, services for displaced persons, 
health precautions, and the regional backgrounds of displaced populations.95  The curriculum also 
placed a strong emphasis on language skills.96  Harry Cassidy, a Canadian academic and public 
servant who had spent the war years as the Dean of the School of Social Work at the University of 
California at Berkeley, organized the training program.  He placed a strong emphasis on the skills of 
the professionally-trained social worker, but believed that what they needed to take away from the 
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training at College Park was the context in which they would be working.  “I’m trying to make them 
understand the country that they are going to, the people that they will work with, the purpose of 
UNRRA and their particular place in it,” Munk told the New York Times in May 1944.97  These were 
the tools that he believed would be necessary in order for UNRRA`s staff to approach the problems of 
war-torn Europe.  UNRRA welfare officer Bernard Warach believed that the purpose of UNRRA’s 
training was for recruits “to be oriented to the circumstances and conditions of postwar Europe and to 
the organization of the American and British Armed Forces in European Theatre.”  Most important 
was that all UNRRA staff had a clear “understanding [of] the functions of the Civil Affairs Division 
of the American and British military, which would be responsible for the Displaced Persons 
Program.”98 
Some of UNRRA’s welfare officers, including Bernard Warach, believed that the training 
period was successful.  Others were not as supportive.  Several UNRRA trainees noted that the 
preparations focused on theory, but provided no information on actual conditions in Europe.  Lectures 
focused on UNRRA’s policies and objectives.  Susan Pettiss stated that “little practical training was 
offered” apart from the language instruction.  She explained that “the most useful information I 
picked up during those weeks was how to dispense meal or travel tickets to refugees loaded down 
with baggage in both arms.  (You put the ticket in their mouths.)”99  Marvin Klemme, a rancher and 
park ranger from Missouri, complained that the training brought together experts who often 
contradicted one another.  He wrote that “we were told so many different things by so many different 
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officials and lecturers that we never were very sure just what those principles were.”100  He concluded 
that “the time was largely wasted for much of the stuff taught was just plain nonsense.”101  Few 
believed that the training helped them in field.  However, all agree that the training period was a time 
for UNRRA to observe all of the recruits and remove those who were not likely to make good 
UNRRA employees.   
 UNRRA employees recruited in Britain received their training in Reading, west of London.  
Early American recruits to UNRRA also took part in the training at Reading as they awaited 
deployment onto the continent.  The ERO’s Welfare Division prepared a series of lectures on a 
variety of topics, including personal counseling, special services for children and mothers, special 
services for women and girls, and leisure activities in the assembly centers.  The lecture on 
counseling highlighted the importance of encouraging each DP to utilize the skills they already 
possessed, noting that the primary objectives of counseling were “to help the individual to recognize 
and develop the resources within himself, to utilize all individual and community resources for the 
enrichment of individual and family life, and to afford protection and guidance needed by those 
unable to cope with conditions with which they are faced.”102  Once again the importance of personal 
and community responsibility was stressed.  While the lecture noted that welfare workers would be 
limited in the scope of their welfare work because of the primitive camp conditions and the sheer 
numbers of people requiring help, nevertheless each welfare worker should strive to do “the right 
thing even on the superficial or first aid level.”103  To them, the right thing meant offering the same 
individual attention as proscribed by the case work approach to social work.  Welfare workers would 
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have to access their “social work skills.”104  While one-on-one counseling should be made available, 
where possible, welfare workers should also “promote recovery through group treatment and welfare 
aspects of the organized life of the centre.”105  This would help overcome the destruction of social 
bonds caused by the war.  The ERO even suggested that, where possible, “some equivalent to ‘home 
visiting’ in Assembly Centres” be carried out, ideally using displaced persons to help with this task.106  
The lecture on welfare services for women and girls reasserted the importance of encouraging 
domestic interests in women, as described in the report on Special Needs of Women and Girls during 
Repatriation and Rehabilitation.107   
The lecture on recreation highlighted the importance of providing a variety of activities in the 
assembly centres, and not only for the purpose of preventing the displaced persons from sitting idle.  
Varied recreational activities “have an important positive aim – the provision of opportunities for 
people to ‘find themselves’ again, whether by individual absorption in some creative pursuit or 
through participation with other members of a group.”108  As the report on Psychological Problems of 
Displaced Persons had emphasized, the displaced persons should eventually be involved in planning 
all recreational activities as a part of the process of rehabilitation.  The training at Reading also 
included an orientation program for Displaced Persons Mission staff, which included a visit to the 
London Council Citizens Advice Bureau.  These were local government offices that provided 
information on welfare services available to London residents, and in particular those who had lost 
their homes due to bomb damage. The purpose of these visits was to highlight the British approach to 
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social work, especially for UNRRA staff coming from the United States and therefore less familiar 
with British practices.       
UNRRA staff recruited on the continent took part in training at the UNRRA Training Centre 
in Granville, in Normandy.  The largest group of personnel from the continent came from France.  
UNRRA’s French personnel were recruited through the French Ministry of Prisoners, Deportees and 
Refugees, and received training there.109    In December 1944 UNRRA had begun searching for a 
property for use as a training facility on the continent, as well as a mobilization centre, where they 
could gather together recruits from Europe and overseas before sending them into the field.  Ideally, 
this centre would house recruits for two to three weeks before they were separated into teams and 
deployed in the field.110  In consultation with French authorities, UNRRA settled on the Normandy 
Hotel in Granville for their Training Centre.  In contrast to conditions in the training centers in the 
United States and Britain, conditions in Normandy were primitive.  At the Normandy Hotel, Susan 
Pettiss recalled that she slept on a canvas cot without sheets, and wore her wool socks and undershirt 
under her nightgown and army-issued blankets, in order to stay warm at night.  When she was 
transferred to Jullouville the conditions were worse still: “three in a room, sleeping on canvas cots, 
window panes out, no furniture, no water most of the time.”111   
It is little wonder, then, that the only UNRRA employee to be captured by the Germans 
reported that his most pressing concern upon liberation was the whereabouts of the gear he was 
forced to leave behind.  In a daring raid on Granville, German soldiers based on the Channel Islands, 
believing that the Normandy Hotel was a major Allied supply depot, had raided the town and taken 
prisoner one UNRRA official.  Upon his liberation in May 1945, apparently the chief concern of “Mr. 
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Alexander, the UNRRA welfare officer who was captured by the Germans in their raid on 
Granville… [was] what happened to the sleeping bag he left behind him at the Normandy Hotel, 
Granville.”112 
The training program in France consisted of six modules, covering topics such as the 
administrative structure of UNRRA’s welfare operations, analysis of the effects of the war on 
Europe’s population, information service provision in the assembly centers, guides to emergency 
feeding and shelter, welfare services for special groups, as well as UNRRA’s future plans for welfare 
operations.113  As part of this training, UNRRA introduced a mock scenario in preparing its 
employees for the field.  The objective of the assignment was to “recruit, train and supervise 
displaced persons personnel needed for the basic operations of an assembly center which is being run 
by an UNRRA team.”114  Each class was divided into teams, and each team was instructed to choose a 
team director.  They were given further details of the scenario: they were to be placed in an assembly 
center which was situated in a section of a German town that had been taken over by the military to 
house the DPs.  The center had been in operation for one week prior to UNRRA’s arrival, and it had 
been administered by two army personnel.  Upon UNRRA’s arrival, the military immediately turned 
over administration of the camp and left.  The center had a mixed DP population of 6350 people, 
including 400 children.  During the previous week, the two military personnel had managed to 
compile a list of camp inhabitants, but they had not undertaken a complete registration.  There was a 
central soup kitchen that fed all center inhabitants.  Some food, mainly fresh produce, had been 
requisitioned from the surrounding community, but they had also been using army rations.  There was 
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a cottage hospital organized in a private residence, but no delousing or medical inspections had 
begun.  Based on this information, the teams were then instructed to create a plan of operation for the 
first week in the assembly center, with a focus on deciding who would assume which functions, how 
help from the camp population would be recruited, and how operations would be supervised.  This 
particular training exercise introduced UNRRA’s recruits to a surprisingly realistic portrayal of what 
they could expect to encounter in the field.         
 Once UNRRA’s staff was recruited and trained, the final hurdle to be crossed before UNRRA 
staff could be sent into the field involved supplying them.  According to UNRRA’s Welfare Guide, 
assembly centre teams included thirteen people: a centre director; a deputy director and administrative 
officer; a clerk; administrative officers for supply, messing, warehousing; a welfare officer and 
assistant welfare officer, a medical officer and a nurse; a cook; and two drivers.115  Each of these staff 
required two full uniforms, mess utensils, helmets, bedding, and personal supplies such as 
toothbrushes and toothpaste.116  Each team also required two trucks.  Outfitting teams entering the 
field proved to be a major obstacle in UNRRA’s early months.  According to Fred Hoehler, director 
of the Displaced Persons Division, the chief cause for delay of UNRRA personnel reaching the 
continent was the lack of equipment.  In particular, UNRRA was having a difficult time finding 
enough trucks for their teams.  They had managed to secure twenty-six reconditioned trucks, but in 
March these were still en route to the continent.  The military had first priority on, as well as control 
of, all shipping, and therefore UNRRA had to wait until space was made available for their supplies.  
Given the slowdown caused by lack of supplies, there was some discussion between UNRRA and 
SHAEF over the possibility of sending UNRRA staff into the field and having the military supply 
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them.  UNRRA had received mixed messages from SHAEF on whether they would accept the teams 
without their full allotment of supplies.  At first “SHAEF had indicated that they would prefer not to 
have the personnel until the equipment is on the Continent and available for the transportation,” but 
Hoehler had since then been informed that “they would use the bodies of the personnel regardless of 
the equipment.”117  This had led to a belief that UNRRA should focus their efforts on sending as 
many teams as possible on to England, regardless of whether they were fully equipped.  This led to 
quite a deal of confusion in the ERO because UNRRA officials did not have access to supplies in 
Britain.  Some UNRRA officials believed that they would receive their field equipment in London, 
possibly from American military stocks, before being transferred to the continent. However, as 
Aickin explained, SHAEF had made clear that “there is no arrangement for the furnishing of such 
equipment to U.S. nationals in London.”118  Since it was unlikely that more supplies would be found 
in the field, all teams should be sent from the United States fully outfitted in order to avoid further 
delays in London. 
UNRRA’s Mobilization Centre in France was headed by a Canadian, John Alexander 
Edmison, a lawyer who had spent the war years at Canada’s Military Headquarters in London.  
Edmison was the individual responsible for ensuring that teams were fully equipped before they 
headed into the field.  Yet equipment remained slow to arrive.  In one instance, seventy tons of 
equipment was left sitting on the dock in England awaiting shipment to the continent.  The greatest 
shortage was in motorized vehicles for UNRRA staff.  The American military finally had agreed to 
make available 410 reconditioned trucks to UNRRA, although the exact state of repair of these trucks 
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was unknown.  “To say that [UNRRA truck] No. 126 inspired little confidence is putting it mildly,” 
wrote Edmison on his experiences in one of the reconditioned UNRRA trucks: 
since it very obviously was a long time fugitive from the scrap yard.  When, finally, it took 
off on its puffing and creaking way, I was made to realize that it is one thing to read 
exasperated reports on the condition of UNRRA vehicles, but it is quite another to receive at 
first hand a practical demonstration thereof… With the object of getting a full report from all 
seats and angles, I took over the driving for a ten mile stretch… I happily ceased this 
experiment after I had learned that the driver of such an UNRRA vehicle requires wrists of 
iron and some considerable acrobatic ability in addition.119 
Welfare Officer Bernard Warach echoed the sentiment.  “Our two vehicles were English Leylands, 
Land Cruisers, open topped.  They had seen better days with General Montgomery in North Africa 
and probably survived the battle of El Alamein, we thought….The vehicles stood high off the ground 
and were badly sprung so that our ride across France on rutted roads was dusty and jarring.”120  
Unfortunately, these were the only trucks available to UNRRA at the time.  Once in the field, teams 
sometimes acquired other vehicles.  Nurse Ann F. Matthews, working at several DP camps in Halle, 
wrote home that her “days are spent traveling between the camps and the hospital, many miles apart.  
I use a funny little car that two-thirds of the time is ‘kaput,’ but with a little profanity and coaxing I 
manage to get places.”121  The problem of outfitting UNRRA’s teams was a serious factor in slowing 
the entry of teams into the field.  Nevertheless, the first UNRRA teams were deployed in early April 
1945 from the Mobilization Centre at Granville.  By 14 April, thirty teams had been sent into the 
field.122 
The process of recruiting, training and supplying a newly-founded organization during 
wartime thus proved a difficult task for UNRRA.  They set their sights on recruiting professional 
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social workers for their work in Germany because of their education, their understanding of social 
norms and deviations, and their ability to promote self-sufficiency among the camp population.  They 
also sought to take advantage of professional social workers’ administrative skills, skills that were 
taught in university social work programs and then reinforced during years of work in the field.  For 
this reason, the American understanding of social work, and the strong emphasis on case work, 
predominated in the American zone of occupation.  Professionally trained social workers brought 
with them the skills and abilities that UNRRA, as a newly-formed organization with no direct 
experience to draw upon, sorely lacked.  These skills included a common language and culture of 
social work.  They held common principles in the form of social norms and deviations; they also 
followed similar methodologies and administrative processes, learnt on the job at relief agencies in 
the United States.  Altogether, this made it possible to construct a functioning administrative 
apparatus in a short period of time.   
UNRRA hoped that both the British and American voluntary agencies would help them 
identify and recruit a keen and dedicated staff, but these efforts proved largely in vain.  Eventually 
they turned to direct appeals to military personnel and government officials, and by the summer of 
1945 they had recruited enough staff to fill the positions that remained.  Not only did they face 
numerous obstacles in recruiting a qualified staff, but even after they were trained and mobilized in 
France, UNRRA faced a final obstacle in outfitting them.  The military had priority over all supplies 
needed for the war effort, and therefore those trucks that they did procure proved old and susceptible 
to breakdown.   
The work done in compiling reports at the ERO pointed to the difficult task that lay ahead.  
The authors of these reports recognized that the standards they recommended would be difficult to 
attain.  The authors of Special Needs of Women and Children asserted:  
 123 
 
the standards of care suggested in this Report may seem impossibly high for a Centre or 
Camp with a transitory population and difficult living conditions and also in a more 
permanent establishment… But if he [the welfare worker] knows on what lines to direct his 
aim he will help to deal with the mental and emotional casualties which will be among his 
most anxious problems and make a valuable contribution towards the personal rehabilitation 
of the displaced people.123   
The training, therefore, placed a strong emphasis on applying previously-learned social work skills to 
the DP population.  However, it did little to prepare UNRRA staff for the difficult conditions that they 
would experience and the more immediate task of providing relief.  Indeed, this lack of preparation 
stemmed from the military’s extreme reluctance to share information on the supply situation in 
Europe with UNRRA.  Therefore, UNRRA workers went into the field ignorant of the conditions on 
the ground, and therefore experienced quite a shock when they arrived to find themselves responsible 
for feeding and caring for thousands of people without the necessary supplies.  As a result, some 
welfare workers were quickly overwhelmed by the difficulties; for others, this was an opportunity to 
prove their mettle.  For all, the strong emphasis that the reports placed on counselling was set aside as 
they were forced to deal with the more immediate challenges of providing food, housing and medical 
care.  However, it was also clear that the goal of rehabilitation was not forgotten and, later, 
counselling, based on the ideal of responsibility, became a core element of the work of UNRRA in the 
camps.  
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Chapter 3 
‘An Endless Stream of Refugees and Displaced Persons’: initial 
SHAEF, UNRRA and DP encounters in Germany 
The job ahead of the military authorities, the governments of Europe, and UNRRA, involves 
the repatriation of 12 to 15 million people.  It is a big task and is the result of an 
unprecedented migration of human beings.  Each of these individuals has a story which is a 
tragedy in itself.  They are scattered in countries throughout all of Europe and Africa and the 
Middle East.  In addition to these, there are many millions of displaced persons in the Far 
East.  UNRRA has planned to be ready and is ready to serve its member governments and the 
military and to assume its share of responsibility for the care and eventual repatriation of all 
of these people.1  
 
 
In February 1945, Fred K. Hoehler, director of UNRRA’s Displaced Persons Division, issued 
this press release, announcing UNRRA’s readiness to take part in the care of Europe’s displaced 
persons.  In late 1944 UNRRA had finally reached agreement with SHAEF detailing UNRRA’s 
involvement, in a supporting role during the ‘military period,’ the first six months following the end 
of hostilities in Europe, but a growing role in the succeeding months.  While the military was 
planning the close involvement of the Liaison Officers (LOs) in the care of the DPs, the military also 
hoped to use UNRRA welfare workers in the field, working alongside the military units and under the 
direction of the military commanders.     
Also in February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin were meeting in the Crimea to discuss 
postwar plans for Europe and the occupation of Germany.  All agreed that only unconditional 
surrender would be accepted from Germany (a condition previously agreed upon by Roosevelt and 
Churchill in 1944, and tacitly by the Soviets all along).  Of particular interest to UNRRA was the 
question of how the Soviet DPs would be treated, and if UNRRA would care for them or not.  
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According to the agreements reached, SHAEF would maintain Soviet nationals in special camps or 
points of concentration, in exchange for the same treatment of British and American soldiers and 
civilians.  The care of millions of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians was, American officials 
believed, the only way to ensure the speedy repatriation of some 75,000 American soldiers in Soviet 
hands.2    In response to the Yalta agreement, UNRRA officials in the ERO wrote to Headquarters, 
concerned that “no reference is made to use of UNRRA in Western Germany although UNRRA 
acting as agents of the military does not appear to be elsewhere excluded.”3  They were also 
concerned about the effect of a separate agreement concerning the repatriation of Soviet civilians and 
prisoners of war.  “Should Russian displaced persons be dealt with separately,” they explained, 
“awkward question of priorities will arise and there will undoubtedly be strong pressure from other 
Allied Governments for special bilateral arrangements.”4  Finally they were disturbed by the 
possibility of displaced persons being repatriated against their own wishes.  These concerns were, 
nevertheless, theoretical in nature as UNRRA personnel had yet to be deployed in Germany.   
SHAEF forces encountered few problems regarding the care of civilians during the initial 
invasion of Germany.  Their procedures for working with the Germans and the DPs appeared to be 
working.  The transition to peacetime control followed a similar pattern across Germany.  As SHAEF 
soldiers crossed the border and entered German territory, they followed the same procedure in each 
town.  They began by posting a “Notice to the Population” proclaiming the beginning of military 
occupation, and then they set about locating the mayor.  In many instances the mayors had evacuated 
alongside the German army, leaving no one in charge.  As a result, the Allies were forced to appoint 
local leaders, despite being unable to verify their history or credentials.  Once they had appointed 
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someone to act as interlocutor with the local population, the troops ordered the surrender of all arms, 
and they conducted house-to-house searches to ensure that no one continued to hold arms that could 
be used against Allied troops.  Each house search required at least three soldiers: one to stand guard 
outside, one to check the papers of everyone living in the house and wait with them, and one to 
conduct the search.5  The Allies also instituted a curfew, banned travel of more than three miles, and 
forbade meetings of more than five people, except for church services.  Finally, they also began to 
register all of the local citizens.6        
The military also followed a standard protocol in their early contacts with the DPs.  U.S. 
Army officers like Payne Templeton, a member of a D.P. detachment of the American army, 
organized the DPs by nationality and demanded food for them from the local authorities.  The 
detachment remained in the area until Military Government and UNRRA officials arrived to assume 
control.  Once relieved, they would continue to follow the combat troops and repeat the process.7  
UNRRA officers described several situations in which the military authorities perfunctorily handed 
over control of the DPs to UNRRA in favour of pursuing Wehrmacht soldiers and their withdrawal 
was in many cases quite unexpected.  Just as the UNRRA team arrived at Esslingen and began to 
bring together the DPs in the area, the Military Detachment announced that they were leaving.  “I 
protested,” UNRRA Team 50 director H. L. Ogden decried, “and asked if one of the Officers could 
give me a hand.  I got all the French together and Russians and Poles together, and the Military 
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Governor said we [the military] are off and they [UNRRA] are taking over….They cleared out and 
left me the whole town.”8   
In April 1945 SHAEF reported having uncovered approximately 2.5 million DPs to date, far 
fewer than the 3.7 million that they had originally estimated.  They suggested several possible reasons 
for the shortfall, including the possibility that large numbers might still be found on farms, in 
Russian-controlled areas, or perhaps in southern Bavaria, where the military had yet to infiltrate the 
countryside.  In the meantime, SHAEF was planning to repatriate “important liberated political and 
racial personages immediately, preferably by air.”9  They quickly identified those who could remain 
in their present location and those who needed immediate medical supervision.  “Displaced Persons 
coming off the farms are in the best physical condition,” they explained, while those who “worked on 
fortifications and in urban areas are generally in much poorer condition.  Individuals found in 
concentration camps are in worst condition of all.”10  SHAEF also began to compile a list of 
concentration camp survivors.  The food supply in Germany was reported as good, with food coming 
largely from local German sources.  Displaced persons were being fed a diet of 2,000 calories per 
day, while local Germans were generally receiving between 1,000 and 1,500 calories per day, 
according to SHAEF reports.  By April 1945, there were 114 UNRRA teams working in the field, and 
697 Allied Liaison Officers.              
 Their push into the interior of Germany also brought Allied soldiers into contact with the 
concentration camps, for which the men were completely unprepared.  American soldiers had heard 
stories of the Soviet liberation of the camps in Poland in 1944, but it was inadequate preparation.  On 
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11 April 1945, American forces entered Buchenwald, outside of Weimar, and a few days later British 
forces liberated Bergen-Belsen, near Celle.  What they found shocked and sickened them: piles of 
rotting bodies; then, the survivors.  “They looked like walking corpses,” Rabbi Herschel Schachter, 
chaplain of the American Third Army, recalled upon entering Buchenwald.  “I got out of my army 
jeep and opened the crematorium door.  At that moment my heart broke.  I stood there for maybe half 
an hour, maybe half a minute, I have no idea how long it was.”11  A SHAEF weekly report noted that, 
“[w]ith one or two rare exceptions, conditions in the more than 20 large concentration camps 
uncovered by Allied armies have been extremely critical.”12  They brought medical personnel and 
food, but “the blunt fact is that many of the persons found alive were in such bad condition that they 
could not be saved.”13   
The Allies ordered the local German population to bury the dead.  The care of the survivors 
proved a more difficult task.  Allied soldiers evacuated the inmates to hospitals and cared for them 
until they were strong enough to join the masses of displaced persons that SHAEF was organizing 
into DP camps.  Even as the war continued to be fought around the camp Bergen-Belsen, the British 
Army took control of a nearby German barracks and collected the necessary equipment to organize a 
hospital with beds for 7,000 people from the local economy.  In spite of the Germans sabotaging the 
hospital’s water supply just as the hospital was set to open, on 1 May 7,000 survivors were evacuated 
to the hospital, cleaned and deloused.  The remaining 10,000 ill were cared for at the Belsen camp 
itself.  “This is surely one of the most remarkable achievements of improvised organization in recent 
medical history,” wrote Dr. A. P. Meiklejohn, the leader of a group of ninety-six medical students 
from London, sent to Belsen to care for the survivors.  “Those of us civilians who were privileged to 
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see the R.A.M.C. [Royal Army Medical Corps] in action at Belsen Camp are agreed that the medical 
problems there were most wisely handled.”14  It was an unprecedented situation.  Major General J. H. 
Hilldring, Director of Civil Affairs Division, highlighted the essential work of a nutrition consultant 
and the British medical students in feeding survivors at Belsen concentration camp intravenously, as a 
full 50 percent of survivors could not consume Army rations by mouth.15  In several camps, Allied 
military doctors fed inmates “food mixtures which could be administered to people found in advanced 
stages of starvation.”16   
SHAEF Memo 39 stated that the DPs were to be grouped in assembly centres and only then 
organized for an orderly repatriation.  However, the DPs did not behave as expected, and this was an 
event for which the military was unprepared.  SHAEF soldiers encountered relatively few DPs west 
of the Rhine because the Germans had moved many industries supplying the war effort into 
Germany’s interior in the last year of the war.   Once they crossed the Rhine River, however, they 
encountered ever larger numbers of DPs.  “In some cases,” a British relief worker noted, “groups of 
foreign workers were found already assembled in camps of their own choosing, or in the communal 
living quarters which had been their homes during the period of forced labour.”17  However, she also 
emphasized that many more were “roaming the countryside and living on plunder, and only moving 
into official camps under pressure of hunger, bad weather, rumours of homeward transportation, and 
direction by military patrols.”18  In order to direct the flow of people away from the fighting, the 
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military authorities quickly began to organize a system of road blocks.  These checkpoints allowed 
them to direct people towards collection points.  “From these collecting points,” Administrative 
Memo 39 had dictated, “refugees would be moved under police escort to transit areas or camps in the 
rear of Corps Zones, and from these in turn they would be transported to the semi-permanent 
assembly centers in the Army Zones.”19  SHAEF had expected, or at least hoped, that the DPs would 
wait until the end of hostilities before attempting to return to their homes.  UNRRA welfare worker 
Pettiss described how these hopes were soon dashed, as  
…a mass movement was set off.  Roads in all directions became clogged with streams of 
horse-drawn wagons, trucks, vehicles of all sorts bulging with humanity—families, ragged 
individuals, freed prisoners of war—Germans and non-Germans, many with nothing, many 
barely discernible under piles of belongings of all shapes and sizes.  It seemed that all of 
Germany was on the move.20    
Welfare worker Bernard Warach described a similar experience:  “I was on the road outside our 
center.  I observed an extraordinary sight.  On that road and far off into the horizon there were 
thousands of people marching, walking west.  It was an endless stream of refugees and displaced 
persons, young and old people, trudging on their way home.”21  No one who was able to travel 
seemed interested in waiting for the Allies to repatriate them; they simply decided to start walking.  
This uncoordinated movement infuriated the military authorities, whose troops demanded unfettered 
access to the roads. 
The DPs were not the only ones filling Germany’s roads.  German refugees were also on the 
move.  Thousands moved westward ahead of the invading Red Army.  Following years of Nazi 
propaganda reinforcing the point, the invasion of eastern Germany led to panic amongst the German 
population.  As Atina Grossman explains, “[t]errifying images of invading Mongol barbarians raping 
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German women were a vital part of the Nazi war machine’s feverish (and successful) efforts to 
bolster morale on the eastern front and keep the home front intact.”22  Some Germans at the time 
questioned the propaganda’s purpose.  “Are they supposed to spur the men of Berlin to protect and 
defend us women?  Ridiculous.  Their only effect is to send thousands more helpless women and 
children running out of town, jamming the roads heading west, where they’re likely to starve or die 
under fire from enemy planes,” one Berlin resident recounted in her memoir.23  Nevertheless, this fear 
was soon reinforced by the experiences of those living in the path of the invading Red Army.  “It was 
not untypical for Soviet troops to rape every female over the age of twelve or thirteen in a village, 
killing many in the process; to pillage the homes for food, alcohol, and loot; and to leave the village 
in flames,” historian Norman Naimark explains.24  The climax was the invasion of the capital city, 
which was “accompanied by an unrestrained explosion of sexual violence by Soviet soldiers.”25  As a 
result of the fear and panic, millions of Germans fled westward from the approaching Red Army, 
bringing with them only the few belongings that they could push on a cart or carry in their hands.  
These German refugees were distinguished from the displaced persons because they were displaced 
within the borders of their own country, whereas the DPs had been displaced beyond their national 
borders.  However, both the DPs and the German refugees were vying for the same limited resources, 
namely housing, food, clothing and medical supplies, as UNRRA would come to learn in the 
following months. 
Allied soldiers pushed further into Germany, and by April 1945 they were fighting in the 
streets of Berlin.  On 30 April 1945 Hitler committed suicide.  Karl Donitz, his designated successor, 
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unsuccessfully attempted to organize a new German government and simultaneously sued for peace.  
The war concluded on 7 May 1945 with the signing of the surrender document, first between German 
and American forces, and the next day, between German and Soviet forces.  The declaration of 
surrender stated: 
[t]he Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, hereby 
assume supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all powers possessed by the 
German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or 
authority.  The assumption, for the purposes stated above, of the said authority and powers 
does not effect the annexation of Germany.26 
They definitively abolished the German government, and the members of Admiral Donitz’s 
government were arrested and imprisoned.  The occupying forces assumed all responsibility for the 
running of the country.  In all but the larger cities, military government took the form of “three or four 
officers apiece, five enlisted men, and two jeeps with trailers….They arranged for the dead in the 
streets to be buried, restored rationing, put police back on the streets, and if possible got the electricity 
and water working.”27  They also arranged billeting for troops, organized labour battalions, and, when 
possible, they also worked to get electricity and water restored.   
The military also continued to be responsible for caring for the DPs, chiefly requisitioning 
food and housing for the DPs, and ensuring that the Germans provided it.  Initially it was quite basic 
but amid popular outcry at home, SHAEF ordered army groups to improve conditions for the DPs.  
This meant both increasing their food rations, but also finding them better housing.  “Arrangements 
should be made at the earliest possible moment for alternative accommodation,” a May 1945 SHAEF 
memo noted, “if necessary by transferring Germans from neighboring villages to the concentration 
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camps.”28  Military authorities began to seek more permanent accommodation for the DPs under their 
care.   
The largest problem they faced was the vast destruction of the war.  Everywhere there was 
evidence of the recent fighting.  The countryside was devastated.  Susan Pettiss described the scene as 
she crossed the Rhine River as one of “complete contrast” with the French cities she had just traveled 
through.  “Now, everywhere were signs of recent fighting,” she wrote.  “All along the sides were 
wrecked tanks, machine guns, German cars.  The German cities were completely leveled.”29  UNRRA 
Team No. 18 Director H. B. S. Ballantyne described the difficulty of travelling through the country 
by truck. “All the bridges had been blown; some had been repaired, but at times we had to ford the 
stream, and at other points make considerable detours over none-too-good tracks.”30  The cities had 
been demolished by the aerial bombardment and the recent fighting.  UNRRA Team No. 5 arrived in 
the seemingly deserted town of Bocholt, just across the Dutch border, where the town had recently 
been taken: “of course no light and water.  A dead town, no inhabitants, ruins, stench of burned things 
and dead.  In front of the building bombed trains and bombed railway station.  The trees were dead, 
there even were no birds to make nests in that dead place.”31 
In May 1945, UNRRA Team No. 51 described their arrival at a DP camp being run by the 
military.  The director explained,  
I have a camp here of 10,000 Poles, Russians, French and Italians who are living in 
conditions of indescribable filth.  The latrine accommodation is rudimentary and foul.  
Hundreds cook their meals over candles looted from German stocks.  The household rubbish 
of potato peelings, paper rag etc., lies about the place in heaps.  The population is lice, flea 
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and bug ridden for there is no D.D.T.  Luckily the food is good for the moment and natural 
resistance to disease high.  But with the advent of warm weather – and yesterday’s 
temperature was over 80 – there is great danger of disease breaking out.32   
There were few facilities completely undamaged by the war.  Therefore, the DP camp structures 
varied considerably.  DPs were housed wherever there was room.  The DP camp at Bocholt was made 
up of “a five floor block of Siemens and Halske factory.  All other parts of this factory had been 
bombed and were a heap of debris.”33  The floors of the building were then divided according to 
nationality.  The ground floor was designated for the Poles, who had with them many women and 
children.  The first floor was full of heavy machinery and therefore uninhabitable.  The second and 
third floors housed the Russians.  The fourth and fifth floors were used by the Italians and French.   
In Munich, the DP camp was comprised of a complex of buildings which had been built for 
the German army to store arms and other supplies, and covered three city blocks, including both the 
warehouses, “completely honeycombed underneath with stock rooms for supplies,” and apartments 
which had previously housed German officers.34  The DP camp at Hockenheim “comprises two large 
schools, one private house for some families and one private house for a clinic.”35  Once organized, 
the camps saw a constant flood of new arrivals.  Camp Director H. L. Ogden explained that they 
originally found 200 DPs living in the camps under his control in Hockenheim, but that within a few 
days the camp population had swollen to 650, including fifty children.  “It is noteworthy that there 
seems to be no system by which a Director can be warned that bodies of D.P.’s are being sent to him 
from other camps.  The trucks arrive out of the blue and that’s that!” a May 1945 report noted.36  
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Bernard Warach described the work involved in organizing the DP camp in Neustadt.  “A unified 
internal Soviet military command was appointed,” he explained, “roofs and walls were repaired by 
the U.S. Army Engineers and German civilians, kitchens were made operational, beds scrounged and 
installed, latrines dug and constructed out of prefabricated plywood, and community activities 
organized.  Everyone was doused with DDT almost immediately after we arrived.”37 
The military was responsible for maintaining displaced persons and German civilians alike, a 
responsibility for which they were singularly unprepared.  One soldier noted that “[s]ince the tactical 
mission has ceased the units in the field do not have a clear conception of their responsibility toward 
military government… we have a definite lack of coordinated and cohesive action on the part of G-3 
and G-4 and G-5.”38  Another highlighted the glaring difference between the way most soldiers 
viewed the DPs and the German population.  “Through no fault of his own,” he explained, “the DP 
makes a poor outward impression on an MG officer, as he attempts to present his case.  His ‘home’ is 
usually a barracks, schoolhouse or barn; his wardrobe, what he wears plus a few extra pieces of 
clothing stuffed in a bag.  He has developed a defensive attitude as protection against German 
brutality…. In American, he looks and acts like a ‘bum’.”39  He contrasted this with “the German 
[who] is well dressed, better fed and living in a home.  He is very correct in his manner when 
addressing an American officer.”40  Military officers were also more likely to have German 
translators with them than those who could translate for the DPs.  He concluded that, despite orders to 
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the contrary, when approached by both a DP and a German, officers “place more credence in the 
German’s complaint about DP looting than in the DP’s complaint about inadequate food.”41   
Soldiers, whether American or British, had little patience for the care of civilians generally, 
and even less for the care of the DPs.  They wanted to continue the fight against the Germans, and 
when the war ended in Europe, to transfer to the Pacific theatre.  The military was especially 
unprepared for the level of care required by liberated concentration camp inmates.  Many soldiers no 
doubt arrived in the field with expectations similar to those of Malcolm J. Proudfoot, who believed 
that “many essential refugee operations, except some of the welfare services required for women, 
children, and family groups, were no more than the standard army procedures involving sanitary 
measures, mass billeting, feeding, and general care.  For all practical purposes these were the same 
for an army barrack or a refugee centre.”42  They were sorely disappointed and frustrated when they 
found that the DPs required more care, and more guidance, than the typical army soldier.  They did 
not see their supervision of displaced persons as a valuable use of either their skills or manpower. 
Under the circumstances, the military had expected the national liaison officers to play a 
significant role in the care of the DPs.  The liaison officers were national representatives appointed by 
their home governments and called forward by SHAEF to register their nationals, issue repatriation 
visas and assist in the provision of services for health and welfare.  This arrangement had been 
outlined in the fall of 1944.  Unfortunately, the liaison officers did not fulfill SHAEF’s expectations.  
They proved unwilling and, at times, unable to control their populations.  Soviet liaison officers also 
made increasingly vehement claims and impractical demands against the level of care provided by 
SHAEF.  Alongside the liaison officers, individual representatives of a whole host of voluntary 
agencies arrived in the field to help.  They did not seek military permission to begin work with the 
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DPs and refugees; they simply showed up, circumventing military protocol and generally getting in 
the way, from the military’s perspective.  Finally, the process of repatriation was fraught with 
difficulties.  The disorganization of the entire process only served to anger SHAEF officials.  Trains 
arrived without warning at all hours of the day.  It was impossible for them to prepare for the arrivals 
and departures.  Finally, the DPs themselves proved an unruly lot.  Many had taken it upon 
themselves to repatriate of their own free will, taking to the road and impeding the flow of military 
traffic.  They also set upon the German population and took revenge against them.  Drunkenness 
proved a particularly deadly problem for those DPs who found large quantities of liquor. 
The combination of difficult displaced persons, unwilling liaison officers and disorganized 
repatriation efforts all combined to alter SHAEF’s understanding of UNRRA’s role in the DP camps 
in Germany.  UNRRA officials were willing and apparently able to take on the administration of the 
DP camps, register DPs, provide food and medical care, and organize the voluntary agencies, all tasks 
that the military found itself increasingly reluctant to do.  Thus, while UNRRA had played a 
supporting role during the initial invasion of Germany, helping the military when they were invited to 
do so, they came to be seen as an increasingly valuable partner in the care of the DPs.   
Unfortunately UNRRA was not prepared to fill this role immediately.  In early 1945 they still 
faced a serious recruitment problem.  As explained earlier, qualified personnel were already working 
for organizations involved in the war effort, whether it was working for the armed forces or groups 
involved in wartime production.  Attracting staff was made more difficult by the fact that UNRRA 
could not promise its recruits either a specific length of service or a precise location of employment.  
Finally, UNRRA itself had only a small staff focused on recruitment, and therefore they relied heavily 
on voluntary agencies in both Britain and the United States to suggest personnel for work with 
UNRRA.  Alongside the problem of recruitment, supplying UNRRA’s teams as they were preparing 
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to enter the field was a second major obstacle to meeting SHAEF’s request for personnel in Germany.  
Throughout the fall of 1944, UNRRA and SHAEF had held numerous conferences on the 
composition of assembly centre teams and the equipment they required in order to be “self-contained 
and independently mobile.”43  Given the military’s prioritized claim to all supplies, UNRRA 
struggled to equip its teams with the most basic of necessities before they entered the field.  The most 
difficult items to procure were trucks for use in the field.  As long as the military retained control over 
requisitioning and refused to supply UNRRA there would be no access to those supplies necessary to 
send UNRRA teams into the field.   
While in December 1944 UNRRA had agreed to provide the military with 200 field teams of 
thirteen members, in light of the problems associated with recruitment and supply, UNRRA was 
unable to provide the promised teams; instead, they resorted to sending out smaller teams, groups 
consisting of three or four UNRRA members, known as spearhead teams.  According to Review of the 
Month, a monthly publication issued by the ERO’s Information Division, the spearhead teams “are 
being used by the military authorities in a variety of ways, according to how fluid or stable the 
situation is in a particular place.  Sometimes the team is split up and the personnel used in an 
individual capacity where the need is greatest; in other cases the team operated as such from its own 
base…; or the team may be divided in half and put to work at two centres.”44  The first spearhead 
teams were mobilized on 15 April 1945, and by the end of June, there were 322 in the field, of 
varying size.  UNRRA then spent the summer of 1945 building up the spearhead teams to their full 
strength.  As UNRRA built up these teams in May and June 1945, the military became increasingly 
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willing to hand over administrative responsibility for the DP camps than they had been earlier in 
1945.     
These UNRRA teams were at all times under the command of the military, as per the terms of 
the UNRRA-SHAEF Agreement.  Bernard Warach noted that in the early months UNRRA had all but 
lost contact with its personnel in the field.  “Communications with the field units was very poor.  We 
were aware of that problem in Neustadt.  The UNRRA teams were under military command and 
provided full logistical support.  There was really no need for UNRRA direction at all.  We receive no 
mail or pay.”45  This period was at once confusing and liberating for UNRRA staff on the ground.  
While they had no direction in terms of policy, they were also not limited in terms of actions that they 
could take.  They did not need to wait for permission to come down from UNRRA headquarters when 
they wanted to institute new programs.  They had free reign over the DP camps that they 
administered.     
 By mid-May 1945 UNRRA had sent 141 teams into the field in Germany.  At the end of that 
month, officials at ERO wrote to UNRRA Headquarters in Washington to request welfare goods for 
the DP camps.  Staff in the field were desperately requesting any clothing, toiletries and recreational 
supplies that could be found.  Officials at the ERO in London had attempted to locate canteen 
supplies and toiletries in Britain, but the only supplies available were timber nails and screws, pencils, 
paint brushes and paint, glue, hammers, mallets, various saws and screwdrivers, sewing needles and 
thread, as well as small amounts of playing cards, chess sets, soap, razors, and toothpaste.  They were 
unfortunately unable to locate any sports equipment, such as footballs, volleyballs and table tennis 
rackets, or toothbrushes and scissors.  They also sought clothing for all age groups, especially 
children. 
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Aside from the challenge of trying to locate adequate supplies, one of the largest problems for 
UNRRA teams in the field was communication with the DPs.   UNRRA teams, despite their 
international composition, rarely spoke the languages of those under their care.  Therefore, UNRRA 
officials often had to turn to the DPs themselves for interpreters.  “All our charges are Poles and 
Russians, and the struggle with the languages is some battle,” reported UNRRA Team No. 18 director 
H.S. Ballantyne.46  “I have got a French-speaking Pole, who can speak Polish and Russian.  Rachel 
Greene [the team’s welfare officer] has an English-speaking Pole who can do likewise, so we manage 
somehow, most ably helped by a number of soldiers of the U.S. Army, who, in their spare time, come 
and give a hand with the interpreting.”47  Ballantyne requested that UNRRA send him a short 
dictionary containing 200-300 words in English, German, Russian and Polish.  “I have got some out 
already here,” he explained, “on the typewriter; and we are beginning to make ourselves 
understood.”48  However, it made an already difficult task especially frustrating and challenging.  “I 
have an awful horror,” he wrote, “that one day I shall be asking for a glass of water in polite society 
and that someone will bring me a double scotch.”49  The chances of this happening were highly 
unlikely, but Ballatyne’s frustration, as well as his sense of humour in the midst of such an absurd 
situation, was not difficult to understand. 
The lack of basic office supplies had very practical and negative implications.  Without 
paper, pens, typewriters, forms, or even rubber stamps, it was impossible to begin to construct the 
paper records expected, let alone the complicated five-part registration that had been designed.  
Nowhere was registration of the DPs taking place.  “Few registration cards are apparently available,” 
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SHAEF noted, and therefore “[o]nly a simple statistical record was kept for purposes of supply and 
transport.”50  Despite this fact, SHAEF reported that the DP camps in Western Germany were 
“functioning smoothly, with some striking instances of exceptional welfare and leisure time 
programs.”51  At the DP camp at Bocholt, UNRRA welfare worker M. Korwan immediately set about 
clearing a space amongst the rubble for the children to use.  When the space was finally cleared and 
the windows and doors repaired, she invited the children into the hall.  “When the children came in,” 
she explained, “they asked what they can do.  I said, ‘all you want, this is your own place.’  ‘Will you 
smack us if we scream?’  ‘No,’ I said, ‘you can shout as much as you like.’  They started shouting and 
for 2 days they did nothing else.  Afterwards they had enough and they began to play normally.”52  
Their wartime experiences had taught them to always be quiet as children “were smacked if they did 
not get out of the way where a German was going, smacked if they broke a flower or laughed or sang 
and also without any reason other than their mere existence.”53  Despite the difficult conditions, then, 
UNRRA workers began developing programs of rehabilitation, even as they continued to solve 
problems associated with basic housing.  Perhaps in some ways, the absolute lack of basic supplies 
and the most rudimentary facilities encouraged a creativity and ingenuity on the part of UNRRA staff 
and DPs alike.    
In reality, in the first months in the field, there was little time to spend filling out reports for 
UNRRA Headquarters.  When the welfare workers did find the time, they often did not have the tools 
necessary.  UNRRA teams were not equipped with paper and typewriters; they had to scour the 
German landscape to track down such things.  As a result, only towards the end of the summer were 
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UNRRA teams able to begin submitting regular reports to zone headquarters.  Initially officers were 
expected to submit an “Assembly Centre Weekly Report,” a weekly numerical summary of the DPs at 
each centre.  The ERO’s Welfare Division recommended that a section entitled “Special Comments” 
be appended to the report for any other information that UNRRA welfare officers believed to be 
important.  The explained that, “[i]n order that action can be taken at the appropriate level on such 
things as the provision of special food, clothing, welfare supplies, special personnel etc. for the care 
of such groups, it will be particularly important for the Welfare Officer to relate his or her reports to 
these groups and their needs, as well as to general welfare problems.”54  The ERO also reminded 
welfare officers that they should report any “special situations” as soon as possible, although exactly 
what qualified as such a situation was never clarified.   
By 6 June 1945, the ERO’s expectations had evolved.  Centre directors were instructed to 
submit a more detailed report on conditions in each centre, and welfare officers were instructed to 
submit to the centre director a narrative report on welfare work in the centre for inclusion.  “When 
making these reports,” the ERO explained, “it is essential that Welfare Officers should relate 
information to needs in such a way that requirements can be speedily and accurately evaluated.”55  
The welfare reports were to comprise two sections: a statistical section and a narrative section.  The 
statistical section was to include the camp population broken down according to age range.  A page 
within each report was to be devoted to a more precise breakdown of the ages of all children.  “The 
Report should be analytical in content,” the instructions explained, “indicating the welfare services 
rendered in relation to the specific situations encountered; it may on occasion be necessary to describe 
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the actual situation.”56  The report went on to state that UNRRA welfare officers “should feel free to 
make definite recommendations on which he considers action should be taken (and, where possible, 
by whom).  These recommendations should, of course, be well documented.  A summary of 
recommendations should appear at the end of the Report.”57  The ERO recommended several 
headings be addressed in each report: general organization of the camp, available facilities, any 
special problem groups, the disposition of unaccompanied children, services offered to all children 
and youth, and personal counseling services.  The instructions on report-writing drew upon many of 
the same principles that were both taught to and followed by American social workers.   
The summer of 1945 witnessed a shift in SHAEF policy based on conditions on the ground.  
SHAEF’s plan for administering the DP camps in Germany relied heavily on the role played by the 
liaison officers controlling their nationals.  However, it did not take long to learn that these officers 
could not effectively fulfill this role.  In the area administered by the American Seventh Army, there 
were numerous reports of problems with Polish liaison officers in particular.  Brigadier General 
Wood reported that their territory contained 134,000 Polish DPs, and that the vast majority of them 
wanted to return home, but that the liaison officers were slowing their movement.  The liaison 
officers themselves “would mostly like to go home, but wonder if they can safely do so.”58  They 
feared crossing through the Russian zone.  Warsaw radio meanwhile was encouraging Poles in 
Germany to “form themselves in groups of 50 and trek home,” but the Polish DPs “are deterred by the 
doubts of Polish Ln [Liaison] officers” on the advisability of such a move.59  As well, the Soviet 
military was forcing Polish DPs across the border into the American zone, which was only adding to 
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the problem.  “For instance,” Wood explained, “1800 [Polish DPs] loaded in Thuringia by the 
Russians, were shipped via Bebra, and ended up at Karlsruhe on 19 July,” in the American zone of 
occupation, rather than being returned home to Poland.60  The UNRRA team working at Euskirchen, 
just west of Bonn and not far from the Belgian border, reported a similar situation.  They were also 
dealing with unexpected arrivals, and in one particularly distressing instance, “a party of Russians, 
expected to number 25, turned up 235 strong.”61 
 The DP exchange centre located at Bebra, twenty kilometers from the border with the 
Russian zone, was a site of particular chaos.  The centre was operated by Major W. A. Nessel of 
USGCC, POW and DP Division, and located in the Bebra train station.  German refugees and 
displaced persons had gathered at the station in order for transport home, either into Eastern Germany 
or beyond to Eastern Europe.  At the end of July 1945, 15,000 such people had gathered in Bebra and 
the American Army simply did not have the resources to care for them.  “Few people are being 
exchanged at Bebra,” the report stated, “because of the inability of Major Nessel to reach a working 
agreement with the Russians.”62   As a result, conditions in the town had quickly deteriorated and 
“[t]he town is jammed with frantic people.  Considerable human misery is being encountered which is 
difficult to alleviate due to present food and medical shortages.”63  The problem stemmed from the 
fact that the Russian military was only accepting Russians into its zone, while forcing Polish people 
in the opposite direction.  Another point of contention concerned the return of trains used to move 
people eastward.  Major Nessel wanted reassurance that the trains would be returned to the American 
zone.  “The Russians have refused to guarantee the return of any rolling stock; in fact some US RR 
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[railroad] equipment seems to have been mysteriously swallowed up within the Russian Zone 
already.”64 
The problems with the liaison officers led to a revision of SHAEF’s policy.  The first 
evidence of this shift came in a memo entitled “Liberated Citizens of the Soviet Union,” issued on 8 
April 1945.  This memo touched on some of the problems encountered in the field.  In the section 
concerning camp management and security, SHAEF reduced the role of the liaison officers to a 
supporting one.  “For security and other pertinent reasons,” the memo stated,  
…control over the liberated Soviet citizens must be exercised by the US forces with the 
assistance of the Soviet authorities.  The US commander, in whose area the camps or 
concentration points are located, will appoint a US commandant for each camp who will have 
the overall responsibility for discipline and administration thereof.  The Soviet authorities 
have the right to appoint the internal administration and to set up the management and 
discipline within the camp according to Soviet law and military procedures.65   
According to the updated memo, in cases where the Soviet camp leader was unable to 
maintain internal discipline, the US commander had the power to remove him and appoint someone 
new in his place.  As well, the memo noted that “where the US camp commandant or military 
commander feels that additional military or administrative personnel is required in order to carry out 
the responsibilities of US forces, military commanders are authorized to assign such military or 
UNRRA personnel as may be available.”66  UNRRA was now expected to play a much larger role 
than Memo 39 had originally allowed it.  In cases where the liaison officers were unable to manage 
the camps themselves, UNRRA staff would be brought in to assist them.  The access of liaison 
officers was also curtailed:   
Soviet officials and repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access to the 
camps and points of concentration.  Such visits to camps and points of concentration will be 
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restricted to those who have been duly authorized by this headquarters.  The above mentioned 
right of immediate access does not apply to Russian officers or liaison personnel who are not 
directly connected with repatriation activities.67 
   Similarly, this memo emphasized the control of the US commander over all DP movements, 
including those involving Soviet DPs.  “All movements of Soviet citizens under US control are US 
responsibility,” the memo asserted, “and will not be executed on the sole responsibility of any Soviet 
authority.”68  Finally, in all cases where crimes were committed beyond the confines of the camp 
itself, the offender would be tried by military government court, and not by Soviet officers.  
The changes made by SHAEF to its operating procedure with regards to Soviet DPs make 
clear that the LOs were simply not living up to SHAEF’s expectations of them.  These changes were 
further cemented in May 1945, when SHAEF issued a revised manual for the care of the DPs, Guide 
to the Care of Displaced Persons.  In this newest edition, which superseded all previous guides to the 
care of DPs, including Administrative Memo 39, the changes reflected the experiences of those 
working with DPs in early 1945.  The ultimate goal remained the repatriation of the DPs as quickly as 
possible and the Guide outlined the same timeline as presented in Memo 39.  During the combat 
period (previously labeled the period of military advance), the military would continue to move DPs 
from the front lines toward collection points, before being transported to assembly centers.  At the 
collection points, the military would provide food and first aid treatment to those in need, as well as 
dusting with DDT to prevent the spread of disease.  No attempt at registration would take place until 
the DPs had been transported to an assembly center. 
The Guide made clear that any and all buildings available could and would be utilized for 
housing the DPs.  “These Centers will not necessarily consist of camps or communal buildings, 
though such accommodation will always be used if available.  If it is not, blocks of houses or sections 
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of a town may be taken over from the German population to provide lodgings for displaced 
persons.”69  In such cases, the assembly center itself would include a central office and perhaps some 
communal facilities as available.  In no cases were the DPs allowed to be billeted in homes also 
occupied by Germans.  The Guide suggested that several factors be taken into consideration when 
choosing the site of a new assembly center, including location in relation to communication routes 
and food supplies.  However, the most important factor was the availability of adequate physical 
space.  Each center required enough space for sleeping quarters, administrative space, warehousing, 
cooking and dining facilities, latrine and washing facilities, laundry, as well as room for recreational 
activities and school classes.  Suitable accommodation for assembly center staff was also a factor to 
consider.  Beyond the issue of space, assembly center directors also had to ensure the accommodation 
would keep out the elements.  “The first two elements of good accommodation are weatherproof 
roofs and solid floors.  The latter are particularly important from the point of view of cleanliness,” the 
Guide explained.70  This was a clear reflection of the type of housing that the DPs were living in.   
 The Guide explained that the DPs were to be registered upon arrival at an assembly center.  A 
flow chart appended to the Guide outlined the process for receiving DPs into the centers, listing six 
steps: arrival and medical examination, assignment of accommodation, registration, verification of 
nationality by the liaison officer, waiting in the assembly center, and finally “disposal,” which meant 
either repatriation or movement to a camp for non-repatriable DPs.71  Upon arrival, the DPs were 
expected to be kept separate from the assembly center population until such a time as they could be 
properly registered.  The Guide suggested that each assembly center prepare an Admission Control 
Section in which five hundred persons might be held, with facilities for “messing and sleeping, as 
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displaced persons often arrive hungry and tired and it may take some time to put them through the 
initial processing.”72  Only once they had been medically examined and deloused could they enter the 
general assembly center population.  The liaison officer was responsible for confirming the 
nationality of each DP and for issuing travel visas.  During the verification of nationality, a DP might 
meet one of three possible fates: in the first instance their nationality is confirmed and they await 
repatriation in the assembly center; in the second instance they are identified by the liaison officer as 
an enemy national and sent to a detention camp; and in the third instance, when their nationality 
cannot be confirmed, they become the responsibility of the chief liaison officer at SHAEF 
headquarters, who is then responsible for deciding their fate.  The ultimate goal of each DP, according 
to the chart, was to reach “disposal,” either through repatriation or movement to a camp for those who 
cannot be repatriated.  As William I. Hitchcock notes, “[t]he chief goal of the assembly centers, then, 
was not to house but to process DPs.”73  SHAEF wanted the DPs organized for a speedy repatriation, 
with those unable to return home moved into separate camps to be dealt with at a later date by some 
other authority.   
 The Guide further detailed how to properly register the displaced persons.  For each DP, five 
separate documents were created.  The first document, the DP1 card, assigned each DP a registration 
number and included their name and signature.  This was the DP’s proof of identity in the camp.  
They were told to hold onto these cards and to keep them accessible.  As the Guide explained, when 
necessary, the DP1 card could be used to verify a DP’s identity through their signature.  The DP2 
card contained more detailed information, including all of the information on the DP1 card, as well as 
proof of disinfection and medical inspection, the liaison officer’s stamp of approval upon nationality 
verification, and all information collected during the liaison officer’s interview.  In order to verify a 
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DP’s nationality, the liaison officer might inquire about place of birth, other residences, names of 
parents, and occupations held by the DP.  This information was recorded on the DP2 card.  These 
cards were held by the assembly center’s officials, but travelled with the DP when they were 
repatriated or moved to a new center.  The DP3 card contained much of the same information, 
including the name, registration number, nationality, sex, age and date of arrival of each DP, but these 
cards remained in the center, even if a DP was moved or repatriated.  The DP3 card also tracked 
blankets and clothes issued to each DP in the assembly center.  Alongside the three DP cards, each 
DP was assigned a Supplementary Medical Record, which noted the dates of medical examination 
and disinfection, and also tracked all other medical treatment received.  Finally, each DP was issued a 
DP Meal Record Card to be shown at all meals.  These five documents, then, were the means by 
which SHAEF organized the processing of all DPs.  SHAEF was also helping to normalize the lives 
of the DPs by giving them a legal identity.  They could simply have housed and fed the DPs 
temporarily without worrying about their identification.  However, in providing identity cards they 
legalized their identity.   
While under SHAEF care, the assembly centers would provide the DPs with food, clothing, 
shelter and medical care.  They would also register all DPs, work to verify each DP’s nationality, 
conduct a security screening, provide welfare facilities and temporary employment, and prepare each 
DP for repatriation.  In order to avoid difficulties, the Guide suggested several measures be 
implemented: national groups should be kept together where possible, families should not be divided, 
displaced persons should be allowed to bring all of their belongings with them when moved, they 
should be given as much information as possible, and they should be allowed to speak freely to 
assembly center officials and liaison officers.  The Guide also recommended that as many programs 
and activities as possible should be organized in order that the DPs not sit idle for long periods.  The 
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DPs should also be encouraged to take part in running the center.  National group leaders should be 
chosen, with input from both the DP population and the liaison officers, and they should take part in 
the organization of activities.   
Whereas in the earlier Memo 39 UNRRA’s role was a very minor one, in the Guide SHAEF 
stated that the “Supreme Commander has signed an agreement with the Director General of UNRRA 
to facilitate UNRRA’s contribution, which will be a growing one.”74  While the care and repatriation 
of the DPs ultimately remained the military’s responsibility, SHAEF was now prepared to hand over 
administration of the DP camps to UNRRA.  The position of Assembly Center Director, previously 
only held by military commanders, was now an UNRRA position.  An assembly center housing 
approximately 3,000 DPs now initially required, according to SHAEF, a team of 12, including three 
military officers, eight soldiers, and one UNRRA official, but these military teams were to be 
replaced as quickly as possible with UNRRA teams, including UNRRA staff and additional personnel 
from the voluntary societies.  Following the transition to full UNRRA administration, assembly 
center directors were encouraged to utilize DPs in the camps’ administration.  “As a general rule,” the 
Guide states, “center administration will provide employment for 7½% of the total inhabitants of a 
center.  This may be raised to 10% when there is a high proportion of women and children in the 
center.”75  The Guide also stressed the importance of providing DPs willing to work in the assembly 
centers with extra privileges in order to ensure that they performed their tasks satisfactorily.  Some of 
the suggested functions for DPs included acting as national group leaders, interpreters, assembly 
center police and firefighting.  The Guide also encouraged the center directors to use the DPs in 
counseling, recreation programs, school programs, cooking, handling supplies, and in medical 
services.   
                                                     
74
 Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany, 1. 
75
 Ibid, 6. 
 151 
 
The greatest change to the care of DPs was the evolution in the role played by the liaison 
officers.  While Memo 39 had highlighted the important role that SHAEF believed they would play, 
this was significantly curtailed in the Guide.  The principal duties of the Allied liaison officers were 
now restricted to verification of the claims of nationality made by each DP, distribution of 
repatriation visas, and recommendations on repatriation priorities.  Subsidiary duties might include 
assisting in the control of their nationals, furnishing information, and generally helping the assembly 
center director when necessary.  It is clear from this change that SHAEF was disappointed by the role 
played by the liaison officers in the early part of 1945, and as a result had shifted responsibility away 
from them as a result.      
On 5 June 1945, the Allies agreed to form a joint commission for governing defeated 
Germany.  The country would be run by an Allied Control Council, made up of the military 
commanders of the four zones who would together develop policy.  The British organized a Control 
Commission to govern their zone of occupation.  The Americans created a zonal-level Control 
Council, which was comprised of three divisions: the Armed Forces Division, which planned for 
disarmament, demilitarization, and repatriation of prisoners of war; Military Government Division A, 
which would deal broadly with economics; and Military Government Division B, which would deal 
with political matters.  At the same time, agreement was reached between the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the repatriation of Soviet displaced persons.  According to 
this agreement, displaced persons would be exchanged at ten reception delivery points along the line 
separating SHAEF and Soviet-controlled areas.  “Transport of Soviet displaced persons from points 
on Allied side to Soviet reception-delivery points will be undertaken entirely by SCAEF Armies,” 
which would then use the empty trucks to transport Allied displaced persons and American and 
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British prisoners of war back into SHAEF-controlled territory.76  SHAEF took full responsibility for 
the transportation because of the considerably larger number of Soviet nationals in SHAEF territory, 
which included the agreed-upon American, British and French zones of occupation, as well as large 
parts of Thuringia, Magdeburg, and Saxony-Anhalt (in the future Soviet zone of occupation).  The 
memo noted that the movements were running smoothly.  Although some of the repatriation trains 
lacked both enough food and a sufficient number of security guards, as of 26 May, SHAEF had 
delivered 160,000 Soviets to the reception points, with a further 5,000 Soviets being transported by 
plane from France.  At the same time, more than a million Western Europeans had been repatriated, 
including more than 120,000 French and Belgian citizens by plane.  The SHAEF memo also noted 
that the care of the displaced persons remaining under SHAEF control showed “steady 
improvement,” and that the biggest problem concerned a “failure in some instances to use line 
military personnel to fullest extent.”77   
The summer of 1945 saw a large number of outside visitors visit the DP camps in Germany.  
Newspaper reporters filed stories and news of the difficult conditions was soon reported in the major 
American newspapers.  In response to these reports, President Roosevelt appointed Earl G. Harrison, 
former Commissioner of Immigration, as the American representative on the Intergovernmental 
Commission on Refugees, and sent him to Germany in June 1945 to tour the camps and report back 
on conditions.  In late September 1945 Harrison submitted his report.  Harrison was most concerned 
for the Jewish DPs, “in so many ways the first and worst victims of Nazism.”78  Harrison’s report 
highlighted the problems with the living conditions and the need to improve them as quickly as 
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possible.  While recognizing that the initial postwar period was a time of chaos and that the military 
was at first severely limited in its capabilities, he asserted that the military was also responsible for 
improving conditions as quickly as possible.  Specifically, he explained that   
…three months after V-E Day and even longer after the liberation of individual groups, many 
Jewish displaced persons and other possibly non-repatriables are living under guard behind 
barbed-wire fences, in camps of several descriptions (built by the Germans for slave-laborers 
and Jews), including some of the most notorious of the concentration camps, amidst crowded, 
frequently unsanitary and generally grim conditions, in complete idleness, with no 
opportunity, except surreptitiously, to communicate with the outside world, waiting, hoping 
for some word of encouragement and action in their behalf.79 
He was shocked by the lack of clothing: former concentration camp inmates continued to wear their 
striped clothing for lack of anything else.  Harrison was also concerned about the amount and type of 
food served to the Jewish DPs.  While accepting the fact that food was scarce everywhere, “one must 
raise the question as to how much longer many of these people… can survive on a diet composed 
principally of bread and coffee, irrespective of the caloric content. In many camps, the 2,000 calories 
included 1,250 calories of a black, wet and extremely unappetizing bread,” while Germans living in 
rural areas continued to eat a more nutritious and varied diet.80  Housing also posed a serious issue; 
while their current housing would suffice for the summer months, it would not provide adequate 
protection from the elements during the winter, and Harrison was certain that the fate of Europe’s 
surviving Jews would not be decided by then. 
 As a result of his tour, Harrison made key and fateful recommendations which had profound 
implications.  Crucial, he argued, was that Jewish DPs be recognized as such and not categorized 
according to their former nationality as “the result is that special attention cannot be given to their 
admittedly greater needs because, it is contended, doing so would constitute preferential treatment 
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and lead to trouble with the non-Jewish portion of the particular nationality group.”81  He explained 
that, in fact, “it is not a case of singling out a particular group for special privileges. It is a matter of 
raising to a more normal level the position of a group which has been depressed to the lowest depths 
conceivable by years of organized and inhuman oppression.”82  In addition, the DPs expressed great 
concern over their future, he explained.  While some Jewish DPs were willing to be repatriated to 
their former homes, Harrison asserted that the majority of Jewish DPs wished to immigrate to 
Palestine.  The only solution was to make available enough visas for them to be able to do so, 
regardless of the concerns of the British government (who feared that increased Jewish immigration 
would threaten the tenuous position of their mandate in Palestine, and relations with the 
predominantly Arab population).  He also felt strongly that the military should hand over 
administration of the DP camps to a civilian authority as soon as possible.  “While it is true the 
military have been urging UNRRA to get ready to assume responsibility,” he explained, “it is also the 
fact that insufficient cooperation of an active nature has been given to accomplish the desired end.”83  
Harrison’s report led President Truman to write to Eisenhower demanding better conditions for the 
Jewish DPs.  In response, Eisenhower appointed an adviser for Jewish Affairs and began to move the 
Jewish DPs into separate camps.      
The summer of 1945 also saw increasing problems of law and order amongst the DP 
population in many camps, and an inability or reluctance to halt it on the part of the liaison officers, 
ostensibly one of their functions.  Looting was widespread; so too was drinking.  Malcolm Proudfoot 
attributes alcohol to some 2,000 deaths during the summer of 1945.84  There were reports of acts of 
violence against the German population by the DPs.  An August 1945 USFET report on displaced 
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persons described in detail many the problems with law and order amongst the DP population.  In a 
typical week, 20-27 July 1945, the Military Government Detachment at Schwäbisch Gmünd (in 
Baden-Württemberg) received thirty written complaints and twenty verbal complaints against the DPs 
there, including one instance in which “2 Germans were shot and seriously wounded and another 
stabbed by a group of Polish nationals.”85  In the nearby city of Heilbronn, there were reports of 
“gangs of Polish and Italian nationals threatening shopkeepers and farmers, stealing cattle, and 
destroying potato and onion fields.”86  In the towns of Flein and Lehrensteinfeld there were violent 
clashes between DPs and local Germans.  In Karlsruhe and Obergriesheim DPs were believed to be 
responsible for the murder of Germans.  In Kreis Esslingen, “8 armed Russians engaged 2 American 
security guards on duty guarding a farm in a fire fight, during which one of the soldiers was wounded 
and one of the Russians killed and another wounded.”87  The report explained that at least part of the 
problem involved American soldiers urging DPs to disregard the German police.  “In the town of 
Sulzbach,” for example, “members of the police were beaten up by American soldiers following the 
arrest by the police of several intoxicated Italians, some of whom were armed.”88  
As the dust began to settle in the summer of 1945, UNRRA’s newfound responsibility 
seemed threatened again.  The core source of uncertainty was that its ability to operate in Germany 
was contingent upon its agreement with SHAEF.  SHAEF had been envisioned solely as a wartime 
organization, and when its operations ceased at the beginning of July 1945, UNRRA feared it would 
have to renegotiate its agreement with its successors.  In early 1945, there had been a great deal of 
hope that UNRRA would be allowed to operate throughout occupied Germany, both in the American 
and British (and later the French) zones, but also in the Soviet zone.  This would have been possible if 
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the Control Council as a whole had agreed to it, but this was not to be.  In May 1945, with Germany 
definitively divided into zones of occupation and the military forces of each occupier withdrawn to 
their zonal frontiers, it became clear that UNRRA would not be invited into the Soviet zone.  When 
the USSR decided not to employ the services of UNRRA, the Control Council (which required 
quadripartite agreement on anything it decided), no longer had the authority, or the need, to sign a 
single agreement with UNRRA.  Instead, each zonal authority had to sign a separate agreement, 
opening up space for drastically different terms of operation in each zone.  While the Americans were 
more enthusiastic about UNRRA’s participation, and therefore created an agreement that granted a 
central role to UNRRA, the British and French were much less enthusiastic and their agreements 
reflected this.  In the American zone of occupation, UNRRA had control of all of the DP camps by 
the fall of 1945.  In contrast, UNRRA administered less than half of the DP camps in the British or 
French zones. 
On 4 July, SHAEF forces adjusted to the new zonal boundaries that had been agreed upon.  
The American zone of occupation encompassed the Länder of Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg and 
Hessen, and included the cities of Munich, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Manheim and Karlsruhe.  
Altogether, the zone was home to approximately 15 million Germans.89  Less than two weeks later, 
on 13 July, SHAEF ceased operations and all control passed into the hands of the individual zone 
commanders.  The joint wartime command was dissolved, and in its place each zonal occupation 
force was now responsible for administering its own zone, although the country would remain a 
single economic unit.  They were expected to develop policy jointly under the aegis of the Allied 
Control Council.  In the American zone of occupation, SHAEF’s staff and soldiers came under the 
command of US Forces, European Theatre (USFET).  Eisenhower remained in charge as the military 
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governor of the American zone of occupation and USFET headquarters were located in the former 
I.G. Farben building in Frankfurt.   
At the end of July the Allied leaders met to finalize the agreement on the occupation of 
Germany.  Stalin, Harry S. Truman (who had been named President following the death of 
Roosevelt), and Clement Attlee (who had defeated Winston Churchill in the July British elections) 
agreed on several points: the disarmament, demilitarization and democratization of Germany; 
reparations; the disposal of the German navy; and the apprehension and trial of war criminals.  They 
also agreed at this time on the transfer of all German populations from Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia into German territory, although the British and Americans both stressed the 
importance of carrying out these transfers in an organized fashion.  The following month, on 30 
August, the Allied Control Council met for the first time in Berlin to begin implementing this 
agreement. 
 The agreement at Potsdam had legitimized the expulsion of the ethnic Germans, known at the 
Volksdeutsche, from their homes throughout Eastern Europe.  At the end of the war, the Polish and 
Czechoslovak governments had begun expelling the remaining Germans from their homes and 
pushing them westward, into Germany’s prewar borders.  More than 700,000 ethnic Germans living 
in Bohemia alone were expelled by the end of 1945.90  They were often given only a few hours’ 
notice before being evicted from their homes.  They took only what they could carry or push on a 
cart, and these items were often confiscated by soldiers at checkpoints along the way.  One American 
soldier witnessed these expulsions.  “When the Nazis conquered Czechoslovakia,” he explained,  
they disposed Czechs to make room for Nazis with ‘no baggage but the clothes on their backs 
and no jewelry except wedding rings.’  The Czechs are preparing to turn this same formula 
around and apply it to the Sudeten Germans.  Screening is already completed.  ‘Undesirable’ 
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citizens of German extraction have been segregated, may not move freely, and must wear 
yellow armbands in the interim before their transfer to Germany as refugees.91 
Those refugees coming from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania generally entered Germany 
through Bavaria, but those from Polish territory crossed the Oder River and flocked toward Berlin, a 
city unable to cope with the influx.92  According to its mandate, UNRRA was not responsible for 
caring for the German refugees; this task fell to the German relief organizations.  Their presence did 
impact UNRRA’s operations nonetheless.  German charities improvised shelter and provided food, 
and were forced to draw from the same food stocks and the same limited supply of housing as the 
military and UNRRA were using for the DPs.  The arrival of the Volksdeutsche only further stressed 
an already overburdened supply infrastructure.    
By the end of the summer, UNRRA had identified several core problems still facing welfare 
workers on the ground.  In the American zone of occupation, UNRRA continued to encounter 
resistance from the military; there were still many individuals in the American military who 
disapproved of UNRRA’s involvement.  At the end of July 1945, Brigadier General Eric Fisher Wood 
of the United States Group, Control Council’s Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Division 
reported back to the Commanding General of the USGCC on UNRRA’s relationship to the military.  
“The policy towards turning over to UNRRA the administration of DP Camps,” he explained,  
…at as early a date as possible, is not as well understood and supported by military echelons 
below ARMIES as would seem desirable.  The number of UNRRA teams in the field is still 
insufficient, and the strength of these teams in many cases is too small.  From this arises a 
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tendency for US Army units to do the work themselves rather than to educate and give 
responsibility to UNRRA for future reference.93   
 Alongside the problematic relationship with the military, welfare workers continued to 
struggle to provide the basic necessities to those DPs in their care.  An August 1945 meeting of the 
welfare committee made this clear.  The welfare committee identified four immediate problems: 
housing shortages, the poor quality of the food, problems tracing family members, and the lack of 
educational programs, vocational training and employment opportunities in the camps.  The most 
acute problem concerned housing: “A large proportion of the camps are overcrowded, even in terms 
of summer housing; winter housing will intensify this overcrowding.”94  As well, they noted that 
many people were sleeping in large, open spaces such as school rooms and recreation halls.  There 
was also no separate accommodation for girls and single women.  To address these problems, the 
committee recommended that UNRRA present the military with a clear explanation of the housing 
shortage and demand that they provide the required housing as soon as possible, because “if those 
standards are not achieved now it will be impossible to convince the army of the need for instituting 
them after UNRRA has been given major responsibility.”95  The committee also recommended that a 
list of necessary supplies be compiled and presented to the military at the earliest possible date.  A 
key point of concern for the welfare staff was that it was the military who was deciding which centres 
would remain open and which ones would be closed, for reasons that were not always obvious and 
resulting in poor decisions.  “Inquiry as to the basis on which permanent camps are being selected” 
should be ascertained, they asserted, and “recommendations to the army as to important criteria to be 
                                                     
93
 Memo, Eric Fisher Wood, Brigadier General, to Commanding General, US Group CC, subject: Report of 
Reconnaissance, 17-22 July 1945, dated 23 July 1945, in NARA, RG 260, Box 92, File 6 “AG 383.7 Displaced 
Persons Reports OMGUS 1945-46.” 
94
 Report of Committee Meeting on Welfare Services, Held at UNRRA Staging Centre, August 4-5 1945, in 
UNA, Series 425, Box 62, File 3 “Welfare IV Minutes of Special Meetings – Zone Headquarters – 
Welfare/Relief Services.  
95
 Ibid. 
 160 
 
used – sanitation, adequate floor space, facilities for eating, kitchen units, recreational space, 
classrooms, etc.”96   
The meeting notes make clear that welfare workers in the camps and UNRRA staff at 
headquarters still had little understanding of the army’s process or plans even in August 1945.  The 
Committee explained that they believed that the army was planning on using the “Kaserne type of 
housing unit” (basic military barracks) for housing DPs, but they asserted that this type of housing did 
not work well for families and that in its place “a definite effort [should] be made to take over small 
villages or sections of small towns” in order to accommodate these groups.97  This was a first hint at 
differing understandings of the needs of the DP population, and the differing agendas of the military 
and UNRRA.  While the military saw the barracks as adequate short-term housing for the DPs, 
UNRRA recognized that barracks were inadequate, even for short periods, and especially for families.  
UNRRA’s understanding of rehabilitation meant normalizing life, and this would be difficult to 
achieve in large, open barracks that offered little in the way of privacy.  This different understanding 
of acceptable forms of housing for the DPs was the beginning of many such clashes over DP care.      
 A second major problem identified by the welfare committee was the problem of food.  The 
feeding problem centered on the fact that the local German administration was responsible for 
providing food for the assembly centers, and, according to UNRRA officials, they chose to send the 
worst of their supply.  “Inferior grades of food are sent to Centers,” the welfare committee asserted.98  
As well, there was also a problem of keeping food fresh.  Even when milk was made available, it 
quickly turned sour.  In general, there was also a lack of variety.  “A caloric diet of 2000 is not 
assurance of an adequate diet,” they asserted.99  The solution to this problem was to requisition spices 
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in order to make the food tastier.  As well, instead of cooking all of the food for a camp in one large 
kitchen, it recommended that smaller cooking units be provided so that the DPs could cook for 
themselves.  Again, the military and UNRRA had differing understandings over DP care.  For the 
military it would clearly be easier and more economical to serve entire DP camp populations from a 
single kitchen.  In contrast, UNRRA saw cooking as part of the process of normalizing life for the 
DPs.  Responsibility for cooking their own meals was an important means of introducing 
responsibility, and therefore a key factor in rehabilitation. 
 In the midst of continuing to work towards solving the problems of food and housing, in the 
late summer of 1945 UNRRA also began to offer expanded welfare services in the centres.  Welfare 
workers identified two key areas where they could begin this work: creating a Tracing Bureau to help 
the DPs contact family members, and providing the DPs with work and educational opportunities so 
that they would not sit idle while awaiting repatriation.  The DPs desperately wanted to locate their 
families, either in Germany or beyond, but no mechanism as yet existed for them to do so.  “Because 
of the lack of any centralized plan to date for accomplishing these reunions or providing this 
information,” the Welfare Committee noted, “many local schemes have developed and many D.P.’s 
have taken to the roads in an effort to locate people themselves.”100  The only solution to this problem 
was the full implementation of a Central Tracing Bureau.  Such an organization had been envisioned 
in the Displaced Persons Division of SHAEF, the Committee noted, but it was not yet fully 
functional.  Officials were working to prepare lists of each centre’s inhabitants, but they had yet to 
introduce a “tracing form” which could be “used for further searching of those people not able to 
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locate one another through lists.”101  The committee recommended that this be accomplished as soon 
as possible.  UNRRA founded the Central Tracing Bureau in November 1945 to fulfill this task.102  
 UNRRA welfare workers’ second concern was the lack of employment, vocational training 
and educational opportunities for DPs.  The welfare committee identified both “those young workers 
who are completely without vocational training or work experience except that of slave labor” and 
those “professional people who have been out of touch with their field of practice” for some time and 
therefore needed re-training.103  The committee recommended that each assembly centre organize 
workshops in order to teach or re-teach skills, as well as agricultural projects.  Farming projects, it 
was thought, would provide an excellent means of involving the DPs in their own care.  As the ERO’s 
Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons made clear, the DPs had spent years with no control 
over their own food supply; they ate what was served to them, and many DPs had experienced severe 
and long-term hunger.  Both assuring the DPs of an adequate food supply and giving them control 
over it was a means of working toward the rehabilitation of the DP population.  It would also build 
trust between the DPs and UNRRA’s welfare workers.   
When necessary, the Welfare Committee continued, use should be made of local German 
trade schools, alternating hours used by the Germans.  For women, they likewise recommended 
courses in practical nursing, homemaking, cooking and sewing.  The committee also recommended 
that further work opportunities be made available to the DPs outside of the camps.  These ideas 
reflected the process of rehabilitation as outlined in the ERO’s wartime planning reports, the goal of 
which was the reintroduction of responsibility: personal responsibility for one’s appearance and 
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hygiene; responsibility for one’s actions and its effect on those around them; and responsibility for the 
community as a whole.  Only once the DP population as a whole accepted responsibility for 
themselves, their actions and their communities would they easily and fully reintegrate into their 
prewar societies upon repatriation.  Food, work and training were a few readily available means of 
beginning this. 
The committee recognized the many problems associated with providing schooling for 
children.  They recognized that educational activities were important to both the DPs and UNRRA, 
but that many obstacles remained, including the complete absence of books and facilities.  Another 
major concern was how to introduce schooling to those children who had either never been before or 
who had not attended school in many years.  The only solution was to introduce education programs 
as quickly as possible, and to demand the required supplies from the military.  A third issue was 
finding the necessary teaching staff.  The hope was that teachers could be located within the DP 
camps.  A training course should also be offered to help them refresh their skills.  These, then, were 
the problems that needed to be solved.  The outline of a plan for rehabilitation was beginning to 
emerge. 
By the fall of 1945 more than six million DPs had been returned to their homes.104  This left a 
population of 307,301 DPs receiving care in UNRRA DP camps in the American zone of occupation 
in December 1945.105  These people were now the responsibility of UNRRA, who had officially taken 
administrative control of all of the DP camps in the American zone of occupation on 1 October 1945.  
As the temperatures began to fall and the threat of frost increased, housing once again became a 
prime issue for both UNRRA as well as the military, who remained responsible for securing supplies 
and housing.  Adequate shelter was essential for those DPs who had not yet been repatriated before 
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winter set in.  Attention in both military government and UNRRA circles turned toward winterizing 
the existing housing for this purpose.  By November 1945, the US Army acted.  On 23 November, 
they ordered German sources to turn over the necessary tools and supplies for this purpose.   
It is a military responsibility to insure [sic] that DP camps are winterized.   
a. In meeting this responsibility, Director, Office of Military Government for Baden-
Wurttemberg and Greater Hessen will:  
1. Provide necessary materials to accomplish required repairs; 
2. Insure that No. 1 priority for use of building materials is given. 
The military also promised to “[p]rovide technical supervision to insure uniformity, best use of 
materials, and rapid completion of the repair program.”106  Those facilities that could not be 
sufficiently winterized were closed down and their populations moved.  In some instances they were 
moved into other camps; in others the American Army requisitioned German housing.  In the city of 
Ulm, the Wilhelmsburg Kaserne and Hindenburg Kaserne DP camps, both former army barracks, 
were relocated.  UNRRA’s field supervisor, R. J. D. G. Blackmore, reported that the Hindenburg 
Kaserne was very overcrowded, and the camp was evacuated by 6 November, with a much reduced 
population moved with the UNRRA team into the Donau Bastion Ulm, another former military 
barracks.  Similarly, the Wilhelmsburg Kaserne was evacuated because it was deemed unfit for winter 
occupation.  The camp population from Boelcke Kaserne was moved into private dwellings.107  This 
process of moving DPs between camps and into private housing took place continually throughout the 
fall of 1945, as they worked to ensure that those who would remain in Germany over the winter had 
adequate housing.       
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 These, then, were the problems that UNRRA welfare workers faced in the fall of 1945.  They 
had recruited, trained and equipped 373 teams, first under military direction, but soon administering 
the DP camps on their own.108  They had accomplished the tremendous feat of helping care for and 
repatriating millions of DPs.  By December 1945, UNRRA was operating 134 DP camps in the 
American occupation zone of Germany.109  Those DPs who remained required housing that would 
protect them from the elements, and continued access to food and medical care, a constant challenge.  
UNRRA also believed that they required rehabilitation, with an emphasis on personal responsibility 
and responsibility for the community as key to normalizing life for the DPs.  It was now time to begin 
putting these plans into action.
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Chapter 4 
Cleaning up the DPs: UNRRA’s initial efforts at rehabilitation in Ulm 
The latrine accommodation is rudimentary and foul.  Hundreds cook their meals over candles 
looted from German stocks.  The household rubbish of potato peelings, paper rag etc., lies 
about the place in heaps.  The population is lice, flea and bug ridden for there is no D.D.T.  
Luckily the food is good for the moment and natural resistance to disease high.  But with the 
advent of warm weather – and yesterday’s temperature was over 80 – there is great danger of 
disease breaking out.1   
 
Under the circumstances, the displaced people seemed surprisingly happy.  They were 
singing, dancing, putting on plays, concerts and variety shows in spite of a pitiful lack of 
facilities.2  
 
Because a considerable period of time is likely to elapse between the time such persons are 
uncovered and their ultimate repatriation, it is essential that everything possible be done for 
their gainful employment in activities desired by the military forces.3 
 
 
When UNRRA staff crossed the border in Germany to work alongside the Allied military 
forces in caring for Europe’s displaced persons, they were full of energy and excitement, but soon 
shocked by conditions on the ground.  German cities had been devastated by both the aerial bombing 
and the fighting; food distribution networks had all but collapsed; the electricity and sewer systems 
were in complete disrepair.  UNRRA teams had been sent into the field with little more than the 
clothes on their back as the military was responsible for providing all supplies.  When they arrived on 
the scene to take over administration of the DP camps, they were largely unprepared for the task 
ahead.  UNRRA’s training had focused on language instruction and the relationship between UNRRA 
and the military.  There had been no discussion of conditions in the field, largely because UNRRA 
did not have up-to-date information to share with them.    As a result, when UNRRA staff arrived, 
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they found themselves overwhelmed by the enormity of the task before them.  Nonetheless, their goal 
continued to be the provision of not only relief, but also rehabilitation.  UNRRA’s first attempts at 
rehabilitation focused on four fronts: housing, hygiene, education, and employment.  In each case, 
UNRRA had a vision of how these elements could be used to restore the DPs to the social norm, as 
UNRRA understood it. In some cases, the DPs clearly shared those norms; in others, perhaps not.  In 
all cases, implementing a program of rehabilitation that touched on these four aspects of life in the DP 
camps proved more challenging than any had anticipated.  These challenges, and how the UNRRA 
staff met them, or not, is made very clear in the story of the small city of Ulm.  
The city of Ulm lies on the eastern edge of the Land Baden-Wurttemberg, in southern 
Germany, half-way between the major centres of Stuttgart and Munich.  The city sits on the River 
Danube, while across the river lies the twin city of Neu-Ulm, Bavaria.  Ulm was always an important 
city because of its location: the river traffic brought traders and kings alike.  In the twelfth century it 
was confirmed as an imperial city (which meant that it was self-ruling and answered only to the 
emperor, not a local duke or bishop).  The city gradually declined over the course of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, and during the Napoleonic wars it was occupied by the French army and its 
fortifications were destroyed.  In 1810 the city became a part of the Land (province) of Wurttemberg, 
and it soon became an industrial centre, owing again to its location and ease of access by river 
transport.  During the Second World War, Ulm was home to several factories and was therefore the 
target of aerial bombardment.  The city was 81 percent destroyed; of an inventory of 12,756 
buildings, only 1763 remained undamaged. 4   
The city of Ulm provides an excellent window onto the relationship between UNRRA, the 
military and the DPs and UNRRA’s work towards rehabilitation.  First, the city housed DPs of all 
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nationalities.  During the first year after the war, it housed several temporary transit camps used by a 
number of national groups as they awaited repatriation, including large Polish and Ukrainian 
populations.  Beginning in 1946, many of these camps were emptied in order to make space for 
Jewish infiltrees arriving from eastern Europe (both Holocaust survivors who had returned to their 
prewar homes and those who had survived the war either in hiding or behind Soviet lines and 
subsequently fled eastern Europe, entering the occupied zones of Germany illegally, many en route to 
Palestine).  Several postwar pogroms encouraged returning Jews to continue westward into Germany.  
The worst such attack took place in Kielce, Poland on 4 July 1945 and involved the murder of forty-
two Jews; altogether these anti-Semitic outbursts led to nearly 1200 deaths in the first postwar year in 
Poland alone.5  While small numbers of Jewish DPs trickled into the DP camps in the summer and 
fall of 1945, they arrived in large numbers in the spring of 1946, putting pressure on a still 
overburdened German supply system.  Tony Judt estimates that 63,387 Jews arrived in Germany from 
Poland alone between July and September 1946.6  These were numbers for which both UNRRA and 
the military were quite simply unprepared.  Ulm’s relatively undestroyed cityscape meant it became 
an important site for housing these infiltrees. 
The second reason why the DP camps in and around Ulm provide a useful case study of 
UNRRA’s rehabilitation work is because the city took in German expellees and refugees as well as 
DPs, and therefore the scarcity of resources was severe.  The city had been bombed and several 
buildings damaged, but the city had not been leveled.  Its location on the bank of the Danube, 
between Munich and Stuttgart, made it an ideal place to locate German refugees and foreigners alike.  
Third, the DPs were housed in several different types of buildings, including kasernes (army 
barracks), private apartments, and even a former German Army bakery, which provided a more varied 
                                                     
5
 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 43. 
6
 Ibid, 24. 
 169 
 
camp life for DPs in comparison to some of the large cities and small towns, which only offered one 
type of housing.  The urban area surrounding Ulm, Baden-Wurttemberg and Neu-Ulm, Bavaria 
contained buildings old and new: the Donau Bastion and the Wilhelmsburg Citadel in Ulm, as well as 
the Pioneer Kaserne in Neu-Ulm, were all constructed in the mid-nineteenth century; the Sedan 
Kaserne in Ulm and the Bleidorn Kaserne in Neu-Ulm were constructed at the beginning of the 
twentieth century; and the Boelcke Kaserne and Hindenburg Kaserne were both built in 1935.  In the 
initial postwar months, all of these buildings, as well as private apartments formerly belonging to 
German families, were used to house DPs.   
The fourth reason why the DP camps in and around Ulm provide an excellent case study of 
UNRRA’s work towards rehabilitation of the DPs is because the varied camp sizes provided 
opportunities for a whole host of programs.  The proximity of these camps to one another made it 
possible to offer different programs and services at different camps, but which were made available to 
DPs from across the city, not just the host camp’s inhabitants.  As a result, the DP camps located in 
and around Ulm offered many different educational and vocational training opportunities to the DP 
population that resided there.  Finally, we have excellent records for the camps located in Ulm 
because UNRRA Field Supervisor Richard Blackmore was a prodigious report-writer.  He began as 
the director of UNRRA Team 127, but was soon promoted to the position of field supervisor and in 
this new position he was responsible for all of the DP camps in the city of Ulm and the surrounding 
county.  In the autumn of 1946 he was once again promoted, this time to Area Supervisor.  His 
reports were both detailed and opinionated.  He was not afraid to express his opinions, sometimes 
bluntly, and the reports reflected his frankness on conditions in the camps, as well as on the 
individuals who administered the camps and those who resided in them.   
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 Little had been accomplished by the city administration in preparation for the invasion of 
Ulm by Allied forces in early 1945.  The local administration had planned for a set of inner and outer 
ring defences to protect the city, but all that had been accomplished by the time that American and 
French troops arrived was the construction of a tank ditch.  During their withdrawal, the German 
army had blown up four out of five of the bridges across the Danube, but this did little to slow the 
American advance.  On 23 April, the mayor, district party leader and police chief quit the city, and 
Ulm was left without government. Two days later, on 25 April, the American commander arrived.  
One resident of Ulm described the feeling of relief once the city was occupied.  “It was at first, in 
spite of everything, easier,” he explained. “The terribly oppressive threat of air war was now over. In 
the local Wagner school gymnasium soup with pieces of meat was served daily in parchment cups to 
drink, for who had a spoon? … At many ruined houses there were notes written in chalk, explaining 
where the former occupants could be found.”7  The American military had originally named Acting 
Police Commissioner Frank Hermann as mayor when they arrived, but on 7 May they replaced him 
with Carl Eychmuller, head of a local factory.8  This was a common practice in the early days of 
occupation.  To facilitate the management of the local population, often the military would select a 
mayor to communicate orders without necessarily conducting a complete background check.  In many 
cases, these interim leaders turned out to be either Nazi party members or simply ineffective 
administrators, and they were soon replaced by more capable, and trustworthy, individuals. 
 In UNRRA’s planning phase, owing to the fact that UNRRA knew that the military would 
make all final decisions over all housing, little was detailed by UNRRA planners about exactly how 
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DP housing should be organized.  However, UNRRA planners did stress two important general 
principles for DP housing: privacy and normalizing conditions as much as possible.  In their report 
Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, UNRRA planners recognized that the DPs had lived 
for years without any privacy:   
[t]he displaced person was no longer able to enjoy even a few hours a day with persons whom 
he has chosen, he was constantly in the crowded presence of persons whom he had not 
chosen and probably would not have chosen, as companions.  He had no longer opportunity 
to be alone or to reflect upon things as a private individual.  He was driven back to a crowd 
existence in the camp where he became a victim of all mass-emotions and rumours.9 
As a result, what the DPs required in the postwar period was housing that afforded them some level of 
privacy.  “Good sleeping accommodation,” they argued, “together with sufficient privacy and 
adequate washing facilities allowing as much privacy as possible is important.  Facilities should be 
provided for displaced persons to be alone or quiet, as many will need opportunities for solitude after 
the long years of being herded together.”10 
 Equally important for DP housing, according to UNRRA planners, was the belief that all 
attempts should be made to normalize life.  The most important way of doing this was by housing 
family members together.  Special Needs of Women and Girls during Repatriation and Rehabilitation 
asserted that even in temporary accommodations, “Families should be kept together… unless 
exceptional conditions make it impossible or the well-being of the children would be endangered.”11  
They also emphasized the fact that the DPs should be involved in their own care, beginning with food 
preparation.  “In the matter of food, its general and detailed distribution, and often its cooking and 
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serving, the active participation of displaced persons should be encouraged and formalised into 
catering, delivery and messing committees created by displaced persons themselves to work alongside 
the appointed workers of the distributing organisation.”12 
 The military had slightly different expectations and standards, made very clear in its own 
Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany.  The Guide outlined some basic factors to 
consider in choosing locations for DP camps, but also made clear that conditions would vary 
immensely in different districts.  “Displaced persons may be housed in hotels, schools, halls, cinemas, 
churches, disused factories or any other type of public building; they may occupy blocks of houses or 
apartments from which Germans have been evicted, or they may occupy workers camps varying in 
size from 50 to 5,000 occupants,” SHAEF explained.13  They recommended that several factors be 
taken into consideration when choosing the site of a DP camp.  “The first two elements of good 
accommodation,” the Guide noted, “are weatherproof roofs and solid floors.  The latter are 
particularly important from the point of view of cleanliness.  Ventilation is another factor to be 
considered.  The better the accommodation, the more satisfied will the displaced persons be, and the 
easier it will be to care for them.”14  Another important factor was location.  They suggested that 
camps be located on communication routes and near food supply sources.  Camp buildings had to 
provide sufficient space for sleeping quarters, administrative offices, warehouse space, cooking 
facilities, bathing facilities, hospital requirements and recreational space.  As well, camps required 
adequate space to accommodate camp staff, a reliable water supply, and means of sewage and waste 
disposal.  “If water cannot be obtained from a chlorinated supply, water for drinking purposes, 
brushing teeth and washing of fruits and vegetables to be eaten raw should be treated with a chlorine 
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solution in canvas water sterilizing bags or some other container suitable for distributing water,” the 
Guide explained. 15   
The Guide also clearly outlined the proper disposal of waste.  In the first instance, SHAEF 
recommended that flush toilets be used.  When unavailable, a pit latrine should be constructed based 
on the military manual guidelines.  “Because of continental habits,” the Guide explained, “a squat-
type latrine may be found most satisfactory.  Due to difficulty in policing, can latrines should not be 
resorted to unless a pit latrine cannot be used.  Urinals should be provided in latrine areas for 
males.”16  Each camp required one toilet per twenty people and one urinal per twenty-five men.  All 
facilities were required to be at least 100 yards from any mess hall or water supply.  “Care and 
maintenance is essential,” the Guide warned.  “A detail of people must be assigned to keep latrine 
areas clean at all times.  Any evidence of defecation or urination in other than the facilities provided 
for, such should be investigated energetically and its repetition prevented.”17  Similarly, SHAEF set 
out strict guidelines for the collection of garbage.  Proper disposal of trash was also necessary in order 
to stop the spread of disease.  “Sanitary inspections of kitchens, mess halls, food dump, dormitories, 
latrines and other facilities important in environmental sanitation will be made daily,” the Guide 
noted, “by a qualified persons under the direct supervision of the Center Medical Officer,” who will 
then report to the center director.18  SHAEF explained that continual inspections were necessary in 
order to ensure the health and safety of the camp’s population. 
Thus, in setting up the DP camps, SHAEF and UNRRA had very different understandings of 
what comprised the best type of housing for DPs.  While UNRRA clearly preferred housing that 
allowed a high level of privacy and the maintenance of family units in their own quarters, the military 
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focused on housing that would provide for the easiest management of the large DP population.  For 
them, this meant housing the DPs in large barracks with kitchens that could feed all of the camp’s 
inhabitants.  SHAEF’s Guide suggested that camps should be located in urban centres, exactly where 
there was the greatest destruction from aerial bombing.  Undamaged and appropriate facilities were 
thus at a premium.  In Ulm, these limitations quickly became evident as the first DP camps were 
organized in 1945. 
 The Boelcke Kaserne had originally been constructed in 1935, and a DP camp was 
established there by the military on 13 June 1945.  The camp was soon handed over to UNRRA Team 
127, under the leadership of Director Blackmore.  By the end of August, it housed 2250 Polish DPs,   
although it had a capacity of only 2000 people.  As Blackmore pointed out, it was badly overcrowded.  
Fifteen UNRRA personnel administered the camp, and a Polish liaison officer was also attached, 
although the liaison officer was proving less than helpful, according to UNRRA.  “Polish Liaison 
Officers refuse to cooperate with Camp Commanders,” Director Blackmore noted, “and pursue an 
independent existence causing much nuisance.”19  There were also approximately 1000 Russian DPs 
living in the area, although not within the camp itself.  As the Russians were being repatriated, 
Blackmore did not expect that they would be moved into the camp.  As well, there were an 
indeterminate number of Polish DPs living in Ulm, but outside of the camp, and the military 
recommended that they remain there for the time being.20  In keeping with UNRRA’s model for the 
camps, the camp itself had established a Polish administration made up of DPs.  They assumed 
responsibility for registering camp inmates, assigning accommodation, providing welfare assistance 
and organizing the school, all under the supervision of the UNRRA director.  It was a good start, but 
there was clearly room for improvement according to Blackmore.  “Polish administration is generally 
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good,” he observed, “but it requires careful supervision.  Leaders lack ideas and initiative in 
organizing health and cleanliness campaigns.”21  The DPs living in the camp were generally happy, 
but they complained about the restrictions placed on their movement by the U.S. military.  The camp 
administration held 300 passes to be distributed to those wishing to leave the camp.  The DPs 
believed that this was an unnecessary restriction and as a result there were frequent “[b]reakouts at 
night or early morning.”22  Nor had UNRRA team 127 begun registering the camp population because 
DP cards had not yet been provided by the military, although they were in the process of filling in the 
DP2 cards.  While conditions were not as UNRRA had anticipated, especially with regard to the role 
that UNRRA had envisioned the DPs playing in their own administration, conditions in the camps 
were improving and the DPs were taking on increasing responsibility.   
DPs were also being housed in the Wilhelmsburg citadel, on the northern outskirts of Ulm, 
originally built between 1842 and 1949.  An assembly centre had been established there by the 
military in May 1945, but UNRRA Team 509 had only taken over its administration on 21 September 
1945.  On 15 October 1945, this center had a population of 1184 DPs.  The largest group was 
comprised of 855 Polish DPs, but there were also large groups of Italian (165), Rumanian (65), 
Yugoslav (31) and Greek (17) DPs, as well as small numbers of other nationals (51 altogether).  The 
camp at Wilhelmburg was run by a team of five UNRRA officials and one member on loan from the 
staff of UNRRA’s field supervisor in Ulm.  There were also four liaison officers working in the camp, 
one each for the Russian, Polish, Italian and Czech DPs.  Each national grouping had chosen a leader 
when the camp was first established who organized “a complete staff handling the affairs on [sic] 
their respective people.”23  In mid-October the registration of the camp population was approximately 
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65 percent finished, and expected to be completed by the following week.  They had also held a few 
recreational activities, including a film viewing.  DPs living at Wilhelmsburg were allowed to take 
part in welfare programs at other camps in Ulm as well.24  By the end of October, however, it was 
obvious that the citadel was not going to suffice for housing over the winter months and plans were 
made to transfer Poles from it.  Those who were going to repatriate soon were moved into other 
camps.  Those who were not were moved into private German dwellings.   
In anticipation of the closing of the Wilhelmsburg camp, the DPs held a ‘farewell dance.’  
They also organized a dance for people from the Dachau concentration camp, as well as a lecture 
about the concentration camp.25  By early November 1945 this camp had also been evacuated as it 
was considered “unfit for winter occupation,” and its remaining population had been relocated to the 
QM Bakery on Sedanstrasse and into private dwellings spread throughout the town.  “The 
administration of the private billets,” director Nowicki noted, “is fairly difficult as the German Town 
Authorities did not clear for Displ. Persons a closed area of the town, but requisitioned single 
dwellings only.  In consequence the D.P.s are practically mixed up with the German population.”26  
On the other hand, the move had improved their morale, he noted, and had even caused a number of 
Polish DPs to volunteer for work in the camp as a result.   
By mid-November 1945, Nowicki reported that Team 509’s DPs seemed much happier in 
their new accommodations.  The Polish DPs who had moved into the private dwellings enjoyed more 
privacy.  However, many of these apartments had also suffered war damage.  As well, when the 
Germans were forced to evacuate they had removed all of the furniture, so that the apartments were 
bare.  In spite of this, the DPs preferred this new situation to the Wilhelmsburg Citadel.  Although 
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UNRRA continued to provide them with food supplies, which they collected from one of two 
collection points established by UNRRA, each unit had its own kitchen, which meant that the DPs 
could prepare their own meals.  By November 1945 the average weekly ration included bread or 
flour, cabbage, potatoes and apples, as well as small amounts of coffee, sugar, lard and milk 
powder.27  While these new accommodations were sparsely furnished at best, they provided the DPs 
with a level of privacy that many had not known throughout the war, and therefore it was a chance for 
the DPs to reestablish a more “normal” life.   
The non-Polish DPs who had moved into the QM Bakery were not as satisfied because 
conditions at the Bakery remained extremely crowded and lacked privacy.  The center had formerly 
housed a Wehrmacht bakery, but at the end of the war it had been occupied by the American Army.  
It had a maximum capacity of 500, although in November 1945 it only housed 317 DPs.  It had 
latrines and bathing facilities (10 showers, three washbasins, and twelve toilets), a central mess hall 
with seats for 110, as well as three large rooms used to house both families and individuals.  A 
separate part of the building was used as an UNRRA storehouse, and yet another part of the building 
was used by the US Army to store machinery.  The building also contained a large kitchen, including 
several large kettles which could hold 1500 litres, and a coal range with six fireplaces, but an 
insufficient supply of dishes and cutlery.  In fact, Blackmore recommended that it be operated as a 
transit camp.28   
At the same time, UNRRA Team 141 was administering a DP camp in a group of army 
barracks, all of which had sustained significant damage during the war.  The Hindenburg Kaserne was 
one of its newest buildings, built between 1935 and 1937 for Wehrmacht use.  In his visit to the camp, 
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Blackmore was unimpressed.  As he explained, the camp “has a capacity of 2500 persons, at present 
it accommodates 3000 Poles….  There are five main blocks and buildings and many garages.  All 
buildings have suffered more or less from bomb damage and blast effect.” 29  UNRRA had been 
working to repair the damage, but they could not complete the repairs without glass.  As an interim 
solution, the windows had all been boarded up, but this meant that “people live in a state of semi-
darkness in many instances.” 30  Electricity and running water had been restored, but electric light 
continued to be rationed.  Team 141 Director Mr. Van Ark remained concerned about what would 
happen if the DPs remained in the camp over the winter.  “This place can be used for winter quarters 
but I do not recommend it as it would be depressing in the extreme,”31 he exclaimed.  Further 
complicating matters, they had no winter clothing or boots for the DPs.  Otherwise the camp was 
functioning well, in that there was enough food to feed each DP 2000 calories per day, prepared in 
two central kitchens.  Interestingly, the DPs all chose to eat their meals in their room and not in a 
central dining room, testament to the importance of eating meals individually or in family groups as 
an important way of normalizing life in the DP camps; it was one of the few ways in which they 
could reestablish their own prewar social norms.  While eating in the rooms made it more difficult to 
keep track of dishes and utensils, many UNRRA workers understood and sympathized with the DPs’ 
desire.  In contrast, the military believed that this was an unhygienic practice and complained about it 
in their inspection reports continually.   
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In November 1945, Blackmore reported that the camp at Hindenburg Kaserne remained 
severely overcrowded, and that UNRRA planned to evacuate the camp by 6 November.32  In order to 
empty the camp, the population had to be dispersed.  The Polish families were to be moved into 
private dwellings; 400 DPs were being repatriated on 1 November; a further 1000 Polish DPs on the 5 
November; and the remaining 700 DPs were relocated to the Donau Bastion.  The Donau Bastion had 
been built between 1843 and 1855, and at the end of the war, the building had functioned as a British 
transit camp.  Blackmore believed that the camp could house a maximum of 700 people over the 
winter, but that a great deal of work was yet required before the camp would be inhabitable.  UNRRA 
Team 149, under the direction of Mr. Fishbein, was in the process of organizing the camp.33  DPs in 
Ulm were also housed for short periods in the Sedan Kaserne, the Pioneer Kaserne, and the Bleidorn 
Kaserne, but these buildings were soon handed over to the German authorities to house German 
refugees.  
 The fall of 1945 was spent relocating those DPs who wished to repatriate into camps from 
which it would be easiest to arrange their transportation, while moving those DPs who wished to 
remain in Germany into more permanent housing.  According to SHAEF’s Guide, all movements 
required the coordination of the Assembly Centre director, the Allied liaison officer and the chief 
convoy leader, a repatriate appointed from amongst the DP population.  These officials were to work 
jointly on the details of the journey and the DPs involved were to be informed of all such details at 
least 48 hours before they are due to depart.  Assembly Center Directors were to ensure that all DPs 
due to participate in the movement were ready to move out at the stipulated time; that the DP2 forms 
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had all been completed and were duly handed over to the OC convoy, together with copies of the 
nominal rolls of the party for handing over to G-2 representatives at the frontier and to the national 
authority in the country of destination.  The liaison officer would have complete responsibility for the 
convoy and would take all necessary action in cases which could involve delay.  He was to ensure 
that the necessary rations and equipment were loaded on the train if travel was by rail and to 
supervise the overall issue of rations.  This operating procedure was meant to provide structure to the 
movement of so many people in such a short period of time.   
 While repatriation did not occur in nearly as orderly a fashion as SHAEF had hoped, 
movements continued throughout the summer and autumn at a rapid pace.  By December 1945 the 
population of the DP camps in the three western zones of Germany had settled at 511,000, most of 
whom had refused repatriation or had declared themselves stateless.34  While in the winter months it 
was not possible to move large numbers of people, with spring, the military moved to consolidate the 
camps into fewer, larger camps.  It was very frustrating for the DPs and the UNRRA workers alike, 
and as one welfare worker lamented, “[t]he Army was moving them around again, shifting groups 
from camp to camp, uprooting them as soon as they had tacked up a private-room partition or strung a 
light-bulb, giving them no chance to create a temporary home, in the hopes that maybe they might 
begin to thinking of their real home in Poland and go there, if for no other reason than for the peace of 
staying put.”35  
These constant movements between camps became a strong point of contention between 
UNRRA and the military.  For the military, these movements to consolidate the smaller camps into 
larger ones meant that each camp would (hopefully) be run more efficiently, requiring less men and 
using less space.  “As pressure to repatriate increased,” Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray 
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explain, “populations were moved from camp to camp, reflecting the belief of many within the 
military that the ‘shifting of the D.P. from one centre to another is desirous so that they shall not 
become ‘too settled’ in their conditions.’”36  From UNRRA’s point of view, the continual movements 
worked against the reintroduction of social norms that UNRRA had been working toward.  While 
UNRRA was working to normalize lives by creating order and stability, the constant movements 
upset the DPs and undermined any sense of normalcy that they had achieved.   
The constant population shifts only became more frequent in the summer of 1946, as the 
infiltrees arrived in ever larger numbers.  Camps were cleared of other DP populations in order to 
make room for them and for the military.  At the beginning of July 1946, the transit camp housed in 
the QM Bakery was closed and the building returned to the U.S. Army, who claimed that they needed 
it for their own purposes.  In the same month, the evacuation of the Polish population residing in the 
private dwellings administered by UNRRA Team 508 began in order to make room for the Jewish 
infiltrees.37  The biggest problem then was providing adequate housing for those infiltrees who 
arrived.  “Our camps are filled above capacity,” the Team Welfare Officer wrote.38   
Overcrowding was a common theme in the DP camps throughout UNRRA’s tenure.  
UNRRA believed it was essential to provide housing that permitted the restoration of the family unit, 
and for this reason they supported the move out of barracks and into individual dwellings.  The DPs 
clearly shared those values, as they preferred the apartments - even when they were substandard - to 
the barracks.  The ability to cook one’s meals independently played an especially important role.  
Even when forced to live in barracks, the DPs did their best to replicate the 'family unit' mode of 
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living, exemplified in their insistence on eating their canteen-produced meals back in their own 
private space.  UNRRA worked to institute their vision of a kind of rehabilitation through proper 
housing, and the DPs were willing participants.   
 
The military was not uniformly unsympathetic to the DPs’ plight.  There were some examples 
of the military using its clout to provide better housing for the DPs.  On occasion, the Military 
Government threatened the German population with worse conditions in order to move them to 
action.  In Coburg the water lines were damaged at the Kaserne which was housing the DPs, and the 
local commander ordered the Burgomeister (mayor) to haul water using a horse and buggy.  When he 
complained that this was not possible, the commander threatened to move Germans out of their 
houses to make room for the DPs if he did not comply.  Similarly, in Sonnsberg the local commander 
demanded that the Burgomeister provide food for the DPs.  When he failed to produce the required 
food, the military entered the butcher shops and bakeries, requisitioned their entire contents and 
handed it over to the DPs.  Consequently, in nearby towns the order to provide food for the DPs was 
quickly filled in order to avoid a similar fate.39  However, these actions proved the exception rather 
than the rule.  More typically, UNRRA was forced to contend with an indifferent military who 
controlled the allocation of housing and decided where DP camps would be located.  The limited 
supply of individual dwellings, and the military’s reluctance to remove Germans from their own 
homes in order to make room for the DPs, meant that most DPs continued to live in barracks, and not 
in apartments.   
Alongside rehabilitation through housing, UNRRA also believed in encouraging social norms 
concerning cleanliness.  Hygiene norms in the United States had undergone significant changes in the 
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last decades of the nineteenth century.  In the decades between 1820, when baths with permanent 
plumbing began being installed in homes, and the First World War, bathing “went from being an 
occasional and haphazard routine of a small segment of the population to a regular practice of the 
large bulk of the people.”40  By the middle of the nineteenth century, then, personal cleanliness was 
firmly rooted in American middle-class behavior.  A strong connection had been forged between 
cleanliness and morality.  To be clean meant not only to smell nice and look tidy, but was also a 
reflection of one’s self-respect and higher moral standards.  Middle-class social reformers had carried 
this into their work with the poor.  Social workers identified a lack of personal cleanliness as a form 
of social deviation.  They strongly encouraged the poor to introduce regular bathing into their daily 
routine.  They sought not only improvements in public cleanliness, but also better schools and 
playgrounds, more parks and green space, increasing regulation of conditions in tenement houses, and 
more consistent garbage collection, as they also drew a connection between the many social ills that 
existed in such communities and the physical environment.  The reformers believed that scrubbing the 
bodies of the poor, as well as the buildings and streets of these neighborhoods, “would ameliorate the 
social problems arising out of squalor,”41 including not only disease, but also malnutrition, addiction, 
and crime.   
By the time that UNRRA’s welfare workers arrived in Europe, personal cleanliness was 
understood as the key to maintaining the health of not just the individual, but also the community.  
Those who did not accept the importance of personal cleanliness were likely to catch and spread 
disease.  Robert W. Kelso, President of the National Conference on Social Work, explained: 
that community which is shot through with syphilis and gonorrhea, which is shorn of a high 
percentage of its working energy by tuberculosis; which has not one perfect set of teeth in a 
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thousand; which musters barely sixty percent of passable physiques in a war levy of her finest 
manhood—such a nation, except resuscitating and preventive measures be soon set up, is 
likely to become morally rotten and in the end Godless—likely to crumble as a power in 
civilization.42   
The connection between cleanliness and morality also remained strong.  Those people who carried 
disease risked infecting their neighbours and therefore made them not only a danger to themselves, 
but to society as a whole.  UNRRA and the military brought this strong belief in the importance of 
cleanliness with them into the field and the DP camps.    
 Like personal cleanliness, the drive for oral care had grown swiftly in the United States in the 
nineteenth century.  The first school for training dentists was founded in Baltimore in 1840.  Previous 
to this, dentists trained as apprentices for many years, but there were neither schools nor a 
professional curriculum.  “There were neither diplomas nor state regulations,” Maurice Bremner 
explained.  “Anybody who so desired could set himself up in practice with no more restriction than 
the opening of a blacksmith shop.”43  However, beginning in the 1840s, the movement to 
professionalize dentistry gained momentum.  Schools were opened and a number of professional 
journals established.  Technological advances, most notably the discovery of laughing gas in 1772 
and its arrival in North America forever changed the average person’s perception of visiting the 
dentist.  “Patients, who in the past preferred to suffer toothache rather than go to a dentist,” Bremner 
explained, “now were glad to take a few whiffs of the wonderful gas to obtain permanent relief.  The 
removal of teeth had become a simple operation which most sensible people ceased to fear.”44  In 
combination with training and technological advances, a massive media campaign began at the turn of 
the century.  Just as social workers were teaching adults and children alike the importance of bathing 
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with soap, so too were dentists spreading the message concerning the importance of brushing one’s 
teeth.  They printed pamphlets, gave lectures and spoke on the radio of the importance of tooth-
brushing as a means of preventing tooth decay.  By the beginning of the Second World War, brushing 
one’s teeth was part of every middle- and upper-class American’s hygiene regimen, and it was 
another social norm that UNRRA welfare workers brought with them into the field.      
The military also brought into the field its own expectations concerning DP cleanliness.  
According to the Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany, each DP camp was to be 
regularly inspected to ensure that they met army standards of cleanliness.  SHAEF explained that 
continual inspections were necessary in order to ensure the health and safety of the camp’s 
population.  While UNRRA social workers were not ideologically opposed to inspections for the 
purpose of maintaining cleanliness and reducing the risk of disease, their support for the inspections 
did not prevent numerous confrontations between the DPs, UNRRA workers and the military over the 
way in which the inspections took place.  Laura Hilton argues convincingly that the military saw the 
DPs as soldiers who were under their command, not as the civilians that they were, and therefore 
expected them to meet unrealistically high standards of cleanliness, both in the camps and as 
individuals.  UNRRA welfare worker Kathryn Hulme explained that she looked forward to the winter 
of 1945, when she hoped that weather would prevent, or at least slow,   
the military inspections which harassed us….  The ‘new broom’ officers came through camp 
and made suggestions that kept us crazy for weeks at a time, undoing past work, redoing it 
the new way and revamping all reports to fit the orders in the sheaves of directives which we 
had to study at night because we still had fifteen thousand people to take care of during the 
days.45 
UNRRA also conducted its own inspections and reported back to UNRRA Headquarters on 
conditions in the camps.   
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The task of establishing UNRRA’s social norms to the DPs through standards of cleanliness 
was a formidable one.  Alongside the continual inspections of sleeping quarters, bathrooms and 
kitchens, many UNRRA directors took it upon themselves to introduce courses of instruction on 
matters of cleanliness.  While these courses were never outlined in any of the planning materials, it is 
clear that UNRRA was unsure of the level of personal hygiene practiced by the DPs before the war, 
and that many individual workers expected the DPs’ standards to be far below their own.  Blackmore 
was certainly amongst this group.  They believed that they would have to educate the DPs on this 
front, and, indeed, much of the language associated with the courses of instruction on personal 
hygiene seems to echo the orientalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  They imply 
that the DPs have yet to learn the ‘proper’ methods of taking care of themselves.  In this way, 
UNRRA saw itself as the transmitter of civilization to the uncivilized DPs.  In October 1945, 
Blackmore reported that his successor as camp director at Boelcke Kaserne, H. A. Oprel, had 
organized a series of lectures on public health and sanitation.  “The main problem appears to me to be 
the inculcation into the center inhabitants of elementary knowledge of sanitary facilities and simple 
health measures.  This problem is common to all centers and I have selected Mrs. Wanda Woytowicz-
Grabinska to cooperate with Team Directors and advise them on necessary action,” he wrote.46  
Unfortunately documents do not describe exactly what advice Team Directors gave the DPs under 
their care.  However, Blackmore’s reports continually emphasized the importance of regular bathing 
and fresh air in the living quarters.  On numerous occasions he argued that “the Poles have a marked 
dislike for fresh air with the result that the rooms are stuffy.  Also they do not bath sufficiently 
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often.”47  Thus, regular bathing and opening of windows in the living quarters seem to have been a 
point of contention.   
While UNRRA welfare workers launched their campaign at the adults, they also sought to 
teach the children about personal hygiene.  When the kindergarten and school at the DP camp in 
Bocholt was first opened, the UNRRA welfare worker there was startled by the lack of personal 
hygiene among the children.  “Some of the children hadn’t had a bath, or even a proper wash, for 
months,” she explained.  “Very few of them had lice, but the majority had scabies.  We had a stove 
for hot water, and four men volunteered to carry water the whole day; every mother could bath her 
child three times a week.”48  The worker took it upon herself to teach the children about the need for 
personal cleanliness.  She also worked to instill a sense of responsibility in each of the children under 
her care.  “We gave each child soap and a towel, and three children shared a cupboard,” she wrote.   
The oldest of the three was entrusted with the key of the cupboard, and his or her name was 
put on it.  It was their responsibility to see that the other two kept it in order, and didn’t hide 
pinched things; otherwise somebody else would keep the key, and another name would be put 
on the cupboard.  I am glad to say that they were so proud to be entrusted that not a single 
occasion arose in which they key had to be taken away.49 
In teaching the DPs about UNRRA’s social norms concerning personal cleanliness, the 
welfare officers had to contend with the limited facilities at their disposal, and washing and bathing 
facilities varied considerably from camp to camp.  There were severe shortages of basic supplies, 
including toothbrushes, soap, and other cleaning supplies.  None of the camps contained facilities for 
laundry.  The QM Bakery had a total of ten showers, two washrooms with three basins in each, and 
                                                     
47
 Field Supervisor’s Monthly Report, Team No. 525, Dornstadt, submitted by R.J.D.G. Blackmore, dated 24 
April 1946, in UNA, Series 436, Box 15, File 8 “U.S. Zone – Field Supervisor – Mr. Blackmore – Reports.” 
48
 UNRRA Review of the Month (London: UNRRA Information Division, European Regional Office, June 
1945), 10. 
49
 Ibid, 10. 
 188 
 
twelve toilets, all for a population of approximately 150 people.50  The sanitation facilities at the 
Wilhelmsburg Citadel consisted of two large shower rooms, one for men and one for women, with 24 
showers in each.  As well, there were four bathrooms, each with 24 water basins, 56 toilets and 35 
urinals.  While these facilities were “in very bad condition on arrival,” very soon everything was 
being cleaned regularly and kept in good condition, according to an October 1945 report.51  At the 
Boelcke Kaserne, the bathing facilities were adequate for the camp population, but there were not 
nearly enough toilets.  According to military regulations, the camp required one toilet for every 
twenty people.  This camp had a total of thirty toilets for more than two thousand people.  
Nevertheless, the sanitary conditions of the camp were reported as good.  On the other hand, the 
Donau Bastion, dating from the mid-nineteenth century, contained no indoor plumbing whatsoever, 
and so the British army, which had originally used the building as a transit camp, had built outdoor 
latrines.  When UNRRA took over operation of the camp from the American military, it meant that 
these latrines had to be winterized.52 
Despite the lectures on cleanliness and UNRRA’s efforts to instill a sense of responsibility 
for personal cleanliness among the DPs, there continued to be clashes between UNRRA and the 
military over the camp inspections.  The inspections made clear the military’s unfavourable opinion 
of the deficiencies of both the DPs themselves and the UNRRA workers who were administering the 
camps.  In November 1945, the Donau Bastion did not pass its military inspection.  The camp’s 
director, Eldon E. Marple, stated that steps were being taken in the camp to “eliminate the 
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deficiencies noted” by the military authorities.53  The DPs were now being provided with two hot 
baths per week, “despite the lack of coal or dry hardwood to be used with the coal-burning type 
furnaces,” and an educational program on cleanliness for the DP population of the camp had been 
implemented.  Nevertheless, he complained that it was especially difficult to keep the lavatories clean 
when “parts for repair have not been furnished on requisition from M.G.”  He made clear that 
UNRRA was doing the best that it could to keep the camps as clean as possible given the 
overcrowding, the shortages, and the military’s failure to provide adequate support.     
For his part, the military commander who had inspected the Donau Bastion was evaluating 
not only the state of cleanliness of the camp, but also the UNRRA staff administering it.  The camp’s 
physical condition was seen as a direct reflection of the staff’s ineffectiveness.  Thus, he questioned 
the ability of the DP camp director in supervising the DPs, especially in terms of the cleanliness of 
sleeping quarters, bathing areas, latrines and kitchens.  In response to the commander’s criticism, 
UNRRA District Director Charles McDonald wrote to Blackmore to ensure that steps were being 
taken to ensure that the DP camp did not fail its next inspection.  “If the above matters have not 
already been taken care of,” McDonald wrote to Blackmore, “as a result of the inspection referred to, 
please see that same is done immediately.”54   
There is little question that the biggest challenges were the private dwellings, which failed 
their inspections on several occasions.  While they could at least monitor the conditions in the other 
camps, visiting all of the private dwellings on a regular basis proved a difficult task.  UNRRA did 
carry out their own inspections of the private dwellings, and in April 1946 Blackmore reported that 
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“[r]andom inspection revealed state of dwellings to be generally very good and the occupants are 
contented.”55  He was especially impressed in the improvements given the small size of the UNRRA 
Team.  “It should be borne in mind,” he wrote, “that Team 509 is a small Team with comparatively 
heavy responsibilities and it is with pleasure that I note the effectiveness of the supervision exercised 
by the Team and the manner in which the DPs themselves co-operate and share various 
responsibilities throughout the installations.”56  They had organized a system of social visits to check 
in on the DPs living in the private dwellings.  Nonetheless, he noted, “it is very difficult to keep some 
of these people up to standard.”57    
 In the spring and summer of 1946, with the arrival of large numbers of infiltrees, the 
problems surrounding camp cleanliness arose once again.  On 16 August 1946 Blackmore reported 
that the Sedan Kaserne camp, now housing Jewish infiltrees, was in a state of chaos.  “I found the 
standard of cleanliness to be deplorable,” he lamented.  “A large number of Jewish infiltrees in this 
camp seem to have no standards at all and in spite of great efforts on the part of the Team to promote 
some sense of responsibility into these people the rooms were dirty and evil smelling.  Corridors were 
littered with rubbish and food remains.”  He also commented on the state of personal cleanliness 
amongst the infiltrees.  “The conception of regular bathing appears to be quite foreign to large 
numbers of inhabitants.  However, the Team have so far had little time to concentrate on these 
problems and I am sure that the future will show a speedy improvement.”58  He had equally harsh 
words for the kitchen staff.  “The kitchen was filthy and worse than any other I have seen in my 
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experience.  In fact typical of the extremely low standard of the inhabitants.”59  He did note that the 
team’s Welfare Officer, Mr. Thomas, was in the process of organizing welfare assistants and a 
sanitation squad to ensure the cleanliness of the building.   
The situation, however, showed little improvement, to Blackmore’s frustration.  In September 
1946 Blackmore reported that “[t]he camp is somewhat cleaner than before but it is still in very poor 
condition.  The main difficulty is of course in securing proper cooperation on the part of the camp 
population in maintaining the most elementary standards of cleanliness.”60  He continued to explain 
that “[t]he living rooms which I inspected were not good.  In one or two exceptional cases I did find 
cleanliness and order.  Garbage disposal is fair.  Latrines and wash rooms [sic] need constant 
supervision.”61  He hoped that the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JAFP) representative would spend 
more effort on working with the DPs to improve camp cleanliness.  “I am inclined to think that Mr. 
Sklarz could perform more useful work than he is doing at the present time by throwing his weight 
and influence into the general effort to instill a sense of responsibility and cooperation into the people 
as a whole.”62  Still worse were the conditions in the camp kitchen.  He explained that they were 
establishing a kosher kitchen at the camp, but that “[o]n the occasion of my last inspection I found 
fresh meat lying about on dirty floors being cut up by very grimy individuals.”63 
 The reports on the battles between UNRRA and the military over the camp inspections and 
military expectations concerning camp and personal cleanliness focus very little attention on how 
difficult it was to provide soap and hot water to the DPs.  While some camps contained indoor 
plumbing, the majority did not, and required hot water to be heated in the kitchens and then 
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transferred to the washrooms.  Welfare officers were constantly asking the military to provide soap 
for the camp population as well.  The military’s belief that the DPs should be able maintain a certain 
level of cleanliness regardless of the availability of supplies highlights the fact that they had the same 
expectations of the DPs as they did of their own troops.   
These reports also avoid entirely the question of how the DPs themselves felt about personal 
cleanliness, and also what standards they brought with them from their prewar homes.  Neither group 
seriously considered what standards the DPs had previously followed nor how much of a change they 
were instilling in DP social norms concerning hygiene.  The DPs were a heterogeneous group of 
people: some had come from the city, but most were from the countryside.  In his discussion of Poles 
living in Breslau following the Soviet seizure of formerly Polish territory, Frederick Taylor writes, 
the rural Poles “were mostly not city dwellers but farmers and country people.  Not only did they not 
want to be in this German city [Breslau], but they did not actually know how to live in such a 
place.”64  The DPs had likewise come from rural homes where people generally adhered to personal 
cleanliness practices reminiscent of the United States before indoor plumbing spread in the late 
nineteenth century.  Bathing was undertaken in a river or lake in the warmer months, and by sponge 
bathing throughout the year.  American practices of bathing in a bathtub had yet to be taken up by 
much of the urban population in Europe, and by none of the rural population.  Also important were 
the DPs’ wartime experiences.  The toilets and baths were not a major concern or readily available.  
The Germans treated foreign workers, and eastern European workers in particular, with disdain.  In 
his study of foreign workers in Osnabruck, Panikos Panayi quotes a January 1945 German 
government report which described one such forced labour camp as “dirty and disorderly, the 
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provision of clothing for the inmates is inadequate, the heating is insufficient, the inmates are covered 
in lice.  Only about 50 per cent of them go to work.”65   
Therefore, given their prewar habits and their wartime experiences, perhaps what is most 
interesting to note is that the DPs did eventually absorb the values and hygiene standards imparted by 
UNRRA welfare workers and army officers alike.  While the documentation from 1945 and early 
1946 was replete with discussions of inspections and disagreements over their outcome, by the end of 
1946 these complaints had vanished.  Instead, the reports show that nearly all of the camps passed 
their inspections easily.  By 1946 the extreme shortages that had plagued the first year were coming 
under control, and therefore hygiene supplies (such as soap and toothbrushes) were in much greater 
supply, which certainly made it easier for the DPs to conform to these new social norms.  There was 
also certainly some changeover of personnel, although this alone cannot explain the change.  What is 
clear is that after a year of enduring inspections and listening to lectures, the DPs had embraced the 
notion of personal cleanliness, as understood by American welfare workers, as an attribute.  This part 
of UNRRA’s rehabilitation program had been, in spite of the slow start, a clear success.      
Alongside the emphasis on personal cleanliness as a key personal responsibility and an 
important means of rehabilitation, UNRRA also sought to introduce structure into the DP camps and 
the DPs’ lives through the provision of recreational, educational and work programs.  UNRRA began 
introducing recreational activities as soon as they arrived in a camp.  By the end of August 1945, the 
DP camp at Boelcke Kaserne had already hosted several recreational activities, including dances, 
theatre, football matches, and musical programmes by DPs visiting from other centres.  The DPs had 
also organized a Catholic chapel for religious services, and Blackmore had requested that projectors 
and films be made available so that the centre could present a film night to the residents.   
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For children, the single most important means of introducing normalcy was to begin school.  
UNRRA recognized that for many children this would be their first experience with formal education, 
as a “large number of children have never been to school; another large number have had their 
education interrupted and are now in need of both academic and vocational guidance and training.”66  
However, few UNRRA staff members spoke the languages of the DPs or were able to offer formal 
instruction, and no one had the time to devote solely to this effort.  Instead, UNRRA welfare workers 
helped the DPs organize and run the schools by helping them locate the necessary space and 
resources, often at the expense of the German authorities.  For adults, UNRRA sought to organize 
vocational training.  “In conformity with the character and intention of UNRRA’s programme of 
relief and rehabilitation,” Directive No. 5 explained, “vocational training is a means of helping 
displaced persons to earn their living and to contribute usefully to the wellbeing [sic] of their 
countries or place of residence.”67   
In July 1945, UNRRA welfare worker Rita Morgan shared her experiences and thoughts on 
UNRRA’s education program to Conrad Van Hyning, Director of UNRRA’s Welfare Division.  “It is 
of the utmost importance,” she wrote, “that the refugee body through its representatives selected in as 
democratic a way as is practicable have some voice in the determination of education policy.  This 
may seem a slow way to get started but in the long run it will prove most valuable.”68  She 
emphasized the fact that the DPs themselves were the ones to benefit because their children would be 
educated.  This point was expanded upon in UNRRA’s directive Educational Activities in UNRRA 
Assembly Centres and Camps, which explained that while education was considered a key part of any 
                                                     
66
 Report of Committee Meeting on Welfare Services, held at UNRRA Staging Centre, dated 4-5 August 1945, 
in UNA, Series 425, Box 62, File 3 “Welfare IV – Minutes of Special Meetings – Zone Headquarters – 
Welfare/Relief Services.” 
67
 Directive on Displaced Persons Operations No. 5, UNc 1119, undated, in UNA, Series 517, Box 114, File 
219 “Displaced Persons Files No. 3.” 
68
 Recommendations for a services program for a camp of about 5,000 refugees (Draft), Rita Morgan, 26 July 
1945, in UNA, Series 523, Box 593, File 92 “Assembly Centres. Services. General.” 
 195 
 
welfare program, it was one which UNRRA should encourage the DPs to organize themselves.  “The 
Director of an assembly centre or camp should give every encouragement to spontaneous educational 
enterprises undertaken by the displaced persons themselves.  Freedom of educational enterprise is a 
constituent part of the general process of liberation and should therefore be encouraged,” the directive 
explained.69  Thus, this process of organizing children’s and adult education was an especially 
important a form of rehabilitation because it was another way to make the DPs responsible for 
themselves. 
 UNRRA workers faced two types of obstacles in their efforts to coordinate education 
programs in the DPs camps.  The first problem concerned supply: they did not have access to the 
necessary teaching materials, books, paper and pencils necessary to successfully run school programs.  
To solve this problem, they turned to the military for help, but these efforts often met with resistance.  
The second obstacle was the process of repatriation.  As UNRRA’s stated goal was the return of all 
nationals to their country of origin, they had to justify their educational efforts according to 
requirements in their home countries.  UNRRA could not organize programs that would halt or even 
slow repatriation efforts.  As a result, the educational and vocational training programs were 
compromised from the start.   
In August 1945, school programs had begun for 185 children at Boelcke Kaserne.  Subjects 
being taught included religion, history, writing, and Polish language.  There were also English classes 
for adults being offered.  At the QM Bakery, a Polish Education Council was founded at a meeting of 
all Polish camp residents on 7 December.  They decided that children in the first four years of their 
schooling (aged six to ten) would continue to attend classes at Boelcke Kaserne, while older students 
(aged eleven and above) would attend classes at a new school, to be set up in the QM Bakery.  “This 
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arrangement will allow [us] to use in the best way the limited number of trained teaching personnel,” 
the team director’s monthly report noted.  By the end of November the school inside the Bakery was 
providing instruction to students in grades five, six and seven on Polish language, mathematics, 
history, geography, religion and folk song, in spite of a shortage of teaching materials.  Some 
materials, like globes, were available from German sources, but Polish instruction material was not to 
be found.70  In some instances the military was able to provide requisitioned supplies from German 
sources.  However, there are also numerous reports of UNRRA workers attempting to locate the 
resources themselves. “The attention of the staff has been given to the searching of possibilities of 
procuring books through gifts, publication or purchase,” on report noted.  “Plans have been made for 
the publication of additional books in five different languages.  The program provides fairly 
adequately for the first three grades, but additional publication must be undertaken to meet needs for 
higher grades of the elementary school, and for secondary instruction and adult education.”71     
  UNRRA also turned to the voluntary agencies for help.  In October 1945, W.G. Bergman, 
UNRRA’s Education Officer, wrote to the Chief Welfare Officer to ask for help.  Given that 
“[e]ducational training has not been a major factor in UNRRA selection” he hoped that the voluntary 
agencies would “be of assistance in those areas of professional effort which are most lightly 
represented in UNRRA personnel.”  He suggested that UNRRA ask the voluntary agencies to provide 
teachers, especially teachers fluent in Polish and those who “speak a language common to most 
Jewish D.P.’s, Yiddish, German or Hebrew.”72  The need for teachers for the Jewish DPs became 
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more urgent in the summer of 1946, with the arrival of the infiltrees.  In August 1946, Chaplain 
Emanuel Rackman of the United States Army, Aide to the Advisor to the Theatre Commander on 
Jewish Affairs, wrote to UNRRA’s American Zone Director J. H. Whiting in regards to DP 
education.  “Since children are arriving in this Zone in ever increasing numbers, I deemed it advisable 
to participate in deliberations with regard to their education – religious and secular,” he noted.73  
Chaplain Rackman explained that not all of the Jewish DPs wanted their children to receive religious 
instruction, but many did.  In order to solve this problem, he suggested that all children be offered 
secular classes together, and teachers able to teach religious classes offer them to those children who 
wanted to attend them.  Again, UNRRA reached out to the voluntary agencies for qualified staff.      
 UNRRA helped the DPs organize several different training courses in the DP camps in Ulm.  
In August 1945, Blackmore praised the efforts of UNRRA Team 141 in this area.  The Boelcke 
Kaserne had founded an excellent sewing school that was training girls to make alterations.74  The 
only problem was that they did not have access to the necessary supplies.  The UNRRA team director 
had approached the military, “but requisitions are not made promptly.  It would appear that the 
Military Government is lenient towards the German Population and does not pay sufficient regard to 
D.Ps.,” he noted.75  In November 1945, DPs in the QM Bakery were organizing a driver and 
mechanic school to instruct forty people for a total of three months.  They also hoped to begin 
instruction for tailors, typists, and farmers.76     
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  In December 1945, UNRRA drafted a Statement of Targets for Vocational Training.  
UNRRA suggested a complete review of all vocational training currently taking place, with the goal 
of reorganizing vocational training programs according to “priority trades and industries from point of 
view of resettlement … and repatriation.”77  The Statement explained that “[v]ocational training and 
occupational re-training is one of the most important factors in helping people to help themselves, by 
developing their skill, self confidence and morale, needed for their self-sufficiency when they return 
to their own country, and offering a better chance for earlier resettlement.”78  It was a tricky balance 
to strike.  While UNRRA workers brought with them into the field their belief in the importance of 
reinstituting social norms and the important role that education and vocational training would play in 
this process, they soon met resistance from both the military and UNRRA’s leadership, who did not 
want to encourage the creation of any programs that would slow the pace of repatriation.  As a result, 
any vocational training plans had to be short-term; they could not organize programs that required 
long periods of training.   
UNRRA did not have to lecture the DPs on the importance of schooling for children; this was 
a goal that they already shared.  However, education was seen as an especially important aspect of 
rehabilitation because the UNRRA workers had the DPs organize the classes themselves, and so 
merely supported them in this endeavor instead of managing it for them.  Thus alongside housing, 
education provides another clear example of the convergence of DP and UNRRA social norms.  The 
DPs were as keen to provide schools for their children, and to do the work in organizing and 
managing them, as UNRRA was in encouraging them to do so.  The same was true of vocational 
training.  The DPs were encouraged to organize courses themselves, while UNRRA coordinated with 
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the voluntary agencies and the military to procure the necessary staff and supplies.  This was no 
simple task for UNRRA, and they met resistance from the military in many instances.  But in the end 
they provided the DPs with an educational experience that gave structure to their lives in the DP 
camps, and provided many with skills and experience that they could take with them, whether they 
were returning to their home country or hoping to settle abroad. 
UNRRA also believed that both educational and work opportunities would provide structure 
to camp life and instil a work ethic that was considered key.  American understandings of a work 
ethic had evolved over the course of the nineteenth century alongside understandings of personal 
cleanliness.  These notions about work had evolved from Protestant ideas of both work, and 
especially the “Doctrine of the Calling” (which claimed that God had assigned each man a productive 
job), and the dangers of idleness into a more secular understanding of work which focused on each 
man’s duty to contribute to the good of society however he was able.79  Nevertheless, idleness 
remained the enemy.  Daniel Rodgers explains that work fulfilled several purposes in the Victorian 
understanding of society: it took up time that would otherwise be devoted to succumbing to 
temptation; it provided a means of supporting oneself and family; and it gave men purpose in their 
lives.80  A work ethic was a quintessential middle-class value, and one that remained rooted in 
American culture into the twentieth century.  Thus, based on their understanding of social norms, 
American social workers identified both unemployment and the lack of a trade or skill as deviations 
from the norm.  They believed that it was their job to teach people the necessary skills to be able to 
obtain and keep permanent employment – skilled employment when possible.   
UNRRA workers brought these norms with them into the field.  “His career has been 
suddenly disrupted,” Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons explained, “he has been put into 
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kinds of work entirely different from those into which had gone his previous energy and interest.  
Every moment that he worked below his skill-level, his disgust and hate and anxiety grew.”81  
UNRRA’s task was to reintroduce work, but to do so in a way that would help the DPs come to enjoy 
it once again.  The most important thing was to give the DPs some choice in their tasks; they did not 
want to force anyone to perform work that they did not want to do.  Work would also distract the DPs 
from brooding over their previous experiences.  “All his skills of defence were on end as it were, he 
had to be on his guard all the time and was reduced to a constant state of touchiness.  The trivial 
routines of work in slavery made him think more than was good for him, embittered him and thus 
created new fear and anxiety.”82   
For UNRRA, the creation or reinforcement of a work ethic was a central part of the process 
of rehabilitation as they understood it.  The DPs had to learn to be productive members of the 
community.  By working together, they would re-establish normal relations among themselves, and 
hopefully overcome the effects of Nazi policies which had worked to destroy inter-personal 
relationships.  Work would also bring structure to their days, which was also an important part of 
normalizing life in the camps.  For the military, working DPs were less likely to be engaged in black 
market activities outside of the camp or other criminal or deviant activities.  As early as May 1945, 
SHAEF was already stressing this point: “[b]ecause a considerable period of time is likely to elapse 
between the time such persons are uncovered and their ultimate repatriation, it is essential that 
everything possible be done for their gainful employment in activities desired by the military 
                                                     
81
 Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons, prepared for the Welfare Division of the European Regional 
Office of UNRRA by an Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group, dated June 1945, p. 14, in Canadian National 
Archives, Ottawa, R9369, Vol. 3, File 12 “UNRRA – Welfare Division: Report – Displaced Persons; June 
1945.” 
82
 Ibid. 
 201 
 
forces.”83  As well, any work that the DPs could do themselves was work that the military (or 
UNRRA) would not have to do for them.  This proved especially important in the fall of 1945 when 
the buildings had to be winterized and when wood needed to be collected for winter heating, both 
quite laborious and labour-intensive tasks.  Therefore, for SHAEF, employment in the camps meant a 
larger pool upon which it could draw, less demand for army resources and also less worry about what 
the DPs might otherwise be doing. 
 The organization of work for the DPs appeared to be one area in which UNRRA and the 
military agreed.  They both saw it as providing structure and normality to the lives of the DPs.  
However, SHAEF’s reasons and objectives differed from UNRRA’s, and were much more practical 
and immediate.  The DPs were a temporary, if important, labour source to be utilized.    “It is the 
policy of the Supreme Commander,” SHAEF’s Guide on Employment stated, “to give every 
opportunity to United Nations displaced persons to engage in paid employment while awaiting 
repatriation.”84  SHAEF made clear that in the early postwar weeks they expected those DPs working 
in German firms and on German farms to continue working until they received orders otherwise from 
Military Government.  The military was worried that essential services, and especially the food 
supply, would collapse if the DPs stopped working.  At the same time, the military asserted that no 
DPs would be forced to perform paid labour against their will.  Military Government declared that 
DPs would be given priority over Germans in all employment opportunities with the Allied armies.  
They called upon each centre director to appoint an employment officer from among the centre team 
to coordinate Military Government requests for workers and to assure the conditions of work outside 
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of the DP camps.  In no case, however, was employment to be allowed to interfere with repatriation 
plans.   
According to SHAEF, the DPs would also be expected to work within the camps.  “Every 
displaced person will be expected to make his contribution to the community by keeping his own 
quarters clean and by participating in whatever ‘fatigue’ is considered necessary and suitable by the 
Assembly Center Director,” the Guide stated.85  This section of the Guide in particular reflected the 
military’s view of the DPs as soldiers under military command and a source of labour.  SHAEF also 
recommended that the DPs be encouraged to establish services within the camps such as hairdressing, 
woodworking and gardening.  They explained that the Centre Director should encourage these 
endeavours by assisting the DPs in obtaining the necessary tools and materials.   
 Initially SHAEF organized work parties to fulfill tasks within the camps.  Gradually, as the 
camps took shape and a degree of permanence, the DPs took on administrative work as office staff 
and translators, work in kitchens and on cleaning teams, providing health care for the centre 
population, and as camp guards.  By the end of August 1945, Boelcke Kaserne, with a population of 
2250 DPs, had 525 DPs working inside the camp and 120 working outside of the camp.  While none 
of these workers were paid, they received extra food rations from Red Cross packages as 
compensation.86  Boelcke Kaserne was also the site of one of two DP dental clinics.  DPs from the 
camps throughout Ulm visited the DP dentist at Boelcke Kaserne for dental care, or else the Polish 
DP dentist at the Sedan Kaserne.  At Wilhelmsburg, approximately 125 men and 77 women were 
employed inside the DP camp, and an additional 52 men worked outside of the camp on jobs such a 
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woodcutting and driving.  Again, these DPs were paid in Red Cross packages for their work.87  The 
DPs also organized shoe repair, car repair, a carpentry shop and radio repair.  In November 1945, the 
director of UNRRA Team 509 reported that 102 DPs from the QM Bakery were employed in the 
camp.  Some worked in administrative roles, as interpreters and typists, while others worked as truck 
drivers or messengers, and still others worked as doctors, nurses, teachers and cooks.  These DPs also 
received extra rations, soap or cigarettes as payment.88  In January 1946 Blackmore added that DPs 
were also working outside the camp cutting wood for winter heating for the camp, and also as 
carpenters and painters within the camp.  Unlike the residents of the Boelcke Kaserne, the DPs living 
in private dwellings did not participate in any work projects.89  While many of the DPs living in the 
barracks were content to leave their sleeping quarters and take part in work projects, the DPs living in 
the private residences were not interested.   
At a meeting held in Frankfurt on 4 and 5 August 1945, welfare officers from the American 
zone met to discuss welfare issues, including the problems associated with employment.  It was 
recognized that what existed was ad hoc and improvised and UNRRA was keen to bring more 
structure and planning to the employment of the DPs.  They recommended that a placement or 
employment officer be assigned at the district level in order to consult with welfare officers at 
individual camps and to study employment opportunities throughout the district.90  In October 1945, 
UNRRA created the position of Employment Officer to act as liaison with Military Government and 
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develop a classification system for an employment program.  “Recognizing the need for a sound 
employment program, considerable time and effort has been spent in discussion with representatives 
of CHQ in developing effective employment plans for displaced persons in Germany,” UNRRA’s 
director for the American Zone reported.91      
 SHAEF and UNRRA had assumed that the DPs would be willing to continue working for 
German firms once the war had ended, but in this they were largely disappointed.  Initially DPs’ 
employment had occurred within the camp system and had focused on getting the camps functioning 
and prepared for winter.  Once UNRRA had complete administrative control of the camps in the 
American zone in the fall, however, they calculated that it would only need a small number of DPs to 
perform all of the camp functions, leaving the remainder sitting idle.  This was unacceptable from 
UNRRA’s perspective.  However, when they approached the DPs about the possibility of organizing 
work projects with German firms, they found that the “[v]ast majority of Displaced Persons do not 
desire to work for the Germans who share their feelings.”  The Germans objected to the possibility of 
the DPs working outside of the camps because the Germans also needed employment, and 
opportunities were scarce in the postwar months.  When UNRRA staff approached the DP leaders at 
Boelcke Kaserne they learnt that the camp population refused to work for German firms or 
individuals, despite the fact that this was the only work available outside of the camp.92  The same 
was true throughout many of the DP camps.  The one exception to this rule appeared to be the 
Estonian DPs.  “The employment program is making good progress here in striking contrast to the 
Polish centers in my area,” Blackmore explained.  The Estonian DPs were “very enthusiastic and 
eager for training and occupation” and only the limiting factor was the availability of materials, 
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which, if remedied, “would make it possible for practically all employable persons in this [Estonian] 
center to be working.”93 
Throughout the fall and winter of 1945, there was much work to be done inside the camps to 
prepare them for the winter, and this work kept many DPs busy, but in the spring of 1946 UNRRA 
once again took up the question of providing work for the DPs.  On 1 March 1946, Leon Berger, 
UNRRA’s Chief Employment Officer, reported on the state of UNRRA’s DP employment program.  
Berger reported that in February 1946 the Employment Branch had finally begun operations.  Its 
purpose was to find employment for DPs both inside and outside of the camps.  As part of this 
process, they began organizing employment registration and classification for all adult DPs.  They 
also began to procure supplies for vocational training projects.  To begin, they hoped to procure a 
large quantity of cloth which was in the military’s possession for making children’s and adults’ 
clothing.  They hoped to provide work for DPs within the camps, but paid for by the local German 
authorities “at the established rate,” that is, what German firms would pay their employees.94  In other 
words, they hoped to provide the DPs with contract work from German firms.  When they presented 
this plan to UNRRA teams, the welfare workers responded that this was a good idea, but they worried 
that few DPs would be willing to take part unless they were offered incentives beyond cash wages.  
The DPs recognized that Germany’s Reichmarks were nearly worthless, and that there was little that 
they wished to purchase anyway.  The welfare workers explained that “without additional incentive in 
the form of extra food or goods, maximum results in a ‘production’ type operation could not be 
assured.”95  In other words, the DPs would not work unless they were also given extra rations.  In the 
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end, the military instead made this fabric available to German firms, who found willing workers and 
quickly began turning the fabric into much-needed clothing.   
Berger instead focused his efforts on matching individual employment requests with suitable 
candidates from amongst the DPs in the area.  His efforts, however, were hindered by the slow 
registration process.  Many teams were unable to complete the registration and classification because 
they did not have personnel qualified to evaluate the DPs’ skills.  He had sent out detailed instructions 
on how to complete each camp’s employment registration in both German and Polish to all teams 
who had not yet completed the registration, but the reports trickled in very slowly.  “The fact that 
most teams have not as yet submitted their occupational registration reports prevent establishing any 
effective district personnel placement pool,” he explained.96  It is important to remember that the 
teams were also swamped with the many other tasks they had to carry out.  There was also a lack of 
paper, pens and typewriters – all of which made it impossible to submit reports.  Berger continued to 
face many other setbacks as well.  “Establishment of more projects, a better attitude of the military 
toward use of DP personnel, and improved attitude of displaced persons toward accepted of 
employment with incentives, improvement of incentives to employment are a few of the problems,” 
he lamented.97  His relationship with Military Government remained strained.  According to Military 
Government regulations, the local German authorities were responsible for paying the wages of those 
DPs employed in official positions within the camps, amounting to 7 ½-10 percent of each camp’s 
population.  Berger wanted to provide employment for the rest of the camp, but they could not all be 
paid by the German authorities.  As well, despite orders to do so, the military hesitated to employ 
DPs.  “The military claims that the displaced persons are unskilled, lazy and unreliable,” he wrote.  
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“A selling job with the military is necessary to try to dispell [sic] this idea.”98  Berger explained that 
he had also approached them about accessing captured enemy war material sources for use in camp 
work projects, but that he had been repeatedly rebuffed.  “The fact that the military declines to 
commit itself to providing materials for rehabilitation,” he exclaimed, “is a major limitation on work 
shop and employment activities.”99   
As the welfare workers had previously noted, Berger also realized that the DPs seemed to 
require ever larger incentives in exchange for work. He explained that because “most workers think 
that, if they perform their normal camp housekeeping functions, they will be fed and clothes 
regardless of participation in work projects, they look for some substantial extra incentive being 
provided for work done.”100  In fact, different camps had developed different methods of incentivizing 
work: while some camps distributed goods solely based on need, others had established elaborate 
‘centre currency systems’ by offering goods at canteens for those who work.  This was yet another 
example of UNRRA’s efforts to put “responsibility” into action.  He explained that each camp 
director approached the problem differently according to the conditions in the camp, and the amount 
of free time available to staff to organize these systems.  This was very typical of conditions in the 
camps in 1946, with the UNRRA staff responding to a particular problem in an ad hoc, uncoordinated 
manner – generally reflecting an impressive ingenuity, but also a lack of any central direction.     
In June 1946 the picture appeared somewhat brighter.  The district employment officer for 
District 1 reported that the employment registration had still not been completed by all of the DP 
camps in the district, but that some progress had been made in organizing work programs within some 
of the camps.  The chief problem facing employment officers was a lack of transportation.  In places 
where the employment officers were located, “they have organized excellent registration offices and 
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employment programs” but “[t]he full utilization of the three UNRRA Class I employment officers 
assigned to Teams has been impossible because the District Office has had not vehicles to assign 
them to travel among the Teams in the areas assigned.”101  With the arrival of large numbers of 
infiltrees in the spring and summer of 1946, the employment program was thrown into further 
disarray.  Blackmore described the newly founded infiltree employment committees as “verbose 
rather than active” and explained that “co-operation among the infiltree population generally renders 
the situation difficult.  However, we are endeavoring to overcome these obstacles.”102  Team 509 
Director L. van Eyck Jr. reported that “Jewish [DPs] do not wish to work outside the camp in German 
firms.  As our shops are set up employment increases.”103  As was the case with previous DP groups 
in the area, the infiltrees were willing to work on projects within the camp, but they refused to work 
for German firms outside of the camps.  They wanted no part in helping to reconstruct the German 
economy. 
Alongside DP challenges to the plans UNRRA had worked to organize, the DP employment 
program faced hostility from the military as well.  They wanted to provide the DPs with work to keep 
them busy, but only so long as it did not interfere with repatriation efforts.  Indeed, the American 
military used DP labour in many instances: DPs worked as drivers, warehouse staff, DP policemen 
and woodcutters.  They provided valuable labour that the military required.  However, when it came 
to providing supplies for camp employment programs, the military had little time for these requests.  
While they appreciated the help in meeting their own short-term needs, they did not share UNRRA’s 
vision of rehabilitation.  These programs required materials that the military was unwilling, or at least 
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extremely reluctant, to provide.  Given this enormous constraint, it is not difficult to see how UNRRA 
staff like Leon Berger became disillusioned with their task.  At the same time, employment programs 
were further undermined when DPs were either moved to new camps or repatriated in large numbers.  
During an Employment Officers’ Conference at UNRRA Headquarters in March 1946, Berger was 
reminded once again that the purpose of DP employment was to prepare the DPs to return to their 
home countries:   
[s]tress was laid on the paramount importance of repatriation and the fact that the 
employment program should be conducted as a short-term operation with emphasis on 
immediate placement and vocational training in simple skills, to terminate when 
accommodations for repatriation are available.  The occupational interview and registration 
should be used as a means of orienting the DP towards repatriation.104 
The competing goals and very real constraints made construction of an effective employment 
program that would advance the rehabilitation objective extremely difficult. 
At the same time, UNRRA workers praised the resourcefulness of the DPs.  Blackmore was 
particularly impressed by an ingenious project in which “a tinsmith shop is using cans and army 
biscuit tins to turn out large numbers of very useful household articles such as dust pans, sauce pans, 
tin baths and even a church cupola is being entirely constructed out of wood and tin.  This week’s 
production includes 200 dust pans for distribution to the housewives throughout the camp.”105  He 
also praised a DP carpenter shop which was “making furniture, toys, police truncheons, photo frames 
and many other useful articles.  Machines smashed and buried by the Luftwaffe have been dug up, 
dismantled and the material used for constructive purposes.”106  It was a remarkable (from his point of 
view) demonstration of the revival of a strong work ethic – exactly what UNRRA was hoping for.  
And it was happening without UNRRA or military assistance.  Surely this demonstration of a strong 
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work ethic could only be a good thing.  Ironically, however, UNRRA and the military alike were 
concerned about the growing number of independent DP businesses in Germany.  By setting up their 
own, private businesses, the DPs were placing roots in Germany, and this only meant that it would be 
that much harder to repatriate them.  On numerous instances the military used the excuse that these 
goods were being sold on the black market to discourage the DPs from further efforts.  Berger himself 
mentions his own fears about DP enterprises in his reports.  He also reported that these private 
enterprises often competed with similar cooperative work projects taking place in the camps.  While 
the DP entrepreneurs sourced their raw materials on the German market, the DPs working collectively 
on projects in the camps were limited to the supplies provided by the military.  This constraint, in 
many cases, discouraged many DPs from working cooperatively in the camps, which worked against 
UNRRA’s rehabilitation process.  While UNRRA wanted the DPs to work, they wanted them to 
engage in productive work that would help them reintegrate into their home communities.  Building 
independent economic partnerships in Germany worked against repatriation, they worried.  This was 
evidence of a serious conflict between UNRRA’s goals of rehabilitation and repatriation.  While they 
wanted to provide the DPs with skills that would help them later on, these plans were always limited 
by the necessity of putting repatriation first. 
 For their own part, the DPs had many reasons for wanting to start their own businesses.  The 
Jewish DPs in particular brought with them a long history of commerce.  Barred from owning 
property, Jews had historically congregated in the cities and participated in trade, often acting as 
middlemen in the sale of goods between the towns and the cities.  They also sold finished goods such 
as clothes and footwear.  Many also owned taverns.107  These were, then, the skills that the Jewish 
DPs brought with them to the DP camps.  Non-Jewish DPs also brought with them a long history of 
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barter.  Ukrainian DPs had primarily been agricultural workers, unskilled workers or merchants 
before the war.108  Farmers had a long tradition of trading agricultural goods for manufactured 
products that they could not make for themselves.  Therefore, it was not surprising that so many DPs 
wanted to open their own businesses, providing goods and services to DPs and Germans alike.  
Unfortunately, this goal was not in line with UNRRA’s expectations of DP work. 
 Thus, UNRRA’s initial efforts at rehabilitation met with varying levels of success.  Housing 
was one area in which both DP and UNRRA social norms meshed successfully, and therefore the DPs 
accepted the move to the apartments willingly, and even happily, despite the apartments’ deficiencies.  
Unfortunately, severe shortages in this type of housing made it impossible to house all of the DPs in 
this way.  The military made clear that it was easier and more convenient for them to house the DPs 
in barracks and other large, open structures.  As a result, rehabilitation through housing did not 
achieve the results for which UNRRA had hoped.   
UNRRA was more successful in its efforts to instill a sense of personal hygiene in the DPs.  
While the majority of DPs arrived with little understanding of personal hygiene and cleanliness of 
living quarters as understood by the American relief workers, reports from less than a year later 
mention none of the same failed inspections.  In order to pass both military and UNRRA inspections, 
the DPs had to follow the practices as laid out by UNRRA staff, and these included regular bathing, 
keeping one’s sleeping quarters and washing facilities tidy, and even letting fresh air in once in a 
while.  While UNRRA believed, at least at first, that they were rehabilitating the DPs by 
reintroducing standards of cleanliness that had existed in the United States for some time, they were 
in fact introducing for the first time new standards of personal hygiene to many of the DPs.       
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 Education was the area in which UNRRA met with the most success.  Welfare workers 
wasted little breath having to explain to the DPs the important of education; the DPs themselves not 
only thought that it was important, but were willing to actively organize the courses of instruction, 
turning to UNRRA for help procuring the necessary supplies.  UNRRA’s plans for rehabilitation 
through work proved the most problematic.  While UNRRA worked to provide the DPs with work in 
German firms, the DPs refused.  Instead they turned their attention to organizing camp projects, but 
UNRRA had to contend with the military insistence that no work program divert efforts at 
repatriation.  At the same time, all work projects had to be organized with resources provided by the 
military, who were at best reluctant to requisition them from the Germans.   The DPs preferred to 
open their own private enterprises, much to the chagrin of the military, who saw such enterprises as a 
further hindrance to DP repatriation.       
A closer look at UNRRA’s efforts at rehabilitation through housing, hygiene, education and 
work inadvertently identify several instances in which the DPs either accepted or opposed UNRRA`s 
plans for rehabilitation.  In many ways, the military and UNRRA had expected to encounter a 
subdued and submissive group.  Instead, what they found were people willing to take matters into 
their own hands.  While the DPs had little control over housing or food, they did have the ability to 
protest when they felt their needs were not being adequately met, as will be discussed in chapter six.  
In cases in which the DPs shared UNRRA’s goals, they acted decisively to institute the programs 
planned by UNRRA, as was the case in education and vocational training.  However, the DPs showed 
the most surprising opposition when it came to organizing work.  While they may not have worked in 
the exact manner proscribed by UNRRA staff, they did not sit idly by.  Instead, they took the 
initiative to begin their own businesses and provide goods and services that were not available.  They 
did not wait passively for UNRRA to do things for them; they took action.  They were as keen to 
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return to "normal" as UNRRA was keen to see them do it, although their "normal" did not always 
coincide with UNRRA’s. 
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Chapter 5 
Reversing the ‘utter collapse of law’: DP experiences with civil law 
in the American Occupation Zone of Germany 
It should be made clear that UNRRA officials have no power either to approve or disapprove 
of marriage, and are not in any sense the legal guardians of Displaced Persons.1 
If the marriage should take place in Germany, it has to be accomplished in accordance with 
the formalities prescribed by German law.  The necessary information on this subject can be 
obtained from the Burgomaster of his present place of residence.2 
 
For UNRRA, reintroducing the DPs to the law was best approached in a series of steps, all 
meant to foster a respect for authority and the rule of law.  UNRRA saw the restoration of respect for 
the law as a key part of the process of normalizing life.  Their understanding of rehabilitation focused 
on the reintroduction of prewar social norms, and respect for the law was an important social norm.  
Respect for the law was not something one could assume that the DPs understood anymore.  As Tony 
Judt argues, “[t]o live normally in occupied Europe meant breaking the law: in the first place the laws 
of the occupiers … but also conventional laws and norms as well… Theft—whether from the state, 
from a fellow citizen or from a looted Jewish store—was so widespread that in the eyes of many 
people it ceased to be a crime.”3 There was also a loss of respect for the authority of the state, as the 
German occupation of Europe had brought about “the utter collapse of law and the habits of life in a 
legal state.”4   
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Adding to the confusion and tension was the fact that, if the DPs were going to remain in 
Germany for any length of time, they would be forced into at least a minimal level of interaction with 
the local German authorities as they were the only ones legally able to perform certain bureaucratic 
functions.  In the first instance, this meant registering births and deaths with the local German 
registrar.  It also eventually meant legalizing wedded unions and divorces.  Finally, it meant that any 
DPs charged with criminal acts would likely come into contact with German police.  The question of 
dealing with criminal offences was especially complicated by concerns over jurisdiction.  Very early, 
SHAEF had decided that DPs from the United Nations, as well as former persecutees, would not face 
trial in German courts.  Later, the occupation authorities agreed that the German police would not 
have jurisdiction within the DP camps.  However, this did not stop the German police from arresting 
DPs outside of the camps.  This issue – the enforcement of law and order – was a source of particular 
tension.  As with other issues, UNRRA became the intermediary between the occupation forces, the 
German police, local German government, and the DPs when it came to legal matters.   
 DP legal issues fell into two categories: civil law and criminal law.  Civil law referred to 
those legal issues involving institutions and relationships in society not connected to the state.  
Especially important to the DPs were the civil law concerns of registering births and deaths, 
legalizing marriages and divorces, recognizing paternity and sorting out questions concerning 
illegitimacy.  In contrast, criminal law concerned crimes and their punishment.  For the DPs, law and 
order within the camps, confrontations with German police outside of the camps, the jurisdiction of 
German and Military Government courts, and DP legal representation were all important criminal law 
concerns.  In both cases, civil and criminal law, the DPs faced what they considered serious obstacles 
to their objective of rebuilding new lives for them
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UNRRA workers in the field did not have the legal expertise to advise the DPs on all issues.  
In many instances, they were completely unfamiliar with policies and procedures, particularly in 
regards to German law.  Unless specifically revoked by SHAEF, wartime laws remained the law of 
the land in Germany.    As the Deputy Director of the Displaced Persons Division in the ERO noted in 
April 1945, “it would seem unfair to expect Assembly Centre Directors to deal with these problems 
without the assistance of expert advice,” and therefore “it would appear desirable that a small legal 
staff should be available… generally to deal with the legal problems of displaced persons.”5  When 
UNRRA first entered the field as agents of SHAEF, they assumed that SHAEF would be responsible 
for the provision of any legal personnel, but this never materialized.  Thus, early on UNRRA realized 
it needed its own legal staff, including “someone with a knowledge of private international law, and 
preferably German law too,” assigned to each of UNRRA’s administrative Areas.6     
Both UNRRA Headquarters in Washington and the European Regional Office in London 
organized offices for Legal Advisers immediately.  In Germany, UNRRA appointed Manfred Simon 
as Legal Adviser for the entire country on 7 October 1945.  Initially, his primary task was to answer 
questions about the legality of certain UNRRA operations and agreements in Germany, not legal 
questions concerning individual DPs.  The Legal Adviser and his staff in Germany had originally 
been hired “as consultants in legal matters affecting the administration and the operation of the 
organization,” not in DP legal problems.7  Despite this fact, throughout the second half of 1945 Simon 
received letters from UNRRA teams throughout Germany with questions regarding the legal rights 
and obligations of individual DPs.  The ERO also appointed a legal adviser, A. H. Robertson, and 
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when he visited SHAEF headquarters is May 1945 to discuss the relationship between UNRRA and 
SHAEF, he was also bombarded with questions about the legal status of individual DPs.  “We well 
know that we shall be confronted with myriad situations involving divorce, marriage and estate law, 
together with endless queries on nationality status,” J.A. Edmison, Senior UNRRA liaison officer to 
SHAEF, noted.  After discussing the problem with Robertson, both he and Edmison agreed that 
UNRRA would have to provide legal advice to the DPs.  Both hoped that “in time we have expert 
assistance when confronted with such questions as ‘I am a Dane who has not seen my Russian 
husband for eight years, and I want to marry here in Germany a Pole who was married in Austria, 
domiciled in Luxembourg and divorced in France.”8  In response to this very clear need, in June 1946 
UNRRA appointed Legal Advisers for each of the zones of occupation to deal with the myriad 
questions.  The first Legal Adviser in the American zone was M. O. Talent, appointed in June 1946, 
who was succeeded by Paul Winter in 1947.     
 The first civil law problems that came to the attention of UNRRA concerned the process for 
registering births and deaths in the DP camps.  The fall of 1945 witnessed a veritable baby boom in 
DP camps across Germany.  As Atina Grossman describes in her study of Jewish DPs, “at the same 
time that Germans bemoaned the high incidence of suicides, infant and child mortality, and abortion, 
and German women were desperately seeking to keep alive the children they already had, Jewish DPs 
were marrying and producing babies in record numbers.”9  It was not only the Jewish DPs taking part 
in the baby boom; throughout Germany’s DP camps, children of every nationality were born in record 
numbers.  UNRRA was concerned with providing these children born on German soil with valid legal 
documents so that they could be successfully repatriated with their parents when the time came. They 
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were apprehensive that any complications during repatriation might lead single mothers in particular 
to abandon their children before returning home, particularly if the child was illegitimate. During the 
planning stage, UNRRA’s Standing Technical Committee on Displaced Persons had noted that 
SHAEF had made no initial plans for registering births in the DP camps and it made several 
recommendations on this matter.  According to their September 1944 Report on Registration of Births 
and Deaths in the Assembly Center, members of the Sub-Committee had hoped that the “Assembly 
Centre Registration Record Card will serve the purpose [of temporary birth certificate] if National 
Authorities are willing to recognise this as a valid document, at least on a provisional basis,” until 
repatriation, when the Registration Card could be replaced by a birth certificate.10  They asserted that 
as only the Assembly Centre Director had the authority to issue the Registration Record Card 
following the birth of a child in an Assembly Centre, “the card may form the basis of a legal 
document and that the greatest care will be necessary to ensure its accuracy.”11  They also 
recommended that each new Registration Record Card be stamped with the words: “This document 
does not itself constitute a valid certificate of birth” in order to avoid confusion.   
 Unfortunately the Sub-Committee’s plans proved unsuccessful when there was no clear 
agreement that the Registration Record Card could be used as a temporary birth certificate.  No one 
would accept it as a legal document.  At the same time, no state agreed to issue birth certificates for 
children born in Germany.  Instead, SHAEF declared that all births and deaths of displaced persons 
camp residents had to be registered with the German Registrar, as had been the custom during the 
war.  In their Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany, SHAEF declared that the mother 
be issued a DP ration card for each newborn, and also that the birth be registered according to local 
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law, which meant registering the birth with the German Registrar.12  There was some concern, 
however, that some countries might not recognize these registrations.  Thus, over time, the Legal 
Adviser gathered information from the various national Liaison Officers on the procedure to be 
followed in registering births for their nationals in Germany so that there would not be any 
complications upon repatriation.   
In November 1945, UNRRA’s Legal Adviser sent out a bulletin instructing Assembly Centre 
Directors on how to register the births and deaths of its Polish residents.  According to the Chief 
Polish Liaison Officer, Polish law required that all births, deaths, and marriages be registered 
according to local law.  Therefore, the Polish Liaison Officer warned, “[c]are should be taken that 
these occurrences be properly registered by German registrar (Zivilstandesbeamte) and that proper 
extracts of registers (certificates) be handed over to the next of kin or (should there be none) to the 
Polish Liaison Officer concerned.”13  He reiterated the importance of following the directive strictly 
so as to avoid any issues upon return to Poland.  He also asserted that all problems with the German 
Registrar should be taken up with the local Polish Liaison Officer. 
 Births amongst the Jewish DPs posed a particularly difficult problem in regards to registering 
the births of their children.  The Jewish DPs as a group refused to have their newborns registered with 
the German authorities on the grounds that it was with registration lists that the Nazis had identified 
and segregated the Jews, both in Germany and throughout Europe.  They insisted that they would not 
allow the Germans to have this information.  This put UNRRA in a difficult position as there was no 
legal alternative.  In his response to questions from UNRRA officers in the field, Manfred Simon 
responded that “all civilised States have taken great care to lay down rules as to who is obliged to 
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declare a birth, as to how and by whom the registration of this Declaration has to be carried out, and 
as to the penalties attached to the non-compliance with the rules pertaining to birth registration.”14  He 
explained that no other document could replace an official birth certificate because no state would 
recognize it as a legal document.  If the parents continued to refuse to register the birth of a child with 
the German authorities, Simon stated that the Camp Director should make a declaration to the 
German Registrar in the interests of the child.  “As the legislative measures pertaining to birth 
registration contained in all National laws – the German included – are designed in the interests and 
for the protection of the child,” Simon explained, “the disposition of the German law ought to be 
complied with when children, whether Jewish or non-Jewish, are born in UNRRA-directed Displaced 
Persons’ Camps.”15  While Simon’s ruling made perfectly clear the legal necessity of registering 
births with the German registrar, he had failed to recognize the very real concern of the Jewish 
parents, namely the fear that the Germans would use this information for their own nefarious 
purposes.  Only over time were the UNRRA welfare workers able to convince the Jewish DPs of the 
necessity of proper documentation for babies born in the DP camps.  In the end, they told the parents 
that if they refused to register their children, the camp director had the authority to undertake the 
registration, and that regardless the births would be recorded with the German authorities.16   
 The DPs were also forced into contact with the German Registrar if they wished to get 
married.  Whether from Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, or elsewhere in Europe, the DPs 
brought their prewar understanding of wedded union with them.  Of these, the most complicated 
system was found in interwar Poland, which had no less than five separate civil law codes.  These 
distinct codes were the product of Poland’s pre-WWI partition between the Russian, Prussian and 
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Austro-Hungarian empires. Each empire had followed a separate legal tradition which proved 
difficult to meld in the interwar period.  The issue that was the most problematic was divorce.  As a 
devoutly Catholic country, divorce in Poland was not authorized; but in certain districts, including the 
town of Wilno, divorce was granted provided that the couple renounced their Catholic faith.  In 
response to the interwar government’s attempt to standardize the issue of divorce across the country, 
both the Catholic Church and its critics challenged the civil law proposed by the Codification 
Commission.  The result was that no unified law was promulgated.  As a result, marriage in interwar 
Poland was defined according to the five pre-WWI law codes.17   
Those DPs coming from territories under the control of the Soviet Union, in contrast, 
understood marriage not as a religious celebration, but as a civil ceremony performed by a 
government official.  Following the Russian Revolution, all territories that fell under Soviet control 
had done away with the religious celebration of marriage in favour of civil marriages.  As Becky L. 
Glass and Margaret K. Stolee explain, Soviet law instituted changes that “attempted to create the legal 
foundations for a transformed society.”18  In 1919, civil marriage became the only recognized form of 
legal marriage, and, as a result, annulment of a marriage was considerably simplified.  Whereas in 
western Europe, civil marriage had been the norm since the French Revolution, this was the first time 
that civil marriage was implemented in eastern Europe.19  However, while civil marriage in western 
Europe was almost always accompanied by a religious ceremony, the Soviet authorities tried to 
eliminate the role of religion in Soviet society and the religious celebration of marriage along with it.  
Therefore the DPs brought with them very different understandings of how to celebrate weddings 
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depending on their home country’s customs.  When they wished to wed in Germany, the legal 
regulations and customs of their home country shaped the DPs’ understanding of how to go about 
marrying in Germany.    
This was problematic because, according to international law, a marriage was required to 
meet the laws of the country where the marriage was taking place in order to be considered valid in 
other jurisdictions.  Therefore, any marriage that was legalized in Germany required that the couple 
meet the conditions set out by German law.    Marriage in Germany had been governed by the 
Marriage Law for Greater Germany, dated 6 July 1938, but in the immediate postwar period this law 
was modified slightly to eliminate its racist prohibitions.  As Andrew Szanajda explains, “Control 
Council and U.S. military government expressly forbade the application of National Socialist 
principles in the administration of justice from the beginning of the occupation.”20  The Nazi marriage 
law was officially replaced on 20 February 1946 with Control Council Law No. 16, “Marriage Law.” 
As Magdalene Schoch explained, the new law only made minor changes to the wartime process for 
legalizing marriages.21  The new law, like the old, stated that the religious celebration of marriage was 
not recognized in Germany; only marriage ceremonies conducted by the Marriage Registrar were 
considered legal.  Furthermore, the marriage of all foreigners in Germany required two preliminary 
steps.  First, each couple had to publish banns.  This was a long-held tradition throughout much of 
Europe that involved making a public announcement, often in the form of a published newspaper 
announcement, of an upcoming marriage.  It was an opportunity for people to present any information 
that might challenge the proposed marriage, such as a previous marriage, lack of consent on the part 
of one of the parties or their family, or a close blood tie between the betrothed couple.  In a February 
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1946 letter, Manfred Simon further clarified the conditions for publishing banns, explaining that 
“[a]rrangements for publishing of bans [sic] of marriage can be made by a close relative of the person 
concerned.  The bans have to be published for three weeks running before the marriage takes place.  
The marriage has to take place inside three months after the last publication of the bans.”22 
The second step that each couple had to complete before a marriage between foreigners could 
be legalized in Germany was to acquire a Certificate of Nubility, sometimes also called a Certificate 
of Eligibility or a Marriage Ability Certificate.  This Certificate was to be provided by the domestic 
authorities of each person’s home country and it had to state that there were no legal impediments to 
the marriage.23  The certificate was to include each applicant’s name, birth date, religion, their last 
place of domicile before entering Germany, as well as all of the details concerning their parents.24  
The couple was also required to submit certain documents, such as birth certificates.  The couple 
submitted these to either their Liaison Officer or an UNRRA Administration Official, who then 
passed on the relevant information to the local Marriage Registrar.25   
In the autumn of 1945, UNRRA workers on the ground began writing to UNRRA 
headquarters for clarification about the legal status of certain marriages, questions which were 
forwarded to the Legal Adviser.  One such letter, sent by Joseph G. Nicoletti, an American Supply 
Officer with UNRRA Team 52, neatly encapsulated many of the issues.  In his August 1946 letter, 
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Nicoletti explained that he wanted to marry a Latvian woman, Eizenija Cikutis, and adopt her son.  
However, Eizenija had been previously married in Latvia.  Her husband had been forced to join the 
army and she had subsequently lost contact with him.  In October 1944 she was forced to leave Latvia 
for Germany and, at the time of Nicoletti’s letter, Eizenija had not heard from her husband in more 
than two years.  After the war she had approached the Tracing Bureau, placed ads in Latvian 
newspapers, and even asked for help from a Russian Liaison Officer, but was unable to find any 
information about her husband.  Nicoletti explained that he very much wanted to marry Eizenija, but 
he did not know how to contract the marriage.26     
The response from the Assistant Legal Adviser, Marie-Louise Barblé, was not a propitious 
one.  Barblé explained that, because Eizenija could not prove that her husband was deceased, she 
could not likewise show that her marriage had been legally dissolved.  As a consequence, she could 
not legally remarry.  Barblé pointed out that there was some differentiation between states on this 
matter: some governments would allow a Declaration of Death to be issued after ten years had lapsed 
without contact or evidence of the individual being alive; but other governments asserted that the 
marriage would never be considered dissolved, regardless of how long the spouse had been absent 
unless the spouse was proven dead.  Barblé conceded that it would take her more time to ascertain 
which category Latvia fell into, but that either way there was no way for Eizenija to marry in the 
foreseeable future without proof of her husband’s death.27  The outcome of Nicoletti’s efforts to 
marry Eizenija is not known.  However, the likelihood was great that they were not able to legalize 
their union.  Unless they could secure proof of the death of Eizenija’s husband, they would not meet 
the legal criteria for the Certificate of Nubility.   
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The problem of collecting the necessary documents was one experienced by DPs of all 
nationalities in the early postwar months.  Given the destruction of the war and the large-scale 
movements of people, it is not surprising to find that many were no longer in possession of their 
documents.  In many cases they were taken from them by government authorities to ensure that they 
would not be able to move without government permission.  For others, the documents simply got 
lost in their travels or destroyed by the ravages of war.   
In the spring of 1946, mail service was finally restored throughout much of Europe.  This 
brought hope to those many DP couples wishing to marry who knew who to contact for copies of 
their documents.  However, even for them there were many difficulties associated with procuring 
them by mail.  With the collapse of regional and national governments across Europe, it was unclear 
which bodies (if any existed) had the authority and the means to certify and post personal legal 
documents.  There was also the real possibility that those authorities would refuse to do so.  UNRRA 
officers were confronted with many such cases.  In one instance, Hans Meyerhof, a German man 
residing in Italy, asked UNRRA to forward a letter to the mayor of Hildesheim, Germany.  In the 
letter, the man demanded that the mayor reissue birth certificates for himself, his wife and his son.  
He explained that the documents had been “lost during the persecutions I have suffered 
(concentration camps, prisons, etc)” and that he hoped “that the little refaction [sic] for all I have 
suffered by culpability of the Germans, viz the sending of the asked three documents, will be settled 
without resistance from your side.”28  Meyerhof complained that his previous requests for new copies 
of the birth certificates had been ignored, and that if he did not hear from the mayor concerning this 
latest request, he would be forced to bring the issue to the attention of the United Nations, hoping that 
invoking UNRRA would be a sufficient threat to elicit a response.   
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In addition, according to the laws of their country of origin, nationals from Poland, Hungary 
and Yugoslavia required a pre-marriage medical examination certificate.29  UNRRA wrote to the 
President of Germany’s Supreme Court of Justice requesting blank pre-marriage medical examination 
certificate forms in the spring of 1946.   In response, the Director of the Supreme Court explained that 
he did not have any forms for the pre-marriage examination of a foreigner because this was not a 
German law, but rather a requirement of certain foreign governments.  The Germans were only 
following these rules to ensure that any marriage documentation generated would be deemed 
acceptable in a DP’s home country, and this meant that it needed to be performed by doctors in their 
home country.  For a time the German government waived the need for this certificate.  “Under 
present conditions,” The President of the German Supreme Court asserted, “it is doubted that the 
request reaches its destination or is fulfilled.  Therefore, if it can be proved that it is impossible to get 
such a certificate the President of the Supreme Court of Justice will certify that it is not necessary to 
submit such a premarriage medical examination certificate.”30  He explained that proof of the 
impossibility of procuring such a certificate could be shown if a “trustworthy person” witnessed the 
posting of the request for the certificate, and if afterwards the certificate had not arrived in a 
reasonable amount of time, which he estimated to be approximately six weeks, or if the request was 
altogether refused.  However, each foreigner had to at least attempt to procure the necessary 
documents.  Initially, some foreigners were able to marry in this way.  
In acknowledgement of the difficulties associated with procuring the necessary documents, 
the German Registrar allowed some of the formalities for registering marriages to be waived.  For 
instance, foreigners who were unable to collect some of the required documents could take an oath in 
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front of the Officer of Civil Status, verbally providing all relevant information and explaining why 
they could not procure the necessary documents, as well as declaring that there was no reason that 
their marriage should be prohibited.31  However, this process of taking an oath in lieu of official 
documentation came to an end in the spring of 1946.  In April of that year, the German government 
issued a proclamation clarifying their laws with regards to the marriage of foreigners.  The 
proclamation stated that because the European mail system was once again operating, “it is possible 
to mail to foreign countries concerning personal affairs and remarks.  Therefore it is also possible to 
request marriage ability certificates from the homestate of foreign betrothed couples.”32  The 
proclamation instructed all registrars that the ‘marriage ability’ certificates could no longer be 
replaced by other documents, and that they would in the future be required for all marriages involving 
foreigners.  “To avoid troubles and costs for the applicants,” the Minister President warned, “it is 
requested to inform these people in the camps already, that the situation has changed and to induce 
them to request marriage ability certificates.”33   
For those couples unable to procure the necessary documents by mail, the only alternative 
was to turn to the black market.  The trade in stolen or forged documents in the black market has not 
been well researched, largely because of the paucity of documentary evidence.  However, there is 
much written about the existence of forged documents during the war, and every reason to believe 
that such a trade continued in the postwar period.  Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt explain 
that, during the war, “[m]any Poles needed false papers—the resistance, the underground army, Jews.  
Document production flourished.  Some were skilfully done, others were crude.  And some cost a lot 
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of money, while others were given free of charge.”34  This trade in documents continued into the 
postwar period, and was certainly one way in which a DP could acquire the necessary documents for 
a whole host of purposes, including legalizing a wedded union.  The only drawback was that this 
method could be costly.   
When all else failed, DPs could also turn to military officials for help.  There are numerous 
accounts of military personnel forging official documents.  For example, in his account of the way in 
which Jewish DPs joined the Bricha, or the illegal movement of Jews to Palestine before the creation 
of the state of Israel, Alex Grobman explained that “[t]he first phase of the operation required typing 
about five hundred copies of a letter authorizing the bearer, a United Nations displaced person, to 
enter the American zone to search for missing relatives.  The document was signed by a nonexistent 
colonel and had a big red advertising stamp on it.”35  Grobman also recounted a situation in which 
false papers prepared by Jewish chaplain Hebert Eskin were combined with “Eisenhower jackets and 
army watches” to bribe border guards into letting him bring Jewish DPs across the border into Italy.36  
Although there is little known about exactly how these documents were created and by whom, it is 
clear that American soldiers were certainly capable of providing false documents when they deemed 
it necessary.  
Apart from the problem of procuring the necessary documentation, the other serious obstacle 
facing many DPs in their attempts to legalize their marriages was the national Liaison Officers.  As 
was the case with registering births, the German authorities had to be sure that a marriage would be 
legally recognized in the home countries of the DPs involved before they could allow it.  As one 
German lawyer explained, “German judges were obligated under German international private law to 
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check the capacity to marry according to the home laws of the applicants before authorizing the 
marriage.”37  The Liaison Officer was one of the only individuals able to communicate with 
authorities in the home country, and by default he also became the official arbiter of the legality of all 
marriages in his state.  According to SHAEF, the official role of the Liaison Officer was simply to 
“issue repatriation visas” and “assist in the care and repatriation of their displaced nationals.”38  The 
Liaison Officers were generally expected to convince as many of their nationals as possible to return 
to their country of origin: they required people to help in the reconstruction after so many years of 
struggle and destruction.  However, these duties effectively granted them wide-ranging powers, and, 
as a result, they also had the power to comment on applications for marriage.  Their position on any 
particular marriages was often shaped by the impact the marriage might have on the repatriability of 
“their” national.  In cases where the DPs were both from the same country of origin, there was less 
chance of denial, as the marriage would not necessarily impede the possibility of repatriation.  
However, in cases where two DPs of differing nationalities hoped to wed, creating an ‘inter-national’ 
couple, chances of being denied were much higher because it was assumed that at least one of the 
DPs would not be returning to their country of origin.  The Liaison Officers from their home 
countries, with the dual responsibilities of approving marriages and encouraging repatriation, were 
much less likely to agree to marriages when there was a chance that their nationals would not be 
returning home. 
For still other DPs, there was no Liaison Officer at all to whom they could turn for help in 
these matters.  Those DPs deemed stateless had no national representatives in Germany, neither did 
nationals from the Baltic republics.  This was because the American and British governments refused 
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to recognize Soviet control of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Therefore, although the Soviet LOs 
claimed jurisdiction over the Baltic DPs, they were only permitted to work with those DPs who self-
identified as Soviet citizens.  However, the British and American governments also refused to 
recognize the Baltic republics as independent states. Consequently they would not allow any other 
Baltic representatives to assume responsibility for the Baltic DPs either.  This left the Baltic DPs in 
the western zones without access to any Liaison Officer, which meant that their ability to wed in 
Germany was significantly hindered.  As Simon explained, “[i]n cases in which the nationality status 
of a person cannot be ascertained or in which the provisions of the law of his home state are not 
known, the parties to an intended marriage may be faced with a serious difficulty.”39  In place of the 
Liaison Officers, UNRRA officials accepted their documents and forwarded requests for marriage to 
the German Registrar.  Following complaints from UNRRA and pressure from the occupation 
authorities over the problems encountered by both Baltic and stateless DPs, the German Registrars 
again began to perform marriages based on sworn oaths, and not documentation.40  However, the 
Germans remained hesitant to legalize a marriage that had not followed the letter of the law, including 
the submission of a Certificate of Nubility, as there was evidence that some bigamous marriages had 
been inadvertently legalized in this way.41  
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The Jewish DPs presented a unique case in postwar Germany for several reasons.  First, the 
Jewish DPs had access to a special group of advocates in the form of the American army’s Jewish 
chaplains.  A total of 311 Jewish chaplains served in the American armed forces, and ninety of these 
chaplains were in direct contact with displaced persons in Europe.  The chaplains had been recruited 
by the Committee on Army Navy Religious Activities, a special commission organized by the 
National Jewish Welfare Board, a group comprised of representatives from the three major Jewish 
affiliations (Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Judaism).  All of the chaplains were graduates of 
recognized theological seminaries and practicing rabbis.  They had attended a Chaplain’s School, 
organized by the War Department, although this training focused solely on the duties of the chaplains 
with regards to military personnel, so that “nothing was mentioned at these meetings about the 
Holocaust and the displaced persons.”42   
In his study of this small but influential group of men, Alex Grobman explained that the 
rabbis were thus ill-prepared for the conditions they witnessed in the early postwar months, but that 
most were willing to do anything possible to relieve the suffering of those Jews they encountered.  
The chaplains used the resources available to them, and at times resources that were not theirs to give, 
to help the Jewish DPs they encountered.  They worked to alleviate the hunger that they encountered 
by ransacking German stores, appropriating supplies from German farmers, and even sharing their 
own provisions.  They also focused on raising the DPs’ morale: they compiled lists of survivors, and 
they used the military postal system to send mail to DPs’ relatives in the United States.  Grobman 
detailed the experiences of Chaplain Mayer Abramowitz: 
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At least once a week, Abramowitz traveled from Kassel to Fulda visiting the cities and towns 
in the area.  During this fifteen hundred mile journey, he found many displaced persons.  In 
Bad Hamburg, he discovered sixty to seventy young girls and gave them nylon stockings, 
lipstick, and cosmetics.  These items, he learned, had more healing power than bread and 
butter…  Of all of the places he visited, he enjoyed Kibbutz Buchenwald the most.  He 
officiated at their weddings; and when leaders of the kibbutz asked for fake orders 
authorizing them to travel to France, he readily complied.  Abramowitz saw it as his personal 
responsibility to make the lives of the displaced persons better and to help them get to 
Palestine.43   
This was a mission that many, though not all of the chaplains, assumed.  Their position was 
complicated by the fact that they were members of the American armed forces and as such charged 
with providing religious ministration to soldiers.  DPs did not fall within their jurisdiction, and 
therefore their efforts to help the Jewish survivors were sometimes overlooked by their superiors, and 
often condemned.   
 Secondly, as was the case with registering Jewish births, Jewish DP marriages were 
complicated because they also refused to register their marriages with the German Registrar.  For 
many Jewish DPs, the crucial point was having their marriages officiated by a rabbi.  As Margarete 
Myers Feinstein explained, “[e]ven secular Jews wanted a religious wedding ceremony as a means of 
forming links with the past and to ensure family continuity.”44  Even those Jews who did not plan on 
following a strictly observant lifestyle felt that a Jewish wedding which embraced the orthodox 
traditions was necessary.  In the first instance, an orthodox wedding ceremony required the 
construction (or, in some cases, reconstruction) of the mikvot, or ritual baths, used by married Jewish 
women to purify themselves before marital relations.  In some cases women made do by immersing 
themselves in rivers, a practice that some rabbis considered sufficient, but soon there were calls for 
the rebuilding of the baths, both as a practical measure to fulfill Jewish law, and also as a means of 
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reasserting Jewish survival.45  Orthodox Jewish marriage also required the wife to cover her hair after 
she was married.  At first women used kerchiefs or hats to cover their hair, but, as Judith Tydor 
Baumel explained, after the initial months “the increase in the number of orthodox DPs – with the 
influx of repatriated from the USSR – and the reawakening of aesthetic sensibilities, demanded a 
different solution.”46  Baumel reported how one rabbi “combined Italian import, German 
manufacture, and orthodox DP know-how” to produce wigs for orthodox DPs, thus reinstituting a 
religious practice that had fallen to the wayside during the war years.47  The Jewish chaplains 
supported the DPs in all of these efforts.  “Determined Orthodox DPs were successful in enlisting the 
aid of Jewish chaplains and relief workers in obtaining the property and materials necessary for the 
construction of ritual baths,” and at Landsberg they even helped facilitate the order that local 
Germans build the bath for the Jews residing there, a moment which Feinstein described as one 
imbued with “satisfaction” and “the sense of retribution.”48 
In their efforts to help the Jewish DPs in any way possible, many chaplains presided over 
religious wedding ceremonies in the DP camps, as had Chaplain Abramowitz.  There are numerous 
accounts of these weddings.  What they shared in common was a mixture of hope for the future with 
remembrance for the past.  As Michael Brenner makes clear, “even weddings could not obscure the 
tragic situation of those who had just been saved.  The ceremony under the traditional wedding 
canopy usually began with the memorial prayer for the murdered parents of the couple.  Only in rare 
cases were surviving family members present at the wedding.”49  The formal proof of a Jewish 
wedding rested in the ketubah, or marriage contract, which was signed by the couple, two witnesses, 
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and the presiding rabbi.  According to Jewish law, this contract was considered a legally binding 
document.  In this way, the Jewish army chaplains allowed the Jewish DPs to circumvent the rules 
that required all other foreigners in Germany to register their marriages with the German Registrar.     
However, as Control Council Law No. 16 made clear, religious marriages were not 
recognized by the state in Germany.  As such, Jewish DPs married by rabbis were not granted 
certificates of civil marriage.  In order to qualify for the certificate issued by the German Registrar, 
they needed to comply with the rules outlined in the Marriage Law, something that many Jewish DPs 
would not do.  This distinction between religious and civil weddings played a particularly important 
role when it came time for the couple to leave Germany. 
For those Jewish DPs planning on moving to Palestine, there was no question of the validity 
of these marriages.  So long as they were presided over by a rabbi and included the necessary 
marriage contract, they were considered valid in Palestine.  Under the terms of the British mandate in 
Palestine, all “matters of personal status in the courts of the Moslem, Christian and Jewish 
communities, which was vested by the former regime in accordance with the principle of laissez-
juger, has been fully maintained.”50  Allowing each religious group to decide matters such as this for 
themselves was a holdover from the pre-Mandate Ottoman administration, and one that the British 
were loath to replace if just for lack of a better alternative.  In Palestine, the Jewish community was 
led by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the organization “recognized as a public body for the purpose 
of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other 
matters.”51  Although the Jewish population in Palestine comprised both traditional Jewish 
communities, which strictly observed Jewish laws and customs, and agricultural communities, known 
as kibbutzim, which were generally secular bodies, the Jewish Agency’s policies reflected orthodox 
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Jewish practices, including the religious celebration of all marriages.  For any DP hoping to 
immigrate to Palestine, it was clear that the religious celebration of marriage, and in particular the 
signed ketubah, would be necessary and sufficient proof.  Even after the formation of the state of 
Israel, legal marriage certificates remained unnecessary for those Jews wishing to immigrate to Israel.  
The only form of marriage recognized in Israel for Jews continued to be religious marriage, or a 
marriage conducted by a member of the rabbinate.52  There was, and continues to be, no institution of 
civil marriage in Israel.  For this reason, marriage certificates issued by state authorities were not 
considered necessary for those people who knew definitively that they planned to settle there, neatly 
resolving the dilemma for some.   
However, for those Jewish DPs who chose not to immigrate to Israel, but instead to either 
return home or emigrate to countries such as Canada, the United States, or Australia, a legal marriage 
certificate from the German Registrar was necessary.  For this reason, many Jewish couples 
ultimately did register their marriages in Germany.  “Sleepy Bavarian registry offices,” Atina 
Grossman explains, “were staggered by the stream of Jewish DPs—as many as fifteen daily—who 
suddenly appeared, offering their rations of American cigarettes in exchange for official certificates 
registering marriages and births.”53  Still, not all Jewish DPs officially registered their marriages, and 
in some cases, they had to legalize their marriages years after the religious ceremonies had taken 
place in order to acquire the official marriage certificates.  In his study of postwar Germany, Walter 
O. Weyrauch, a law student and court clerk during the American occupation of Germany, explained 
the legal consequences of this.  Weyrauch described the situation faced by a Jewish couple who were 
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married in the Warsaw ghetto and had been issued a ketubah from the rabbi, but no marriage license 
from the Polish authorities.  After the war, when the couple returned from Germany to Poland, they 
applied for passports, only to find that the Polish state would not recognize the legality of their 
original marriage.  “The [Polish] state authorities,” Weyrauch explained, “were incapable or 
unwilling to recognize that the Jewish community under Nazi domination acted validly under its 
internal norms.”54  The couple were required to officially register their marriage in Poland, after 
which time they were issued Polish passports.  This was certainly not the only case in which a 
government refused to accept the religious certificate as proof of marriage, and a couple forced to 
remarry, but this time in a civil ceremony recognized by the state.   
One of the most difficult problems associated with the marriage of DPs in Germany 
concerned the legal citizenship of married women.  Across Europe, women who married men from a 
different country traditionally took their husband’s nationality and at the same time forfeited their 
original nationality, although there had always been exceptions to this rule.  With the swell of inter-
national marriages both during and after the war, the problem of ascertaining a woman’s nationality 
could become quite complicated.  In November 1946 Third Army Headquarters attempted to address 
this issue.  They collated the effects of marriage on women’s nationality and compiled it in a report 
entitled Inter-national Marriages and their effects on national status.  This report confirmed the fact 
that, in almost all instances, women took on the nationality of their husband when they married.  In 
certain cases women could apply to keep their previous nationality, as was the case with Belgian 
women who married German men.  The report explained that “[i]f a Belgian female marries a 
German, her national status is German, though she might keep her Belgian citizenship by filing 
application inside of six months after the wedding, in which case she will be given a certificate 
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proving Belgian citizenship if such is issued by her Government.”55  In the case of Czechoslovakia, a 
German female marrying a Czechoslovak male would acquire his citizenship, except in cases where 
the marriage was not approved by the Czech authorities, in which case “they consider the marriage 
null and void.”56  Similarly in Denmark, a marriage required official sanction from the Danish 
authorities.  “If a Danish female marries a German or a male of other nationality, she loses her Danish 
nationality, and her children will not be considered Danish nationals.”57  The Dutch case allowed a 
woman in some cases to hold dual citizenship, so that if she married a German male, she was 
considered both Dutch and German.  In the Yugoslav case, a Yugoslav female marrying a German 
retained her Yugoslav citizenship, but if she married a man of any other nationality, she took her 
husband’s nationality.   
The differences in each country’s laws caused a great deal of confusion about the nationality 
of women after they married.  In one revealing instance, UNRRA Legal Adviser Paul Winter was 
asked by UNRRA headquarters to clarify the legal position of a Czechoslovak woman who had 
married an Italian man.  The woman, one Cecily Eve Northoff, born in Prague on 22 November 1920, 
had married Ernesto Remani from Merano, Italy, on 22 January 1942.  Where this happened is 
unknown.  In October 1942 the couple dissolved their marriage.  Ernesto had never registered his 
marriage in Italy.  UNRRA workers in the field wanted Paul Winter to comment on Cecily’s 
citizenship in 1947.  Winter explained that Cecily would have given up her Czechoslovak citizenship 
when the she married Ernesto.  Given that Ernesto’s government did not recognize divorce, being a 
Catholic nation, the divorce would not have been considered legal.  The Italian government only 
permitted annulments, which was a legal presumption that the marriage had never taken place.  It was 
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complicated; Cecily had legally given up her Czechoslovak citizenship when she married Ernesto, but 
the annulment of her marriage also voided her Italian citizenship.  By 1947, Cecily had in fact been 
rendered stateless.  The problems encountered by Cecily and Ernesto only scratch the surface of the 
multitude of difficulties associated with marriage in the wartime and postwar period.  The war had 
moved millions of people beyond the borders of their homelands.  It had also created opportunities for 
large numbers of ‘inter-national marriages,’ or unions between people of differing nationalities.  
These marriages proved problematic in the postwar period, as the military looked to classify people 
according to their citizenship, and countries wanted “their” nationals back. 
Given the difficulties, why was it so important for couples to marry?  The DPs themselves 
had several reasons for wanting to do so.  For some, marriage was a means of reasserting control over 
their lives.  After the initial months in the DP camps, the residents remained powerless in many 
aspects, but the one thing that they believed they could control was their marital status.  For others, it 
was a chance at a normality that they had not experienced during the war years.  Weddings were a 
powerful reminder of everyday life before the war, as well as a pledge to the future, and “DPs 
themselves often looked to marriage, the family, and childrearing as the means to reconstruct their 
lives.”58  For others, marriage had more practical implications; for some it vastly improved their 
chances of being accepted as an immigrant to their country of choice, as an example. 
In all of this, it is clear that UNRRA workers played an important part.  Although not an 
officially stated goal, UNRRA strongly encouraged DP couples, and especially those with children, to 
marry legally.  They saw marriage as a key step in taking responsibility for one’s actions, and 
personal responsibility was a core tenet of American professional social work, and one in which many 
UNRRA workers strongly believed.  As Tara Zahra explains, “workers anointed themselves agents of 
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psychological reconstruction,” and the first step in this process was to foster a sense of responsibility 
in each displaced person.59  Their training taught them that the purpose of counselling and casework 
was to “help the individual to recognize and develop the resources within himself, to utilise all 
individual and community resources for the enrichment of individual and family life, and to afford 
protection and guidance needed by those unable to cope with conditions with which they are faced.”60 
UNRRA welfare workers worried about the effects of the social disintegration that had been 
actively encouraged by Nazi policies.  In particular, they were concerned about sexual promiscuity 
and illegitimate children.  They worried about both mothers and fathers abandoning their families.  
“While American social workers worried about deserting husbands,” the European social workers 
“were equally concerned about the morality of women and children left in Europe without male 
supervision.”61 They worried that unwed mothers would not want to raise their children and that 
hundreds, if not thousands, of children would see the end of the war without either parent.  In order to 
address these problems, UNRRA focused on responsibility as the core principle of rehabilitation and 
on marriage as one way of instilling a sense of responsibility for one’s actions as well as a means of 
limiting the number of abandoned children.     
For those couples that UNRRA welfare workers had convinced to legally wed, many faced 
the dilemma of wanting to marry but finding themselves unable to fulfill the necessary criteria for 
marrying legally in Germany.  For this reason, marriage proved to be an important and sensitive issue 
in the postwar period.  The DPs believed that the decision to get married was one over which they had 
control, or should have.  At the same time, UNRRA enthusiastically encouraged unwed couples, and 
particularly those with children, to legalize their unions, although at least initially completely unaware 
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of the numerous obstacles they would face.  When the couple came from two different home 
countries, the obstacles greatly compounded.  In attempting to legalize ‘inter-national’ unions, these 
couples were simply trying to move on with their lives and construct something new, but were 
stopped from doing so because postwar governments were intent on having their nationals repatriated.  
The LOs ensured that these marriages did not inhibit their goal of bringing all of their nationals home, 
even if this meant hindering the marriage of “their” nationals to foreigners.  
Alongside the rush to marry, there were also efforts on the part of the DPs to legally dissolve 
their unions.  UNRRA’s legal advisers recognized several reasons why a DP might want a divorce: 
“one spouse has either been deported by the Soviets, is missing as a result of Nazi persecution, has 
got separated by war events, has not succeeded in leaving the home country, or has stayed behind 
because of different political belief.”62  The person requesting a divorce might require legal 
dissolution in order to apply for resettlement (rather than repatriation) or in order to legalize a new 
union.  The surge in divorces was certainly not unique to DP camp residents; German couples in the 
immediate postwar years experienced elevated divorce rates as well.  As Frank Biess explains, 
wartime experiences and separation meant that “normative prescriptions of gender relations therefore 
stood in marked contrast to the social realities within postwar families in general,”63 and Atina 
Grossman adds that marriages often failed when couples were “unable to withstand the shock of 
reunion between veterans brutalized by war and imprisonment and women toughened by 
responsibilities on the home front.”64  For DPs as well as Germans, sometimes it was not possible to 
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go back.  These couples required the legal dissolution of their marriages, particularly if they had any 
hope of resettlement or remarriage.  
Much like marriage, they encountered numerous problems in legalizing their divorces.  
Divorces had to be sanctioned by a German court, but a “German court [was deemed] competent to 
dissolve a marriage only if the country of nationality of the husband will recognize the decision of the 
German court.”65  Polish DPs had a particularly difficult time legalizing their divorce because their 
government refused to recognize any divorce conducted in Germany.  “Judgements in divorce cases 
rendered by German courts,” stated the Chief Polish Liaison Officer, “where both parties to the 
divorce suit are Polish citizens, will, as a rule, not be recognized in Poland.  This has been clearly 
established by a ruling of the Polish Supreme court of 29 May 1937.”66  This ruling was not altered in 
the postwar years.  For those Polish DPs who were married outside of Poland and whose marriage 
had not been registered in Poland, it was possible to obtain a divorce if the couple could convince the 
court that “it is indifferent whether the divorce be recognized in Poland or not, since the marriage as 
such has never been valid and recognized in Poland.”67  The most difficult divorce cases were those in 
which one of the spouses was not present in Germany, as in the case of Eizenija.  As one observer 
explained, “[h]ere, in addition to the difficulties already reported in Polish, Hungarian and 
Yugoslavian divorce cases, the main difficulty is the proper safeguarding of the interests of the 
missing spouse, in ensuring that he or she be informed about the proceedings.”68  This was never an 
easy problem to overcome when the person could not be located, especially if they were presumed 
dead, but not proven so.  
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Another issue surrounding divorce was the question of which courts were competent to 
decide the issue.  One Relief Services Officer wrote to the Legal Adviser in June 1946 for a resolution 
to a case involving two Lithuanian DPs seeking a divorce.  The two individuals lived separately and 
wanted to legalize their divorce, but they did not know who had the authority to make the ruling.  As 
was the case with registering one’s marriage, it was the court in the country of residence that had the 
authority to rule on the legality of the divorce.  Neither had any intention of repatriating to Lithuania 
and they wanted the matter settled.  The UNRRA officer asserted that, “it can not be expected all 
foreigners will postpone their affairs for a long time without a decision.”69  Unfortunately the Legal 
Adviser did not have a satisfactory answer, as he replied, “there is no provision made for handling 
civil proceedings between such persons” and therefore “in the case contained in reference letter no 
divorce proceedings can be brought, and the matter between the Lithuanian and her husband will have 
to await the time that either some provision has been made by Military Government or they establish 
a permanent residence here in Germany or elsewhere in some other country.”70  The only option for 
them within Germany was to give up their DP status, at which point the German courts could then 
hear their case.  Not surprisingly, this was not an option they were willing to consider.   
Alongside questions of marriage and divorce, another aspect of civil law that UNRRA faced 
was illegitimacy.  As early as September 1945, UNRRA attempted to coordinate efforts to deal with 
the problem.  In a report on the subject, one UNRRA officer noted that his office “had received 
numerous reports from Centers indicating serious problems concerning illegitimate children.”71  He 
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explained that “children have been abandoned by mothers” and “UNRRA officers have been 
requested to accept care responsibilities [sic] for the children.”72  In The Wild Place, Kathryn Hulme’s 
account of her experiences as an UNRRA welfare worker, the author described an incident in which a 
pregnant girl sought out a soldier who had already returned to the United States.  She recounted, “The 
girl looked at me with unbelieving eyes as she told the Countess in Polish that Joe was her fiancé, 
they were to be married this month, he would never have run away from her like that, without a word, 
without a farewell…There was a mistake somewhere.”73  She also described a particularly gruesome 
instance in which she came across a baby that had been killed.  “I thought of a baby that had been 
spilled out of an ashcan the week before, a perfectly formed full-term male child with a faint lavender 
thumbprint on the front of his neck.”74  She attributed these deaths to mothers whose boyfriends had 
abandoned them and who no longer wanted to raise the children.   
The problem of illegitimate children was two-fold: some of the fathers of illegitimate children 
were DPs or local Germans, while others were soldiers from the occupation army.  For those women 
whose GI boyfriends refused to recognize paternity, they had little recourse to action.  In a March 
1946 letter to Commanding Generals and Members of Military Government, the Adjutant General 
outlined the policy with regards to children fathered by troops serving in Germany.  He explained 
that, “since only US law can determine who is an American citizen, and since such American citizens 
are assimilated to the status of United Nations Nationals for the purpose of treatment as displaced 
persons, such minor children having dual nationality should receive United Nations displaced persons 
treatment and care.”75  In cases in which the father willingly admitted to paternity, soldiers could ask 
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their commanding officer for assistance in providing financial assistance to the mother.  However, in 
cases where the mother made a complaint against a soldier, the soldier was under no obligation to 
respond.  In a follow-up memo, the Adjutant General asserted that “[n]o member of the military 
service will be returned to a foreign jurisdiction against his will to answer a complaint in paternity or 
support cases” and, once the soldier had been relieved of active duty, “the writer will be informed of 
the separation and that the War Department no longer has jurisdiction in the premises.”76  In other 
words, American soldiers had no responsibilities for children they fathered while on service in 
Germany.    
The problem was also complicated for women with illegitimate children by DP fathers.  In a 
December 1945 letter to UNRRA Headquarters, the Director of UNRRA Team 168 asked for 
guidance on the problem of illegitimacy in his DP camp.  He explained that he had discovered several 
such cases in his camp.  He asked, “what action can we take, either in establishing paternity, or what 
action can be taken against the putative father in the support of the child born of the illicit 
relationship.”77  In response, the Zone Director admitted that he had purposely avoided the question 
of illegitimate children in the DP camps, hoping that the DPs would be repatriated and that UNRRA 
would not have to deal with this problem.78  The Zone Child Welfare Specialist suggested that, in 
cases where the father admitted to paternity, the mother could ask the father to fill out a form, 
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admitting to the paternity of the child, and this form could then form the basis of an application for 
support in the home country.  In cases where the father refused to admit to paternity, the mother was 
advised to approach her Liaison Officer as the case could not be taken up in the German court.  “You 
are right in your implication that the laws of the countries from which the parents come probably have 
a bearing on the matter,” she explained, and therefore “we suggest the participation of the liaison 
officer in handling such matters.”79   
In cases of illegitimacy, UNRRA believed that it was always best for the child to remain with 
the mother, even if the mother did not initially want to accept responsibility.  “There may be many 
[mothers] who are anxious and uncertain about returning home,” one welfare report noted, “and, in 
the case of those who are unmarried, some may wish to be relieved of the responsibility of their baby.  
Under no circumstances, however, should a child be separated from his mother except where it is 
clearly in his interest.”80  In other words, UNRRA encouraged its welfare workers to convince unwed 
mothers to keep their children.  They believed that the best possible outcome in situations of 
illegitimacy was for the parents to marry.  The Zone Child Welfare Specialist reinforced the 
importance of counselling as a means of encouraging this.  She asserted that “[s]ound social advice to 
the mother and assistance in considering various plans for the child, as well as the relationship with 
the father, are perhaps the most important services which can be given in any of these cases.”81   
However, even when they were convinced, often times these couples ran into problems 
legitimizing the children.  When parents approached the German authorities, the German Registrar 
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was reluctant to recognize the father legally.  “There have been certain complications in the past in 
regard to the legitimation [sic] of children born out of wedlock in this Zone – of whom there is a 
considerable number – by the subsequent marriage of the parents,” one official noted.82  In one such 
instance, a DP child, Olga Heidemko, was registered with a DP card using her mother’s last name 
when she was born because her parents were not married.  In 1946, her mother, Maria, legally wed 
her father, Wasyl Hajdamaka.  When the girl became ill, the father registered her in the hospital under 
his last name, “thinking that it was legal, because he has married the mother.”83  Unfortunately this 
was not the case, and the “persons in charge of the Registration has done an error evidently in 
changing the name without legal documents.” 84  The marriage had not automatically legitimized the 
child.   
As a whole, the civil law cases involving DPs point to the central importance of the law of 
their country of origin and to the power of the Liaison Officers.  As the only people with access to 
communication with the home country, they became not only conduits, but also interpreters of 
national law.  They had the power to acknowledge the legality of birth registrations, marriages, and 
divorces based on their understanding of the law.  They also had the power to reject them if they did 
not meet what they considered the proper criteria.  This proved the most challenging problem for DPs 
who wished to marry.  In particular, marriages between ‘inter-national’ couples were denied by 
Liaison Officers because it threatened the repatriation of all of their nationals.  For those DPs who did 
not have access to a Liaison Officer, either because they were from the Baltic Republics or because 
they were designated as stateless, these difficulties were no easier to overcome.  With no Liaison 
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Officer to turn to for help and no national law to interpret, they had only the UNRRA welfare 
workers.  However, the UNRRA officers were not trained in the law, and in many instances UNRRA 
workers had little understanding of the complex web of rules and guidelines governing these matters 
and could not help the DPs resolve their civil law issues.  This lack of knowledge did not, however, 
stop them from putting considerable pressure on many DP couples to legally wed.  Unfortunately, in 
many cases the DPs remained unable to settle these issues in Germany, and this left them in a legal 
limbo that prevented them from normalizing their lives.  
Even with these problems, it is clear that UNRRA was successful in its efforts to instill a 
respect for civil law.  Despite initial hesitation on the part of all DPs, and Jewish DPs in particular, 
there was by and large acceptance that births and marriages should be registered with the German 
Registrar, as dictated by law.   Even when they were not able to fulfill the requirements, DPs 
understood the importance of the official documentation the Registrar provided.  Whether they 
planned to return home or hoped to emigrate abroad, they collected the necessary documents and 
applied for birth certificates and marriage licenses in Germany in the manner proscribed by local 
authorities.  However, this respect for civil law did not halt the abandonment of children or force 
fathers to take responsibility for their illegitimate children.   Respect for civil law did not necessarily 
include acceptance of all of the social norms UNRRA promoted; they took heed of UNRRA’s 
suggestions only when they believed that it was in their best interest to do so.   For those DPs either 
returning home or looking to emigrate, it was clearly in their interest to apply for the necessary 
documentation so that their marriages would be deemed legitimate in the eyes of foreign 
governments.  This understanding, however, did not extend to the acceptance of all social norms 
proposed by UNRRA welfare workers, only those that were absolutely necessary.
 248 
Chapter 6 
‘Whole populations of criminals’: DPs, crime, and authority in the 
American Occupation Zone of Germany 
The 1st of November 1946 at 12,00 o clock a.m. the resident of Camp Winzer RYBIJ, Mania 
took water of a fire barrel near the wooden barrack No. 12.  As the water in these barrels is 
assigned as protection in case of fire, the fireman on duty LAJBYK, Mychailo drew her 
attention to this fact and asked her to pour the water back.  Mrs. Rybij did not want to do it, 
this resulted in a scolding between Lajbyk and Mrs. Rybij, wherein Lajbyk used some bad 
expressions in regard of her. 
The woman went to her husband, RYBIJ, Stefan and related to him the incident and when she 
finished, the couple hurried into the room of Lebjyk [sic] and Rybij threatened him with a 
knife because of the pretended offense of his wife.  It came again to a quarrel, wherein again 
both sides used disagreeable expressions. Rybij wanted already to go home, but his wife gave 
two hits the fireman into the face [sic], in the same moment Rybij came back and stabbed the 
fireman Lebjyk into the left shoulderblade, Labjyk then took an axe and wanted to beat Rybij 
with it, but other inhabitants of the room mixed in and it did not come to another scuffle.1 
 
 The case of stolen water from the barrel designated for fire prevention and the ensuing scuffle 
highlights one of the many breaches of law and order in the DP camps in Germany.  UNRRA 
believed that the DPs no longer understood the need for rules, even if they were there for their own 
protection, as the water barrel clearly was.  They believed that under normal, prewar conditions, the 
DPs would have accepted the necessity of the water being kept aside in the event of a fire; it was their 
wartime experiences that had caused them to forget these social norms.  “Many displaced persons,” 
write Susan Armstrong-Reid and David Murray, “had become masters of subterfuge to survive in 
concentration camps.”2  The rule of law meant little to a concentration camp inmate or forced 
labourer.  Therefore, a key part of the process of rehabilitation as UNRRA understood it was to 
reintroduce a respect for rules.  The DPs needed to be reminded that society required certain 
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guidelines in order to function properly.  As part of the larger process of normalizing life, the DPs 
needed to be re-taught the importance of law in society.  
In contrast to civil law, which proved to be a section of law that was most directly related to 
the DP-UNRRA relationship, criminal law affected and was affected by the relationship that the DPs 
had with three groups in postwar Germany: the Germans themselves, the Military Government, and 
UNRRA.  The evolution in DP experiences with criminal law was directly correlated to the changing 
relationship between Military Government and the Germans.  When hostilities ended, the American 
military was most interested in punishing the Germans and aiding the DPs.  In this period, the 
Americans were generally uninterested in legally pursuing any but the most violent of crimes 
committed by the DPs.  The military certainly knew about the roving bands of DPs who were stealing 
from the Germans and generally intimidating them.  However, little effort was made to prosecute the 
DPs for these crimes.  Many American soldiers saw these acts as acceptable given the wartime 
experiences of the DPs while under German control; it was retributive justice.  They allowed the DPs 
to act out because they felt pity for them, but this attitude only lasted the summer.  As one observer 
noted, “Military Government authorities took a tolerant attitude towards the desires of the displaced 
persons for a fling after their liberation, but when their actions took the form of exacting revenge 
from their former German masters, serious problems of public order were presented.”3   
By the fall of 1945 there was a marked change in the way that the American military reacted 
to these acts; they were no longer willing to let them continue, and instead they began to arrest and 
charge DPs.  This change in disposition stemmed from several factors.  First of all, the military finally 
had enough soldiers on the ground to deal with the large number of DPs.  Second, once fighting had 
ceased, soldiers could turn their attention to the challenges of managing the DPs and of reinstituting 
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law and order.  The American zone of occupation was considerably smaller than the area of advance 
that the American forces controlled at the close of hostilities, and therefore they were able to spread 
more men over less territory.  By 17 July the zones of occupation had been clarified and the soldiers 
shifted accordingly.  The American zone of occupation included the Lander of Bavaria and Hesse, as 
well as the northern portion of Baden-Wurttemberg.  From their position at the line of contact with 
Soviet forces, American troops had withdrawn from positions as far east as Leipzig.   
At the same time, throughout late 1945, and particularly through the course of 1946, there 
was a clear change in the way that the Americans viewed the Germans, and this change had a marked 
influence on the way that they treated the DPs as well.  The early postwar focus on punishing the 
Germans for their wartime actions meant that the American military had been completely unwilling to 
turn to the Germans for any help in policing the DP camps or arresting DP criminals.  Therefore, in 
the first postwar months, the military took on this task alone.  However, as focus turned from 
punishment of the German people to reconstruction of their country and economy, the military’s 
position on the Germans’ role in their own policing changed markedly.  As it became clear that the 
DPs would not be returning home as quickly as once hoped, it also became necessary to reconsider 
the question of policing the DPs.  While the military helped organize DP police for inside the camps, 
outside the camps they soon changed their minds and allowed the German police to pursue DP 
criminals.  This new American reliance on German police changed the nature of the DP-military-
German relationship.      
Key to this change, too, was the burgeoning black market.  The pressure on the military to 
deal with the problem of the black market coincided with discussions in the middle of 1946 to 
consolidate the DP camps and close them down.  UNRRA’s tenure was coming to an end and it 
hoped to close up operations by the end of 1946, although this goal in the end proved illusory.  
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Nevertheless, the planned shutdown set the tone for the second half of 1946.  Increasing pressure on 
black marketeers, especially those DPs who were involved, was just one of the means used to 
encourage DPs to repatriate.  The military believed that if the black market was shut down, these 
people would be more inclined to accept repatriation.  This move to encourage the DPs to repatriate 
was part of Military Government’s larger process of returning Germany to German administration; a 
process that was complicated by the continued presence of so many DPs in Germany.  Changes in 
criminal law affecting DPs can only be understood in light of these ongoing developments. 
Reports on DP crime come from primarily two sources: UNRRA reports and Military 
Government reports.  These reports show that there were three main phases in crime management and 
in policing during UNRRA’s administration of the DP camps in Germany.  The first period, lasting 
the summer of 1945, saw high DP crime rates in many areas, but an unwillingness on the part of the 
military to prosecute all but the most violent of crimes.  Although crimes ranging from petty theft to 
murder took place in this period, the majority of crimes were random acts, consisting largely of 
robbery, assault and destruction of property.   Most of these crimes were spur-of-the-moment events.  
The second period in DP crime management took place from the autumn of 1945 to the spring of 
1946, and was characterized by continued looting, but a general decline in crime due to increased 
prosecutions and a general crackdown on crime by the military.  With the reconstitution of the 
German police force, DPs could now be arrested by German police outside of the DP camps.  
Random acts of violence subsided as the culprits were now arrested and charged for these acts.   
The third period of DP crime management began in the spring of 1946 and lasted throughout 
UNRRA’s remaining tenure.  This third period was characterized by decreasing reports of random 
crime combined with increasing reports of premeditated crime, and in particular two types of crime: 
black market activity and rioting amongst DPs.  The DPs came to play an increasingly large role in 
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the black market.  With access to the goods in care packages provided by voluntary agencies, the DPs 
now possessed commodities that were in high demand throughout Germany, and this gave those DPs 
choosing to take part in the black market the means to do so.  Certainly not all DPs took advantage of 
this situation, but many did.  The summer and fall of 1946 was a period of a rising number of arrests 
for black market activity.  In an October 1946 incident report, Welfare Officer Marion van 
Binsbergen from UNRRA Team 621, located in Windsheim, related an incident involving the 
presence of a live ox, purchased on the black market, at her camp.  She explained that on Wednesday 
2 October, 1946, the German police requested permission to enter the DP camp.  She described the 
scene thus: “the cellardoor [sic] was locked and nobody could find the key.  We climbed in through a 
cellar window and found a live ox there.  The D.P. Police was summoned and opened the cellar door.  
Captain Wheeler led the ox up the cellar steps and into the Street.”  Upon further investigation, it 
became clear that an inhabitant of the DP camp, known as Kahn, had purchased the ox from a 
German man for 6000 marks.  The welfare officer argued that both the German and the DP would be 
charged for black market activities. 
Alongside black market activities, another crime that became increasingly prevalent in the 
summer and fall of 1946 was rioting by DPs.  Faced with the resurgence of the German economy, and 
feeling increasingly marginalized by the re-emergence of German society, the DPs often lashed out 
against any show of authority, especially on the part of the German police.  Both the German police 
and UNRRA officials turned to the military authorities to contain these increasingly volatile 
situations.  There were several major riots in the U.S. Zone of Germany in 1946.  In one instance, in 
July 1946 a riot broke out in Föhrenwald DP camp in Munich during a funeral march.  On 25 July, a 
Jewish Agency for Palestine (JAFP) representative alerted officials that she believed there was cause 
for alarm.  A resident of the camp, a young boy, had been killed by a German policeman who was 
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conducting searches of DPs accused of black market activities.  The boy had been standing nearby 
and when an argument ensued between the policeman and DPs, he was accidentally shot.  The JAPF 
representative worried about a possible clash between the military and the Jewish DP residents of the 
camp when the boy’s funeral was held.   
Her fears were well-founded.  While the DPs had obtained permission from the local Military 
Police unit for sixteen people to take part in a funeral procession outside of the camp, this information 
was not passed on to the 39th Infantry Division, who immediately halted the procession at the gates of 
the camp.  The JAFP official reported that “the soldiers used their bayonets in an attempt to force to 
people back.  Several people were stabbed.  All of them stabbed in the back while trying to push the 
people back, together with us and the Army.”4  She also noted that the confusion between the various 
groups, including the Military Police and the Infantry Division, would not have escalated except that 
the Camp Director was not present at the time, and therefore “[t]here was no one there equipped to 
deal with the situation in such manner as to avoid from the very beginning the clash and 
misunderstandings between the Army, the DP’s and UNRRA personnel.”5  Camp directors were often 
the only ones who could prevent these types of disagreements from escalating.  Their intimate 
knowledge of all parties allowed them to come up with unique, but workable solutions in many 
instances.  When the camp directors were away, these clashes had the propensity to spiral out of 
control. 
Similarly, the DP camp at Landsberg was described in a May 1946 monthly report as being 
the site of a roving band of ten to fifteen Jewish DPs who indiscriminately assaulted German 
civilians.  The Zone Director reported that the “assaults had increased to riot proportions and the 
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Public Safety Officer estimated that 5,000 to 6,000 Jewish Displaced Persons took part in assaulting 
German civilians when the affair was at its height.”6  Eighteen Germans were reported as requiring 
medical attention at the local hospital.  In the monthly Legal Aid Report, C. A. Mintzer reported a 
worsening of relations between the two groups, which was negatively impacting public order.  He 
suggested several reasons for this deterioration, including the fact that the DPs had remained in 
Germany long past the time it was originally expected by German and DP alike, and also that the DPs 
felt they were being pushed into an inferior social and legal position relative to the Germans.  He also 
mentioned that the DPs felt that the military no longer took care in investigating cases of 
mistreatment by the Germans.  “The result is a potential hysteria,” he explained, and also “an 
aggravated use of force when its necessity might be questioned on the part of the Military which 
frequently explodes into riot and disorder, for the most meagre causes.”7  In other words, there was an 
unnecessary escalation taking part on all sides whenever confrontation occurred.     
 Riots and black market activity came to define DP crime in the second half of UNRRA’s 
tenure, from the spring of 1946 to UNRRA’s closure in July 1947.  This third period of DP crime, 
which was characterized by less random crime but more organized crime, also coincided with two 
important phenomena that were taking place at the time.  The first was the arrival of the so-called 
‘infiltrees’ in the spring and summer of 1946, those European Jews who had spent the war behind 
Soviet lines, but who had escaped to the western zones of Germany, and in particular the American 
zone of occupation, following the defeat of the Wehrmacht.  These infiltrees badly overcrowded the 
DP camps and put pressure on already thin supply lines.  The second phenomenon was the arrival of 
                                                     
6
 Letter, J. H. Whiting, Zone Director, to Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of Operations in Germany, 
subject: Landsberg Incident 28 April 1946, in UNA, Series 400, Box 3 File 16 “013.6 Arrest and Trial of 
Displaced Persons. “ 
7
 Monthly Report, William C. Morris, UNRRA Protective Service Office, to Mr. R. C. Raymond, District 2 
Director, dated: 26 May 1946, p. 2, in UNA, PAG 4/3.0.11.3.1:9 “District Monthly Reports, March 1946 – June 
1946.” 
 255 
 
the Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans who had been living beyond the borders of Germany proper 
before the war, and who were expelled from their residences following the war.  The official transfers 
of ethnic Germans from their former homes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary 
brought millions more people into Germany, all competing for already limited housing and food.  
Increasing German frustration with the continued presence of the DPs was certainly heightened by the 
arrival of the Volksdeutsche.  The overcrowding caused by the arrival of this new group of refugees 
put increasing pressure on the already fragile relationship between the DPs, the Germans, and the 
Military Government, and it led many German communities to lash out.  They argued that the DPs 
were an unwanted drain on their meagre resources, that the DPs were increasing the crime rate, and 
that the DPs were not only using the black market, they were facilitating it.  They wrote newspaper 
articles and sent petitions to the Military Government complaining about the activities of these 
foreigners and their accusations became increasingly inflammatory.   
The black market was pervasive in German society.  The severe shortages meant that any 
goods available on the black market were being traded for several times their prewar value.  During 
the war the black market was made up largely of interactions between German people from the cities 
with German farmers from the countryside.  This form of trading was sometimes the only means of 
finding fresh fruit, vegetables, and meat.  As one economist noted, “[e]very family was involved, at 
more or less frequent intervals, in the black market sale of some possessions and the purchase of 
some ‘black’ foods, stimulants, clothing, etc.”8  After the war, the black market continued to thrive 
because of the occupation authority’s desire to suppress inflation by continuing price controls that had 
been instituted by the Nazis in the last years of the war.  The Allies limited the prices charged for the 
food and meagre manufactured goods that were available with ration coupons.  For those goods that 
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were not available for ration coupons, the black market was often the only other place to obtain them.  
The most valuable commodity for trade was the cigarette, but coffee was also very valuable.  In this 
way, the black market functioned as a forum for the bilateral exchange of goods.  In the postwar era, 
farmers continued to bring their surplus crops into the cities to barter on the black market.  Foreigners 
in Germany, including the DPs, were able to take part in this illegal economy as well.  This was 
because, after the war, they had the means to participate in the form of the food and other supplies 
that they received from aid groups, most notably UNRRA.  Malcolm Proudfoot, a captain in the 
American army, noted that the DPs “soon discovered that their rations of soap, cigarettes, and candy 
could be exchanged for large sums on the black market, and this provided them with alcoholic drinks, 
women, and other pleasures, which in some measure relieved their boredom.”9    
 Even after the military crackdown on DP crime, the DPs had several reasons to continue 
taking part in criminal activities, including black market trade.  For many DPs, they saw bartering for 
goods with the Germans as an economic necessity.  While the DPs were provided with enough food, 
they often found it bland and tasteless.  Their diets consisted mainly of bread and soup, and lacked 
fresh meat and fruit.  In contrast, the Germans looked upon the DP camps as “magical kingdoms” 
because of the care packages filled with chocolate and cigarettes that the DPs received.10  As a result, 
each side had something to offer the other.  A second reason why the DPs continued to take part in 
crime, and in black market activity in particular, is because they had no respect for German law in 
particular.  They were not concerned that black market trade was outlawed by Military Government 
because it undermined the effectiveness of price controls and rationing.  They believed that shortages 
were just punishment for the Germans given their wartime actions, but that the DPs should not be 
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punished for German wrongdoings.  Therefore, many DPs continued to participate in black market 
trade.  They believed that it was their right to take advantage of the situation, just as the Germans had 
done during the war.  A third reason why the DPs participated in criminal activities was because it 
was a means of utilizing their particular skills.  Before their wartime displacement, many DPs had 
taken part in barter economies in their hometowns.  They had experience trading manufactured goods 
for agricultural produce in the provincial towns of Eastern Europe.  They brought with them the 
experience in trade, and they used these skills in their black market interactions with the Germans.  
Finally, the DPs continued to participate in criminal activity because they felt increasingly 
marginalized in society.  They witnessed the slow but eventual reconstruction of German society and 
the German economy, and they were dismayed that the Germans were allowed to rebuild while they 
continued to live in the DP camps, their future uncertain.   
 The military had expected problems concerning DP criminality from the beginning.  They 
had been drafting procedures for handling DP crime since the planning phase preceding the 
occupation of Germany.  Clearly anticipating problems, criminal activity was thoroughly addressed in 
the Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany drafted by SHAEF in September 1944: 
“experiences which they [the DPs] have undergone during the past few years may make them difficult 
to control; they may have little initiative; their desire to take revenge may result in looting and general 
lawlessness; and their pent-up feelings against their former oppressors may express themselves in 
resentment of any type of discipline and authority.”11  Initially the military preferred to deflect 
responsibility by stating that “[w]henever satisfactory arrangements have been or can be made for the 
imposition of adequate punishment by authorities of the displaced person’s nationality, this method 
                                                     
11
 Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany, Displaced Persons Branch, G-5, SHAEF, May 1945, p. 
1, in NARA, RG 260, Box 168, File 3 “383.7 Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany.” 
 258 
 
will be used in preference to all others.”12  In other words, SHAEF hoped that the Liaison Officers 
would be capable of keeping all of their nationals in line.  The Guide also suggested that a list of 
center regulations should be issued in each center, including prohibitions against theft, damage and 
destruction of property, bartering, and “any other undesirable activities to which it is thought 
desirable to draw particular attention.”13  SHAEF called for the formation of a police force for each 
center, selected from amongst the population.  This force would be responsible for the general 
maintenance of law and order in each centre, as well as the organization of a system for fighting fires. 
The SHAEF Guide suggested several punishments for offences against center rules.  For 
minor offences deemed punishable by fine or imprisonment, the best option was that a Liaison 
Officer be empowered to try the case and impose the punishment.  When this was not possible, the 
case should be presented before a Military Government Court, generally a Summary Military Court.  
In certain cases, military commanders were permitted to appoint Assembly Center Directors as judges 
in Summary Military Courts.  “Persons convicted by such a court of limited jurisdiction,” the Guide 
explained, “would have the same rights of petition for review and otherwise as in courts of full 
jurisdiction.”14  In minor matters, Assembly Center Directors were permitted to impose 
“administrative discipline,” which included restrictions on movement, reduction of privileges, extra 
work assignments, and reduction of rations.  In July 1945, SHAEF distributed an amendment to the 
Guide relating to offences committed by Soviet nationals.  Adjutant General R. B. Lovett asserted 
that in cases where the commission of a crime warranted a harsher punishment than administrative 
discipline, “the offender will be delivered, together with a file showing the charges and evidence 
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against him, to the nearest Soviet Repatriation Representative for disposition.”15  The only time that a 
Military Government Court could try a Soviet defendant was when the offence was made against a 
national of the United States or the United Kingdom, or in instances where “an immediate trial must 
be held in order to maintain law and order.”16  In other words, in cases where the commission of a 
crime led to mass unrest in a DP camp, the Military District Commander was permitted to hold a trial 
in order to quell the unrest.   
   Despite the careful preparation of plans for responding to DP crime, in the summer of 1945 
the military had done little to stop much of the looting by the DPs.  The military reports from this 
period detail DPs participating in numerous serious crimes, but there is no evidence of any attempt to 
bring the perpetrators to justice.  A July 1945 weekly report on Displaced Persons stated that: 
the MGO Detachment at Schwaebisch Gmuend [sic] received a total of 36 written and 20 
verbal complaints against such depredations.  On the night of 24 July 2 Germans were shot 
and seriously wounded and another stabbed by a group of Polish nationals.  Heilbronn 
reported gangs of Polish and Italian nationals threatening shopkeepers and farmers, stealing 
cattle, and destroying potato and onion fields… Two Germans were slain at the hands of an 
Italian national at Obergriesheim.  A similar situation was reported at Karlsruhe.17 
There were even reports that the soldiers had encouraged the DPs in their revenge against the local 
German population.  “Partial responsibility for this aggravated situation is attributed to a 
misunderstanding which may exist among the Security troops.  For instance in the case of 
Gerlachsheim, the police complained that the DPs were encouraged by the tactical troops to disregard 
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and resist orders of the German police,” they explained.18  Interestingly, in their own reports of the 
period, UNRRA noted no major incidents inside the camps.       
While crime went unprosecuted in the early postwar months, in the fall the military changed 
its position.  Throughout the summer and fall of 1945, American troops who had taken part in the 
rapid advance across Germany were shipped stateside and replaced by new soldiers who had not 
taken part in the liberation of concentration camps or the opening of German factories filled with 
slave labourers.  These new troops did not have the same understanding of what the foreigners in 
Germany had experienced, and therefore they also did not have the same sympathy.  As early as July 
1945, the American Third Army Command was complaining that caring for the DPs was a large and 
unnecessary burden.  Lieutenant Colonel Bogia argued that, “[a]dministration of DP’s in present 
location can be an interminable burden on resources of U.S. Government.  Suggest that a date be 
determined and set after which DP’s not repatriated become a responsibility of the country in which 
they now reside, become a citizen, or get out.  DP’s must make this decision.”19  Clearly the goodwill 
that the military had once felt towards the DPs was beginning to wear thin.   
 As part of the process of lessening the burden on the military, the handover of responsibility 
for policing took place, although in stages.  First the German police forces were reconstituted.  When 
the Seventh U.S. Army first crossed the Rhine River, “the German police force was found to be 
almost nonexistent in the small villages and had completely disappeared from the larger towns,” but 
as the army made its way further east, and as their advance was made more rapidly, “police forces 
were usually found relatively intact, even in large places like Stuttgart and Rottweil.”20  These police 
forces, however, were overwhelmingly manned by Nazis, who would have to be replaced.  
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Denazification regulations were originally outlined in JCS 1067, written by the American Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, for implementation during SHAEF’s tenure.  When SHAEF operations ended in July 1945 
and responsibility for governing the zones of occupation was handed over to the zonal occupying 
forces, efforts were made to coordinate denazification efforts in all four zones through the joint 
Control Council.   
At the Control Council meeting at Potsdam at the end of July 1945, the goals and policies of 
denazification were agreed upon, and then released as “Control Council Law No. 2” in October 1945.  
This agreement stipulated that the Nazi Party and all associated Nazi organizations would be 
dismantled, including the paramilitary organizations (the Sturmabteilung or SA, the Schutztaffel or 
SS, and the Hitler Youth).  Those police units which had been specifically formed in order to support 
the regime’s political policies, such as the Gestapo (Secret Police), were likewise abolished.  All 
persons in positions of public office, including police officers, were required to fill out and submit 
Frageboden, questionnaires which asked about a person’s employment, military service, and 
relationship to the Nazi party.  These questionnaires were then reviewed by Military Government 
officers and compared to all available information from German police and Nazi party records.21  In 
the case of the police force, the Military then followed a process of selecting a man who they deemed 
reliable and recruiting amateurs to fill positions below him.  In this way, wholly new police forces 
were created.  However, this took time to accomplish.  As well, the military had made a point of 
disarming all civilians in Germany, including policemen.  Thus, following the surrender, German 
police were barred from carrying firearms, and they were instead issued nightsticks.22 
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Only in September 1945 were the German police again allowed to carry arms.  This decision 
had followed a lengthy debate in which the Control Council weighed the issues of manpower 
shortages, the need to maintain law and order, and their desire to continue punishing the Germans. At 
the root of the dilemma was that the troops were being redeployed or demobilized rapidly and as a 
result, the military argued it could no longer be held responsible for maintaining law and order in the 
zone.   They would have to rely on the German police, and this meant that the DPs would have to 
respect their authority.  Lt. Col. Roy Cochrane explained that “on many occasions military police and 
tactical troops have not given the German civilian police the moral and physical reinforcement which 
is vitally necessary to the performance of their duties.”23  In order to remedy this situation, Lt. Col. 
Cochrane ordered that a Military Police Officer be on guard at all times in each German police 
precinct in order to “assist them as an ‘on-the-spot’ Army representative in quelling incidents and 
disorders.”24  Nevertheless, there had been numerous instances in which Military Police instead stood 
by and watched, amused, as German police attempted to handle situations involving the DPs for 
which they were not equipped to manage.   
At the same time as the Germans were rebuilding their police forces, the DP camps were 
creating police forces of their own to keep order in the camps.  The DP police were comprised of DPs 
representing the various national groups in each camp.  They were responsible for enforcing UNRRA 
regulations, protecting UNRRA buildings and materiel, sounding the alarm in case of fire, accident, 
or disorder in the camps, and generally keeping law and order.25  UNRRA strongly supported this 
move as it was an important form of rehabilitation – the DPs would be responsible for policing 
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themselves and keeping each other in line.  This was a key form of responsibility, as UNRRA 
understood it, an important means of teaching the DPs to be responsible for their actions and also 
responsible to their communities.  At first the DP police were trained within their individual camps, 
but in August 1946 a DP Police training school was opened in Schleissheim.  The school offered a 
four-day course on proper police methods and it was run by military police officers from District 
Headquarters.  The police officers were provided with uniforms, helmets, truncheons and 
flashlights.26   
The debate over arming the German police was echoed in a similar debate about arming the 
DP police.  In his July 1946 Monthly Report, the District Director noted that the question of arming 
the DP police remained a critical problem.  He explained that there were several instances in which 
the DP police were at a distinct disadvantage because they did not possess firearms.  “At several 
camps the DP Police have refused to accept the responsibility for guarding warehouses and 
supplies.”27  They feared that people seeking to loot the warehouses would have weapons, and that 
their jobs put them in danger needlessly.  If they had their own weapons, the DPs argued, they could 
defend themselves and the warehouses.  They also believed that the fear of an armed response would 
deter thieves.  While the tactical units of the military agreed to such a provision, the division 
commanders refused to provide the DP police with firearms.  Although the reasoning is never clearly 
outlined, it appears that the American military commanders did not trust the DPs or their intentions.  
They worried that the DPs would use the weapons for other purposes, or even turn them against the 
military.  They had only to turn to the crimes being reported each month as evidence. “Theft and 
pilfering continue,” one monthly report noted, “and reports of armed robberies have been received 
from Land Württemberg-Baden.  Specific cases mentioned concern about armed bands of DPs of 
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Polish nationality.  Several cases involving black market operations have been uncovered but the 
quantity of goods sold was not very great.”28  As a result, the DP police were never armed. 
Participation in the black market brought those DPs involved into direct contact with the 
German police.  When pursued, DPs would typically race back to the camps where they resided.  
Both UNRRA and military reports highlight numerous incidents in the winter of 1945 and spring of 
1946 in which the German police were used in large numbers in camp searches, known colloquially 
as raids.  On 24 January 1946, German police entered the UNRRA camp at Wagenried twice.  First, 
they arrived at 4 o’clock in the morning and asked to use the camp telephone.  Then they returned 
three hours later, this time accompanied by U.S. military personnel.  According to the UNRRA 
Director of Team 306, Joseph Berger, UNRRA was not notified prior to the raid.  Berger explained 
that “the German police were rough,” and the “police impounded and removed from the camp 
properly acquired belongings of United Nations Displaced Persons, including articles properly issued 
to them by UNRRA for their use in accordance with Army directives.”29  Berger argued that this 
search did not comply with military policy.  In particular, he was concerned that UNRRA officials 
were not made aware of the search ahead of time nor were they present for the searches.  They also 
objected to the timing of the raid, which was early in the morning while people, including women and 
children, were still in their beds.   
The Americans soon faced a major backlash for allowing the German police into the DP 
camps, especially after a Jewish DP was killed by a German policeman during a raid at a Jewish DP 
camp in Stuttgart on 29 March 1946.  When the German police entered the camp, the DPs rioted, and 
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during the melee one of the DPs was shot.30  The Jewish DP, Schmul Dancyger, had survived 
Auschwitz and Mauthausen and had only reunited with his family just before his death.31  After this 
incident, German police were banned from taking part in searches of Jewish DP camps.    Instead, the 
American military was responsible for pursuing suspects and maintaining order in the Jewish camps, 
alongside the DP camp police.  UNRRA staff in Jewish DP camps strongly supported this move.  In 
his report on another camp search conducted following the new rules concerning Jewish camps, Team 
306 director Berger reported that he was generally satisfied with the methods followed, although 
some items remained missing from the DPs’ possessions, including two watches and approximately 
2,300 Marks.  This time, the search was conducted by only American troops, not the German police, 
and UNRRA was notified ahead of the raid.  Berger reported that “none of the residents has been 
arrested or charged in any way with crime or misdemeanor” and that the only illegal goods found 
were “two pistols discovered in a large unoccupied attic and an unoperational transmitting set 
discovered in a large unused cellar.”32   
American soldiers remained confused about military regulations regarding law and order in 
the DP camps. “In one detachment, in the opinion of the PSO [Public Safety Officer], he was not 
authorized to enter the camp without approval from the local Military commander,” noted the 
Adjutant General.  However, “[i]n other detachments the PSO’s [sic] were of the opinion they could 
enter without any approval.  This situation should be clarified.”33  In order to clarify military 
procedure, on 7 June 1946 USFET released Standard Operating Procedure No. 81 (SOP 81), 
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Checking and Searching Operations in United Nations Displaced Persons Assembly Centers.  The 
directive explained that only division commanders had the authority to conduct camp searches.  In 
some special cases, such as the search of Jewish DP camps and those DP camps in American-
occupied Berlin, only the Commander General of the Third U.S. Army had the authority to plan and 
conduct searches.  The directive further declared that German police could be used in camp searches, 
but in cases involving Soviet or Jewish DPs, “German police or other German individuals may 
accompany US military personnel as individuals when they are required to identify persons involved 
in criminal acts committed outside centers or to identify material evidence incident to such acts.”34  
These policemen, however, were not acting in an official capacity.  In cases in which German police 
were permitted to accompany US soldiers, they were required to be unarmed and limited to one or 
two in number. 
According to SOP 81, the purpose of a search of a DP Assembly Center was to end any 
criminal activity that was known to be taking place in the camp either by halting black market 
activities, seizing illegal weapons or other illegal goods, or by apprehending criminal suspects, 
counterfeiters, or members of resistance organizations.  In all cases the military authorities required 
either clear evidence or reliable information from a trusted source, although what this constituted was 
not further clarified.  The criminal activity in all cases must have warranted a full search, not simply 
the arrest of the DPs concerned.  The directive also required the military authorities to notify UNRRA 
of any searches.  “Compliance with this provision,” the directive stated, “by the officer conducting 
the operation will include notification of the objectives, time, manner of conducting the operations, 
participants and other pertinent information.”35  All troops involved were to be carefully briefed about 
their duties, as well as the status of United Nations DPs as “allies and neutrals” and their 
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corresponding rights.  During the search of an assembly center, guards were to be posted at all exits 
and had the authority to detain anyone attempting to escape.  Camp police were not permitted to take 
part in the search.  If, in the course of the search, any DPs were arrested, they were to be handed over 
to the Military Commander, along with a file listing their offences.  The directive warned that 
searches of DP camps “require the highest standard of discipline” and “[w]anton destruction of 
property will not be tolerated or condoned.  Courteous, but firm dealing with United Nations 
displaced persons will be required by all commanders.”36 
As a result of the arrest of ever larger numbers of DPs in the spring and summer of 1946, the 
question of where DPs awaiting trial would be held became a serious issue.  While some DPs were 
returned to their camps, others were placed in German jails.  There were several accusations of DP 
mistreatment in German jails, and this became an untenable situation that had to be corrected.  Pre-
trial incarceration was clarified in a revised statement on the Maintenance of Law and Order among 
United Nations Displaced Persons in August 1946.  Those DPs arrested either inside or outside of 
assembly centers were to be surrendered to the director of the nearest Military Government Security 
Detachment for trial no more than twenty-four hours after their arrest.  Taking into account earlier 
questions about the care of Jewish DPs, this directive clarified the procedure to be followed with 
regards to arresting Jewish DPs.  The directive stated that persecutee DPs, including Jewish DPs, 
could no longer be held in German jails, but that instead: 
military authorities having custody over such arrested displaced persons will cause them to be 
brought before the nearest summary court within twenty-four hours from the time of the 
arrest (Sundays and US holidays being excepted from the running of such time) for an 
immediate trial or for release on bail or recognizance, or under such other conditions as the 
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court may deem proper, or for remand to custody pending trial thereafter, as the 
circumstances may warrant.37  
DPs not deemed persecutees could continue to be held in German jails pending trial, but the military 
authorities would inspect German prisons regularly to ensure that detained DPs were not being held 
for lengthy periods so that “no United Nations Displaced Person in being detained therein without 
arrangements having been made for trial before a proper tribunal and that no such person is being 
persecuted or mistreated by prison personnel.”38   
The military also attempted to clarify the rules for sentencing DPs convicted of crimes.  A 
July 1946 revised directive entitled “Repatriation of United Nations Displaced Persons Convicted by 
Military Government Courts” rescinded the sentencing structure imposed by SHAEF and substituted 
new rules that called for the repatriation of any DP sentenced to a prison term by Military 
Government Court.  “United Nations Displaced Persons, except persecutees and stateless persons, 
convicted by an Intermediate of General Military Government Court and sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment are subject to be being repatriated regardless of their personal wishes.”39  All cases 
involving the law and order of displaced persons, and in particular any cases involving firearms, were 
to be automatically heard by an Intermediate or General Military Government Court.  In a trial 
involving an accused displaced person, “after pronouncement of sentence” the DP involved was to be 
permitted to “present any evidence at his disposal which would indicate that after being forcibly 
repatriated he would suffer an overall punishment disproportionate to the crime for which he has been 
convicted and far greater than that suffered by Germans for like or similar offences.”  In the event that 
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the DP was unable to present convincing evidence, the court documents would be sent to USFET, G-
5 for review before any DP would be forcibly repatriated.  If repatriated, case records of trial would 
accompany those being repatriated and would be “delivered to representatives of the receiving 
Government at the turnover point.”   
The directive on sentencing explained that USFET would also organize a Central Detention 
Center in each Land in the U.S. Zone of Germany, including in Berlin and in the Bremen enclave, to 
hold all DPs sentenced to imprisonment.  Under no circumstances were the DPs to be housed in 
German prisons.  The U.S. Third Army would be responsible for the transport of convicted DPs to the 
Central Detention Centers.  If the Court deemed forcible repatriation suitable, USFET would contact 
the DP’s national representative and organize their handover, along with an assurance that the DP 
would not be permitted back into the U.S. occupation zone.  Along with the DP, the court files would 
also be turned over to the liaison officer.  In cases where forced repatriation was not deemed 
acceptable, the DP would be returned to “the Director of the appropriate Office of Military 
Government for completion of the remainder of their sentence.”40  Any displaced person could 
likewise volunteer for repatriation.  The military hoped that these revised rules would deter the DPs 
from further criminal activities, and remove those who had been convicted of crimes from Germany. 
Like the military, UNRRA hoped to deter the DPs from criminal activity.  They too believed 
in the necessity of introducing a respect for German law amongst the DP population.  This was a 
central aspect of rehabilitation as they understood it.  UNRRA saw its primary goal as instilling a 
sense of responsibility in each individual, including responsibility for one’s actions.  To this end, 
UNRRA focused its responses to crime in the DP camps on efforts to make each person responsible 
to the community at large.  At first, each camp director was responsible for issuing minor punishment 
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within the camp.  These punishments included reduced rations and loss of certain privileges.  Any 
infraction deemed worthy of a more severe sentence was to be turned over to the military.  However, 
as part of the process of rehabilitation, and in keeping with the ideal of making the DPs responsible to 
their communities, several DP camps introduced Honour Courts.  The purpose of the honor courts 
was to “mete out internal discipline on matters judged better left internal.”41  They were peopled by 
camp residents, often including those DPs with some legal background, but also encompassing 
laymen, and they could hand out the same punishments as a camp director.  Honor Court appointees 
were generally those camp residents whom everyone agreed would act fairly and impartially and who 
would generally work for the good of the community.  In some instances these courts were later 
charged with overstepping their grounds by handing out harsher sentences than permitted.  In 
December 1946 the Camp Court at Wolfrathausen was admonished for confining a nineteen year-old 
DP after several camp residents accused him of beating concentration camp inmates while a resident 
of Görlitz concentration camp.  When the wife of the accused learned of his incarceration, she 
contacted the military, who in turn contacted the camp director.  The accused was transferred to 
officials of the War Crimes Commission.42  While the Honor Courts generally kept detailed 
documents and accounts of the trials they held, they appear only rarely in UNRRA’s reports.  This is 
one of the few instances in which the camp honor courts are mentioned by UNRRA, and then only 
because the military became involved.  It appears that UNRRA preferred to allow the DPs to mete out 
their own justice as part of the process of rehabilitation.  It would be in keeping with UNRRA’s belief 
that this was an important means of making the DPs responsible to their community. 
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In cases where DPs were charged with crimes outside of the DP camps, welfare workers did 
their best to support the DPs involved.  When DPs were charged and tried by military court, UNRRA 
officials could act as Friends of the Court.  UNRRA’s legal adviser, Paul Carter, explained that 
“UNRRA Team Welfare Officers or other designated Officers… act, as of the time of arrest of a 
Displaced Person, in the capacity of ‘Friend of the Court’ – viz., as a channel through which 
background information in an individual case, factual or influencing, may be had.”43  According to 
UNRRA’s Friend of the Court Guiding Principles, the purpose of this position was to “assist in the 
expeditious and proper administration of justice.”44  A Friend of the Court could only be appointed 
with the permission of both the Military Government officer in charge and the DP’s camp director.  
Once appointed, the Friend of the Court was “permitted a confidential visit with the accused at the 
place of arrest or detention.”  At that time, the arrest record and charge sheet would also be made 
available to the Friend of the Court.  The Friend of the Court also had the power to secure the release 
of the accused into their custody, however in no cases was the Friend of the Court allowed to act as 
the DP’s legal counsel.  While respecting the authority of the courts, UNRRA wanted to ensure that 
the rights of the DPs were respected.   
UNRRA’s support for the maintenance of law and order did not, however, translate into a 
thorough reporting of all DP crime to UNRRA headquarters.  At first there was no means of reporting 
on crime.  In the first months in the field, UNRRA officers were focused exclusively on providing the 
means of survival for the DPs that resided in their camps.  This meant that there was hardly any time 
at all to spend filling out reports for UNRRA headquarters.  When they did find the time, they often 
did not have the means necessary to carry out what they considered the essential tasks, let alone 
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compile comprehensive reports.  In many cases, they had to be creative.  UNRRA welfare officer 
Susan Pettiss described registering new arrivals on her first day and providing them with meal tickets 
created using a rubber stamp carved out of an old automobile tire and an ink pad found in a stock 
room.45  As well, in the first months UNRRA headquarters was unsure of exactly what information 
they wanted to collect from the field.  According to UNRRA’s memo “Reporting from Assembly 
Centers” from May 1945, initially reporting was confined to the official SHAEF form ‘Assembly 
Centre Weekly Report.’  The Centre Director was responsible for preparing this report, which 
provided only essential information, such as camp populations and housing shortages.46  It was up to 
the individual officers to bring to the director’s attention any important information or policy 
recommendations to be included in these reports.  “It is hoped to achieve rather more comprehensive 
reporting at a later date,” the memo concluded.47  Initially, the reports focused primarily on counting 
heads.   
In June 1945 UNRRA revised its directions for reporting from assembly centers and asked 
welfare officers to include a separate statement including statistical information and a narrative report 
on welfare services as an appendix to the director’s report.  The directions called upon welfare 
officers to “relate information to needs in such a way that requirements can be speedily and 
accurately evaluated.”48  The statistics were needed to help plan the welfare needs of different groups 
depending on age.  Especially important was the breakdown of the ages of the children, who had very 
different welfare and supply needs depending on age.  UNRRA headquarters also asked for a separate 
statement on the welfare of unaccompanied minors.  UNRRA’s field workers were clearly completely 
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preoccupied with the all-consuming task of meeting the most immediate needs of the hordes of DPs 
passing through the assembly centres—food, shelter and medical care.  The monthly reports referred 
to security, but only in passing.  For example, in a September 1945 Displaced Persons Report, G-5 
made a short note of the security procedures in each DP camp.  “Most camps were guarded by the 
military,” they wrote, “only a few camps had set up their internal police force.  The necessity for DPs 
to produce a pass in order to be allowed to leave the camps causes much criticism and dissatisfaction 
because the DPs contend that they are treated as prisoners while the Germans are enjoying complete 
freedom.”49  In an October 1945 UNRRA Field Supervisor’s Report on conditions in Ulm, Field 
Supervisor Blackmore similarly noted that “[d]iscipline is generally good and security problems are 
not serious except that the recent removal of restrictions on liberty has resulted in the unauthorized 
entry of American soldiers.  This situation is now under control.”50    
 UNRRA’s early reports may have touched on the security procedures being implemented, but 
they do not shed any light on the question of DP crime.  One of the reasons for this was that UNRRA 
workers inside the camps had no first-hand experience of events beyond the camps.  They were too 
busy working to feed, house and clothe the DPs under their care.  When they heard about such things, 
it was always second-hand, usually from army officers.  A second reason why there was no reporting 
of DP crime is that there was no standardized form for reporting it.  It was not clear that this was the 
type of information that UNRRA headquarters was looking to collect.  It was not until January 1947 
that UNRRA issued an administrative order detailing how DP crime should be reported.  
Administrative Order No. 213 outlined the process for reporting crimes, offences and serious security 
incidents committed by DPs.  The order stated that any “UNRRA Officers who has received 
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information on an incident will be responsible for preliminary checking of facts reported to him, for 
amplification of date and for immediately reporting the incident to the UNRRA Officer in charge of 
the installation.”51  In cases where the threat of danger was imminent, such as riots, racial 
disturbances, assault, murder, rape, or fatal car accidents, UNRRA officers were instructed to submit 
a report by the fastest means possible to the Tactical Unit Commanders responsible for the region as 
well as the installation director.  It was then the responsibility of the director to inform UNRRA 
District Headquarters.  In cases involving theft, unauthorized use of firearms, sodomy, arson, forgery, 
suicide, embezzlement, willful property damage, or auto accidents where no one was seriously 
injured, the UNRRA officer was instructed to submit a report to the installation director, who would 
check the facts before forwarding a report on to the Military Tactical Unit.  The administrative order 
included a Serious Incident Report Form attached, which asked for the date, time and place of the 
incident, as well as the details of what happened and who was involved.  Over a year after UNRRA 
began operations, and scant months before its closure, UNRRA finally felt compelled to order the 
regular reporting of DPs’ crimes.  
However, even once the welfare workers had the time and the means of reporting on crime, 
only rarely did it make its way into the reports which were submitted.  While there is no clear 
evidence of why the welfare workers refused to report this crime, there were several possible reasons.  
Many welfare workers hoped that the DPs would turn themselves around, given the proper 
rehabilitation program.  Criminal activity was just another form of delinquent behaviour that had 
resulted from the years under Nazi tutelage.  Over time, they would learn to overcome these impulses 
and regain a respect for the law, the welfare workers believed.   However, this would take time, and 
they did not want the DPs to be forever tainted by their actions in the early postwar period.  As well, 
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welfare workers hated that the actions of a few DPs came to tarnish the reputation of the majority.  As 
UNRRA District 1 Director Guy R. Codding explained in an April 1946 report, the Army had to be 
dissuaded “that the DPs are not to be treated as criminals on a wholesale basis.  We recognize that 
there are some DPs who doubtless are violating laws, but whole populations of DPs in camps should 
not be treated as criminals.”52   
DP crime came to highlight an important instance in which UNRRA’s dual mandates of 
rehabilitation and repatriation came into conflict.  Any time that crime was reported, it was noted in 
several places: in reports to the area and zonal UNRRA offices and to headquarters; reports to the 
military; and also in each DP’s personal file.  Once a report was entered into a DP’s file, it could not 
be removed.  Upon repatriation, these files were handed over to the liaison officers.  The welfare 
workers worried that any evidence of misconduct could be used to condemn the DPs upon return.  
Stories of those DPs who had agreed to repatriate haunted them, as was the case with welfare worker 
Kathryn Hulme.  “Even before Christmas we were reading the portents in the faces of some of our 
repatriated Poles who reappeared again in the camp, usually tough single men like Tak Tak Schon 
who had no families to impede their long nocturnal treks westward to the American Zone…  They 
stayed only long enough to whisper their warnings to trusted friends and then disappeared.”53  The 
welfare workers were aware that the political situation in Eastern Europe was even less safe for those 
who were forcibly repatriated.  In cases where the DPs sought resettlement, any notes relating to 
criminal activity would surely hinder this prospect.  Resettlement opportunities during UNRRA’s 
tenure were extremely limited, and any history of criminal activity only lessened these chances.  
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“Applications will be considered only from persons who are sound from a security point of view,” the 
immigration guidelines made clear.54   
At the same time, UNRRA staff soon came to question and resent how the DPs were being 
treated by the military.  UNRRA Legal Adviser Paul Carter reported that he had received informal 
reports that there was “an atmosphere of insecurity from arbitrary arrest and uncertainty as to pre-trial 
treatment among D.P.s in the Third Army area.”55  He explained that the problem stemmed from the 
fact that “lower Army echelons regard Displaced Persons as an undesirable element unduly and 
disproportionately complicating disciplinary problems.”56  He blamed their negative attitude on the 
fact that these personnel were largely new to Germany and did not understand the horrific 
circumstances that had brought the DPs to Germany in the first place, or the reasons why they could 
not return home.  In the following month, Carter provided a more detailed account of the injustices.  
He explained that the most common procedural shortcomings included: failing to notify UNRRA that 
a DP had been arrested; refusing UNRRA personnel access to the accused during pre-trial 
confinement; confining DPs in German jail cells with German civil offenders; excluding UNRRA 
personnel from trials involving DPs; and a “general lack of an understanding on the part of Military 
Government Court officials of the service UNRRA personnel are in a position to perform as ‘friend of 
the Court.’”57   
UNRRA District No. 5 Director S. B. Zisman likewise asserted that relations between the 
military and the DPs were a serious problem.  Zisman attended a number of trials of DPs and 
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concluded that “the general attitude of MG in this field cannot be termed friendly or sympathetic.”58  
He explained that because Military Government officers used German personnel, the “attitudes 
developed are, as a result, wholly one-sided.”59  Zisman also argued that relations with tactical troops 
could also be improved.  While most Military Government units handed over those DPs caught after 
minor offences to UNRRA officials, in certain cases Military Government officials refused to follow 
this course of action for even the smallest of infractions.  Zisman raised concerns that the local 
Military Government officer in Landsberg in particular was unable to “meet the difficulties of the 
situation with greater skill and understanding,” and recommended that he be replaced.60    
UNRRA officials also worried that the military’s efforts to crack down on DP crime were 
having a negative effect on repatriation efforts.  In an April 1946 memo concerning the search of 
repatriates, UNRRA District 5 Director S. B. Zisman explained that the baggage searches conducted 
on all repatriating DPs was having the effect of discouraging DPs from returning to their home 
countries.  “Because of the adverse effect on the repatriation program,” wrote Zisman, “and also 
because I was not satisfied as to the procedure of the searches, I instructed Mr. Dawson, Director of 
Team 547 at Funk Kaserne not to carry on general searches, but to continue spot checks as might be 
necessary.”61  Zisman argued that it was required that all searches be witnessed by UNRRA officials, 
and he asked that “full consideration would be given to the rights and feelings of the displaced 
persons who are citizens of allied nations, some of whom would be future citizens of the United 
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States.”62  Zisman warned that the recent searches had taken on the character of a secret police search, 
and that while UNRRA was following a liberal policy in terms of what they allowed the DPs to take 
home with them, the military was then removing items from their luggage that they deem illegal.  
Zisman explained that those DPs agreeing to repatriation were already unsure of conditions at home, 
and that the food rations they had been granted were intended to assuage these fears.  The same was 
true of those DPs who wished to bring the tools of their trade with them – so that they could be 
assured some form of livelihood upon their repatriation.  While UNRRA was as interested as the 
military in stopping DPs from transporting unauthorized goods, Zisman argued, the American 
military should also keep in mind that “these people on the move are still considered to be citizens of 
Allied Nations, and are not assumed to be criminals or law-breakers until proved otherwise.”63 
Alongside their worries about the military’s actions towards the DPs, UNRRA workers were 
also very concerned about the way in which the German police were treating the DPs.  In a memo to 
UNRRA’s US Zone Director on 12 April 1946, District 3 Director A.C. Dunn explained that 
incidents in his District involving the German police were becoming increasingly alarming.  He 
argued that the “German police are taking advantage of their restored authorities by persecuting DPs 
in true Nazi fashion.”  Dunn noted that the evacuation of the DPs from their current installations to 
more “rudimentary facilities,” as part of the process of consolidating the camps, caused the DPs to 
worry that when UNRRA terminates operations, the DPs will be “left to the mercy of the Germans,” 
and they will certainly experience both “starvation and persecution.”64  In his April monthly report, 
District 2 Director R. C. Raymond also warned that the German police were becoming an increasing 
problem.  In particular, he worried about the effect of the order allowing armed German police to 
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enter DP camps.  Raymond explained that “[d]uring the this particular month there have been no 
serious outbreaks because of this, but we have been near to several, and everyone concerned feels that 
it is a dangerous procedure to allow armed Germans into camps.”65  Raymond called for the 
immediate suspension of this order.  He also argued that the American army was unfairly 
characterizing the DPs as black marketeers and the DP community as lawless and in fact using them 
as scapegoats.  “In my opinion, the Army greatly magnifies the security problem presented by the 
D.P. and has made a serious error in allowing entry and search by German Police.”66   
In some cases, UNRRA was also forced to deal with the problem of German officials 
working to discredit the DPs.  In October 1945, Samuel Herman, UNRRA Field Supervisor for 
Regensburg, responded to reports that Jewish DPs were looting German houses in Neunberg for 
clothing for the coming winter.  Herman asserted that “no looting or threat of looting on the part of 
the Jewish DPs” was taking part in his area, and also that the “Jewish committee in Neunberg had 
been very careful and successful in encouraging its members to maintain a correct attitude towards 
the German population.”67  In fact, Herman explained, there were at least two instances in which the 
mayor of the town had attempted to discredit the community of Jewish DPs in his town.  In the first 
instance, in August 1945, when the non-repatriable DPs were moved to a barracks from the private 
dwellings they were living in, the mayor informed the Jewish committee that they were being moved 
in order to repatriate them.  “Little was done by Military Authorities,” wrote Herman, “to explain to 
the DPs that the order to move them to an assembly center was not a punitive deportation, but … 
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designed to improve their living conditions.”68  Then the Mayor posted signs throughout the town 
warning the Germans of the looting that was supposedly taking place.  Herman explained that he 
believed these actions against the Jewish DPs were taking place because of “a lack of clarity in 
military policy,” and the Germans’ belief that “we can get rid of these Jews and make more room for 
the local population provided we can convince Military Government that they constitute a 
troublesome problem.”69  Herman also explained that the town had been forced to take in an influx of 
German evacuees, and that this was one of the reasons for the change in relations with the Jewish 
DPs, with whom they initially had good relations in the months following the end of the war. 
These reports on criminal activity highlight the increasingly complicated relationship 
between the Germans, the military authorities and the DPs.  The military was forced to mediate 
between the Germans and the DPs, and the military played their role as chief arbiter reluctantly.  
Throughout UNRRA’s tenure in the DP camps, it is clear that the Military Government had to 
constantly balance the rights of the DPs and the Germans with their own powers and capabilities.  
While in the first postwar months soldiers on the ground were reluctant to prosecute DPs for their 
random acts of violence against the German population, their attitude changed in the fall of 1945 with 
the arrival of new soldiers and a renewed effort to restore law and order.  The military soon turned to 
the German police for help, first reinstating disbanded police forces and then allowing these forces to 
rearm.  As the military came to rely increasingly on German police for help in combatting crime, and 
in particular black market trade, the DPs came into increasing contact with the German police.  There 
were numerous instances of raids of DP camps which led to rioting on the part of the DPs and 
displays of force from the German officers.  While the military attempted to limit these confrontations 
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by instituting new procedures for the search of DP camps, they did nothing to assuage the fears of the 
DPs over punitive treatment from the Germans.         
As a result of their fears over military and German actions, as well as any future 
repercussions for the DPs involved, UNRRA welfare workers were hesitant to report crime at all. 
Reports of incidents such as the case of stolen water from the barrel designated for fire prevention are 
rare finds in the UNRRA files.  These episodes were simply not reported.  Welfare workers were 
often conflicted over their competing mandates of rehabilitation and repatriation.  Any reports of 
crime would follow a DP long after they had left Germany: if they repatriated, their file travelled with 
them; if they sought resettlement, criminal activities would almost certainly hinder this possibility.   
   
What UNRRA wanted most was for the DPs to behave themselves.  They wanted the DPs to 
take responsibility for their actions.  They believed that the power of both the DP police and the 
Honor Courts would work to encourage the DPs to behave themselves.  However, when efforts to 
encourage community responsibility failed to halt criminal activity, UNRRA was at odds as to how to 
respond and, even more importantly, how to treat those DPs that continued to refuse to comply.  This 
was, UNRRA soon learned, simply not a social norm that the DPs shared or were willing to accept.  
As Atina Grossman explains, the DPs’ “most obvious—and to a military administration, most 
frustrating—symptom, was an intense ‘dislike of authority.’”70  UNRRA wanted to make it clear that 
the DPs had to once again learn to respect the law, even if it meant the law that was enforced by the 
German police.  This is precisely where they ran into the most difficulty; for many DPs, there could 
be no respect for German authority.  When a DP committed a crime against a German, many DPs 
believed that the Germans were only getting what they deserved.  As Tony Judt describes,  
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the desire for retribution also addressed a deeper need.  For most Europeans World War Two 
was experienced not as a war of movement and battle but as a daily degradation, in the course 
of which men and women were betrayed and humiliated, forced into daily acts of petty crime 
and self-abasement, in which everyone lost something and many lost everything.71   
For UNRRA, this proved one of the most trying issues to face.  Any attempt to instill respect for the 
law in Germany was, at best, an uphill battle, at worst, a lost cause.  They soon found that 
rehabilitating the physical person was not nearly as difficult as rehabilitating the conscience.
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Conclusion 
 
The first steps are the most important—they are the foundations on which all subsequent 
relief or reconstruction are based.  Initial organization can make a refugee either into a 
helpless recipient of food and clothing (a true ‘victim’ of relief) or into a self-reliant, 
disciplined member of a naturally resurgent community.1 
 
 
 
 
When the military authorities first organized the displaced persons (DP) camps in Germany at 
the end of the Second World War, they expected these camps to house the DPs for only a short 
period, before they were all repatriated to their countries of origin.  However, by the fall of 1945 it 
became clear that several hundred thousand DPs would not return home, and that the DP camps 
would continue to be their homes.  The military, whose primary focus had been on providing relief 
(namely food, shelter and medical care), now handed over administration of these camps to UNRRA.  
UNRRA saw their task as one of relief as well as rehabilitation.  The DPs’ wartime experiences 
required not only the healing of physical wounds, but also counseling in order to heal the unseen scars 
left by the war. 
The DP camps in the American occupation zone of Germany were overseen by UNRRA 
welfare workers, recruited primarily from the class of professional social workers that had emerged in 
the United States in the interwar period.  Social workers believed that the purpose of their work was 
to help people become self-sufficient, and to stimulate self-reliance.  In order to achieve this goal, 
social workers drew upon their expertise, and especially on their understanding of social norms and 
deviations.  Social norms were seen as desirable social activities and as features of a self-sufficient 
life.  In contrast, deviations were understood as undesirable social activities, and included any actions 
that might inhibit the capacity of the individual to organize his own normal social activities.  In other 
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words, social workers were concerned with the deviations from the social norm that prevented an 
individual from properly socializing.   
As trained social workers, UNRRA’s DP camp officials brought these ideas of socialization 
with them into the DP camps, and they worked to reintroduce the social norms that they believed the 
DPs had forgotten during the war.  There had been no use for the rules of polite society during the 
war, either in a German factory, or in a concentration camp.  In fact, those social graces in many 
instances meant your death.  Life was a struggle, and only the strong survived.  After the war, 
however, these social norms were once again necessary.  UNRRA wanted to re-introduce the DPs to 
these social norms so that they could be successfully reintegrated into their home countries once they 
were repatriated.   
 UNRRA workers were at first very idealistic in their plans for the DPs.  They came into the 
field with a very well-developed concept of what they believed the problems would be and how they 
should address them.  From their previous training, they brought a specific set of social norms that 
they sought to encourage.  They began by focusing on housing arrangements.  They believed that the 
most effective way of reconstructing DP families was by providing them with their own private 
dwellings.  Life in the barracks where the military had originally housed them was not appropriate; 
only privacy could allow each family the time and space to normalize relations.  Second, UNRRA 
turned its attention to personal hygiene.  Welfare workers were very concerned about how the DPs 
looked and how they were taking care of themselves and their living space in the DP camps.  Next 
UNRRA turned to questions of work ethic.  They wanted to teach the DPs how to take pride in their 
work once again.  They wanted the DPs engaging in constructive work in the DP camps.  The key 
word here was constructive.  Participation in the black market was not constructive; in fact, it was 
asocial.  It kept the DPs on the fringe of society, which went against UNRRA’s goal of reintegrating 
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them.  Education was also very important to UNRRA.  If the DPs did not have education, did not 
have skills, then they had to be taught them.  Finally, this process of socialization also involved 
bringing back a respect for the law, both criminal law and civil law, which included such matters as 
registering births and marriages with the local registrar.  A respect for criminal law included an 
understanding that the black market was not a productive part of society, and therefore that all trade 
within it had to be ended.   
Once in the field, however, the welfare workers soon modified their plans to meet the 
changing conditions; their planning had failed to account for both the practical obstacles facing 
them and the DP response to their efforts, and as a result they had to take a more pragmatic approach.  
Overall, UNRRA met with varying levels of success in each aspect of the rehabilitation program.  
UNRRA’s plans for rehabilitation through housing and for educational programming were strongly 
supported by the DPs.  The housing plans involved providing the DPs with as much privacy as 
possible.  In particular, they were focused on providing DP families with their own living quarters.  
They believed that this was an important part of the process of postwar normalization: after the war, 
housing each family separately would allow the DPs to reestablish normal familial relations in a way 
that was not possible if families and single people were all housed together in large barracks, and the 
DPs strongly agreed.  Similarly, the DPs strongly supported UNRRA’s efforts to organize educational 
programs for children and adults alike in the DP camps.  The DPs believed that it was important to 
provide children with educational opportunities, especially since many had not attended school 
throughout the war years.  In fact, educational programs offered the DPs the chance to not only take 
part in UNRRA’s programs, but also to organize these programs for themselves.  UNRRA saw this as 
an especially important form of rehabilitation because it made the DPs active participants in their own 
care.  Similarly, the DPs were also interested in taking part in vocational training opportunities for 
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adults.  These programs provided the DPs with skills that they could then take with them when they 
left the camps, and they were likewise organized by the DPs themselves, with administrative help 
from UNRRA. 
 UNRRA had less initial success with their plans concerning personal hygiene and acceptance 
of civil law procedures.  Once in the field it became clear that the American welfare workers did not 
share the same understanding of personal hygiene social norms as the DPs.  Their prewar lives and 
wartime experiences left many DPs unfamiliar with American understandings of personal cleanliness 
and hygiene as brought into the field by the welfare workers.  As a result, UNRRA was not 
reaffirming a prewar understanding of personal cleanliness, but in fact teaching the DPs to see 
personal cleanliness differently than they had previously.  UNRRA also had to face the very 
practical challenge of not having access to the necessary supplies that were required in order to 
keep the DP camps, and their inhabitants, sufficiently well-presented.  As a result, this was a 
slow process, and one which required lectures and reinforcement in order to bring the DPs on 
side alongside continual demands that the military supply the necessary cleaning and personal 
hygiene supplies.  Nevertheless, less than one year later the DPs had largely accepted the importance 
of personal cleanliness as evident by the fact that they no longer failed the military’s inspections of 
their camps.  A second area which required some work on the part of UNRRA was in encouraging the 
DPs to accept the importance of following local civil law provisions.  According to international law, 
if the DPs wanted their births, deaths, marriages and divorces recognized anywhere else, they had to 
register with the local authorities.  In Germany, this meant registering each of these life events with 
the German Registrar, who then provided the DPs with the corresponding legal documents.  This was 
particularly important for DPs whose relationships during and after the war had led to the birth of 
children.  UNRRA wanted to ensure that the rights of parents and children alike were protected, and 
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the surest way of accomplishing this was by ensuring that each family member had a clearly 
identifiable nationality.  Again the welfare workers had to face the practical challenges facing the 
DPs: in many case they did not possess the legal documents required, such as passports and 
birth certificates.  As a result, in many instances the DPs met with serious difficulties.  
Nevertheless, there were also many instances in which these practical constraints were 
overcome, and the DPs were successful in their efforts to register their marriages and births.  
While at first the DPs were skeptical of the necessity of registering their marriages, UNRRA officials 
successfully encouraged them to register legally and they did so because it suited their purposes.  
 UNRRA had the least success implementing two additional parts of their program: 
rehabilitation through work and respect for criminal law.  UNRRA believed that an important aspect 
of rehabilitation was providing the DPs with opportunities to take part in constructive work.  During 
the war their work had been expropriated, they had been slave labourers.  After the war, UNRRA 
recognized that they would have to work hard to once again instill in the DPs the importance of work.  
In the first months, many DPs took part in camp administration, working in the camp offices, 
kitchens, and infirmaries, and on camp wood-cutting and maintenance teams.  However, this did not 
provide enough jobs for the entire DP population.  Efforts were made to organize work projects 
outside of the camps, in local German firms, but UNRRA soon recognized that DP wartime 
experiences left them unwilling to work for Germans, or to contribute to German reconstruction in 
any way.  As a result, the only successful work projects were those which the DPs organized in the 
camps.  There were many examples of successful enterprises begun by the DPs, but the DP camps 
never reached full employment.   
Similarly, UNRRA was never wholly successful in its efforts to encourage DP respect for 
criminal law.  At the heart of their understanding of social norms was the welfare workers’ belief in 
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the importance of respect for the law.  The DPs resented the forced labour they had provided for the 
German economy during the war and the many injustices that they suffered, and they concluded that 
they were entitled to punish the Germans for their experiences.  In the first postwar months this meant 
looting, assault, robbery, and even instances of murder.  When the American military began to clamp 
down on DP crime, these relatively spontaneous outbursts increasingly turned to two more organized 
forms of crime: participation in the black market and rioting.  Many DPs did not see anything wrong 
with taking the few goods in their possession (including their share of the Red Cross parcels which 
they received in the DP camps) and trading them on the black market.  In fact, many DPs saw this as 
an extension of the prewar commerce in which they had been involved in their home communities.  
UNRRA and the military both saw participation in the black market very differently.  For UNRRA, 
participation in the black market was asocial, it was not productive work, and it would only hinder the 
reintegration of the DPs into their home communities.  For the military, DP involvement in the 
black market hindered their efforts to control prices in the short term, and to reconstitute the 
German economy over time as well.   
Based on UNRRA’s uneven success with the various aspects of the rehabilitation program, it 
is clear that the DPs approached UNRRA’s efforts critically.  When the DPs agreed that the social 
norms were in their best interest, they adopted them wholly; when they could not see the benefit, they 
refused UNRRA’s efforts to impart them.  For their part, UNRRA welfare workers approached the 
DPs as they would have approached any social work client in the United States: as an individual with 
unique strengths and distinct needs.  The welfare workers did not take into account the social and 
political organization that came to define so much of their lives in the DP camps even as the DP 
committees worked to represent their own group’s unique interests, whether they were fighting 
against Soviet repatriation efforts or demanding restitution from the Germans.    As Anna Holian 
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makes clear, while UNRRA did sort the DPs into camps according to ethnicity, they also 
believed that all DPs shared similar challenges that required similar solutions, failing to 
recognize that the DPs divided themselves according to their ethnicity and asserted their claims 
according to their separateness, not their shared identity as DPs.2  For the DPs, their identity 
was strongly tied to their ethnicity.  This was in marked contrast to the increasing emphasis 
placed by Allied governments, the military and the aid organizations on each DP’s individual 
history.  As Daniel Cohen explains, “access to the DP world became increasingly dependent on 
a decipherable and convincing narrative of persecution.”3  Group identity was no longer the 
sole criteria for eligibility, but instead only one factor taken into consideration during the many 
screenings which took place.  Each DP was now responsible for proving themselves worthy of 
receiving care, and they did this by demonstrating that they held valid objections to their 
repatriation. 
Regrettably, UNRRA failed to connect with the DP committees in their rehabilitation efforts.  
They chose not to approach the DP leadership of each group for help in implementing their plans.  
Part of the reason for this was that the DP committees came onto the scene relatively late from 
UNRRA’s point of view.  During the planning phase, they had expected the DPs to be largely 
apathetic, requiring extra encouragement to take part in any group activities.  This proved not to be 
the case, and in fact the DPs were in many ways more vocal and demanding than UNRRA had 
anticipated.  They had certainly not expected the high level of political mobilization that the DP 
committees achieved.  By the time that the DPs were well organized, UNRRA had put in place the 
broad outlines of its rehabilitation program, and did not alter it even as the DP committees became 
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increasingly important partners in the management of the camps.  A second reason why UNRRA 
failed to connect with these committees was because the DPs themselves soon learned that the 
military authorities were the ones who made all of the political decisions, and therefore the military 
was the group to approach with their complaints.  While UNRRA was responsible for their day-to-
day care, the DPs soon saw that the welfare workers were not in a position to influence policy, and 
therefore directed their protests towards the Military Government officials who were.  As a result of 
this lack of contact with the DP committees, the welfare workers did not benefit from the high level 
of organization that already existed amongst the DP population.  Instead, they chose to approach each 
DP individually, hoping to provide a plan of rehabilitation that took into account each person’s 
unique strengths, but failing to connect to the political mobilization that was taking place 
simultaneously.                         
In all aspects of rehabilitation, UNRRA was constrained by its relationship with the military 
authorities.  This was particularly true for plans that required additional supplies.  UNRRA’s idea of 
how to house the DPs was severely limited by the wartime destruction and the fact that the military 
controlled the assignment of all housing.  In order to provide the DPs with the housing hoped for by 
UNRRA, the military would have to remove the local German population, something that they were 
unwilling to do.  In some instances DP families were provided with individual dwellings, but for the 
vast majority of DPs, housing was either in former army barracks or other large, open buildings that 
were easy for the military to monitor.  Similarly, UNRRA’s efforts to instill their understanding of 
personal hygiene were restricted by the lack of cleaning supplies in the DP camps.  American military 
inspectors of the camps chastised the DPs and UNRRA staff alike: the DPs for failing to keep their 
persons and their dwellings at the level of cleanliness expected by the military; and the UNRRA 
workers for not instilling these ideals in the DPs quickly and thoroughly enough.  The military 
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refused to take into consideration the fact that the DP camps were severely undersupplied, especially 
in terms of simple cleaning products like soap, toothbrushes, and lye for cleaning.  Only in the early 
part of 1946 did supplies begin to arrive regularly in the camps, and soon there were far fewer 
problems with camp inspections.  Similarly, UNRRA’s education, vocational training and work 
programs were all severely limited by a lack of supplies.  UNRRA soon turned to the voluntary 
agencies for help in locating supplies for the educational programs.  They were less successful in their 
efforts to encourage the military to provide raw materials from German stocks for DP use. 
 The continued care and maintenance of the hardcore DPs, those who refused repatriation, 
came to a head in the fall of 1946.  UNRRA could not continue to care for the DPs indefinitely; the 
cost was too high, and the international support was no longer there.  It was clear that if the DPs 
would not agree to repatriation, then a program of resettlement was needed.  Unfortunately, the Soviet 
Union strongly opposed any move to allow UNRRA to alter its mandate.  They continued to call for 
the return of their nationals, regardless of DP wishes.  As a result, in the fall of 1946 plans were 
underway for a successor agency to take over for UNRRA, one that would have the power to work 
towards resettlement as well as repatriation.  In December 1946, the constitution of the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) was presented by the United Nations Economic and Security Council, a 
move vehemently rejected by the Soviets.  While handover from UNRRA was scheduled to take 
place at the end of 1946, this was later adjusted to 1 July 1947.  On this date, the IRO took 
responsibility for the nearly 560,000 remaining displaced persons in Germany.4  With a substantially 
reduced budget from that available to UNRRA, the IRO set out to further consolidate UNRRA’s DP 
camps so that a minimal of international staff would be required to administer them.  The IRO 
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inherited many of the same staff members, and also UNRRA’s policies and procedures, based on their 
years of experience running the DP camps.   
  
 In its four years of existence, UNRRA came to redefine the landscape of international aid.  
As an international organization with no previous institutional experience and a staff whose training 
was ad-hoc and inconsistent, UNRRA’s work ensured that rehabilitation has become a central aspect 
of humanitarian work.  UNRRA was never entirely successful in its rehabilitation program; it 
encountered numerous obstacles along the way.  Since then, other organizations have worked to build 
on UNRRA’s model and improve the chances for a successful integration of refugees into their 
societies, whether they return home or settle abroad, and while understandings of what comprises 
rehabilitation may have changed since, UNRRA’s work brought to the forefront the importance of 
rehabilitation alongside relief.  While many agencies have since continued to administer relief alone, 
rehabilitation has now become a central part of the dialogue.  As the British Quaker Bertha Bracey 
made clear, UNRRA had succeeded in ensuring that the discussion surrounding aid, whether in 
Europe’s postwar DPs camps or under the care of other organizations since then, has included the 
provision of welfare services which encourage individuals to become self-reliant, disciplined 
members of their communities, and not simply “helpless recipients of food and clothing.”5 
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